promise immunity in New York

2026Nothing in the record suggests that defendant was induced to accept a plea by the promise of a waiver of any surcharge or fees ( Prihett , 279 AD2d at 335 ).

2025Contrary to the defendants' contentions, the plaintiff was not required to plead unconscionable injury ( see id. ) because she was not attempting to enforce a promise in violation of the statute of frauds ( see Bent v St.

2025Contrary to the defendants' contentions, the plaintiff was not required to plead unconscionable injury ( see id. ) because she was not attempting to enforce a promise in violation of the statute of frauds ( see Bent v St.

1992Defendant’s reliance upon People v Urowsky ( 89 AD2d 520 ) is misplaced.

1989Nor was the statement elicited by any threats or the promise of immunity (see, People v Boone, 22 NY2d 476 ).

1988The prosecutor testified that defendant told him that he could not go through with the agreement to cooperate; that he "could not go ahead and testify before the grand jury.” Moreover, complete immunity from prosecution may be obtained only by strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the immunity statutes (People v Laino, 10 NY2d 161, 163 , appeal dismissed and cert denied 374 US 104 ; People v Flihan, 131 AD2d 269, 271 ).

1988The prosecutor testified that defendant told him that he could not go through with the agreement to cooperate; that he "could not go ahead and testify before the grand jury.” Moreover, complete immunity from prosecution may be obtained only by strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the immunity statutes (People v Laino, 10 NY2d 161, 163 , appeal dismissed and cert denied 374 US 104 ; People v Flihan, 131 AD2d 269, 271 ).

1988The prosecutor testified that defendant told him that he could not go through with the agreement to cooperate; that he "could not go ahead and testify before the grand jury.” Moreover, complete immunity from prosecution may be obtained only by strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the immunity statutes (People v Laino, 10 NY2d 161, 163 , appeal dismissed and cert denied 374 US 104 ; People v Flihan, 131 AD2d 269, 271 ).

1983(See People v Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 35-36 .) The defendant stated on video tape that he was not in Manhattan that night, but in The Bronx.

1975This case is clearly distinguishable from Johnson v Board of Educ. of City of Rochester ( 33 AD2d 647 ), because the facts here are not based upon affidavits alone.

1971(People v. Kurtz, 42 Hun 335 ; People v. Chapman, 224 N.Y. 463 ; see People v. Caserino, 16 N Y 2d 255.) On this record it is our opinion that it was not error for the Trial Judge to receive the statement in evidence.

1960(See People v. Mummiani, 258 N. Y. 394, 396 ; People v. Elmore, 277 N. Y. 397, 404 .) ” The illegality of the detention would not necessarily mean that the alleged confession would have to be rejected, but the jury should have been instructed that such illegality could be considered in determining whether its contents should be disregarded because it was made under the influence of fear produced by threats or under a promise of immunity by the District Attorney (Code Grim.

1960(See People v. Mummiani, 258 N. Y. 394, 396 ; People v. Elmore, 277 N. Y. 397, 404 .) ” The illegality of the detention would not necessarily mean that the alleged confession would have to be rejected, but the jury should have been instructed that such illegality could be considered in determining whether its contents should be disregarded because it was made under the influence of fear produced by threats or under a promise of immunity by the District Attorney (Code Grim.

1929This presumption may be rebutted by proof that both parties contemplated that the work was to be done without remuneration, or that the workman as a reasonable man should from the circumstances have realized that the other party did not expect to pay for the work.” (Alexander v. Automatic Mail Delivery Co., 123 N. Y.

1910(Rice v. Eureka Paper Company, 174 N. Y. 385 .) The effect of such a promise is a waiver by the master of his right to assert as a defense the servant’s assumption of risk incident to using the defective tool or appliance. .(Obanhein v. Arbuckle, 80 App. Div. 465 .) Proof, therefore, of such a promise is not a substantive part of a plaintiff’s case, but is in the nature of rebuttal to the defense of assumption of risk claimed by the master.

1910(Rice v. Eureka Paper Company, 174 N. Y. 385 .) The effect of such a promise is a waiver by the master of his right to assert as a defense the servant’s assumption of risk incident to using the defective tool or appliance. .(Obanhein v. Arbuckle, 80 App. Div. 465 .) Proof, therefore, of such a promise is not a substantive part of a plaintiff’s case, but is in the nature of rebuttal to the defense of assumption of risk claimed by the master.

1881(Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet., 113 ; Rochester City Bank v. Elwood, 21 N. Y., 90 ; Rindge v. Judson, 24 id., 64; Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. [U. S.], 426.) The drafts drawn by Bingham Bros, are within the contract of defendants.

1867(Id.) A new promise is a waiver of it in case of contracts, by rebutting the presumption of payment involved in it, (Sluby v. Champlin, 4 John. 461 ,) although such rebuttal is not admissible in case of torts.

1867(Oothout v. Thompson, 20 John. 277 .) In equity, such statute was held not to interfere with the right of enforcing a lien on lands for a debt more than six years old.