15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Borries v. Z. Frank, Inc.green2 sentences2008Frank, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 263, 266 , 226 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1967). 2008Frank, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 263, 266 , 226 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1967). | 2 | 2 |
Ciborowski v. Philip Dressler & Associatesgreen1 sentence2019Ciborowski v. Philip Dressler & Associates, 110 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Priestly v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1963The reason underlying this rule was thus explained by Mr. Justice Traynor in Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 812, 818 , 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958) : “If an officer were allowed to establish unimpeachably the lawfulness of a search merely by testifying that he received justifying information from a reliable person whose identity cannot be revealed, he would become the sole judge of what is probable cause to make the search. 1963The reason underlying this rule was thus explained by Mr. Justice Traynor in Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 812, 818 , 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958) : “If an officer were allowed to establish unimpeachably the lawfulness of a search merely by testifying that he received justifying information from a reliable person whose identity cannot be revealed, he would become the sole judge of what is probable cause to make the search. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Showalter v. Western Pacific Railroad
green
2 sentences1990Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.’ The rule has been succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of California: ‘When, a declaration is 1990Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.’ The rule has been succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of California: ‘When, a declaration is | 3 | 1961–1990 |
Ahmed v. Pickwick Place Owners' Ass'n
green
2 sentences2011“Our supreme court has 29 1-09-3053 explained that the reason underlying this rule is based upon a recognition that ‘a jury more clearly understands a particularized special interrogatory than a [general verdict, which is] a composite of all the questions in a case.’ ” Ahmed, 385 Ill. 2011“Our supreme court has explained that the reason underlying this rule is based upon a recognition that ‘a jury more clearly understands a particularized special interrogatory than a [general verdict, which is] a composite of all the questions in a case.’ ” Ahmed, 385 Ill. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Tyrrell v. Ward
green
2 sentences1943This doctrine was defined by this court in Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt, 168 Ill. 618 , as that ‘which results from an equitable right springing from an express agreement with the debtor, by which one advances money to pay a claim for. the security of which there exists a lien, by which agreement he is to have an equal lien to that paid off, whereupon he is entitled to the benefit of the security which he has satisfied, with the expectation of receiving an equal lien.’ The reason underlying the rule was stated as follows: ‘ This equitable principle is enforced solely for the accomplishment o 1938(Tyrrell v. Ward, 102 Ill. 29 .) In that case we held that Bayard, who advanced the money, was subrogated to all the rights of the prior lien holders, and that equity must treat the transaction as an assignment to him,of the prior mortgage. | 2 | 1938–1943 |
Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt
green
2 sentences1943This doctrine was defined by this court in Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt, 168 Ill. 618 , as that ‘which results from an equitable right springing from an express agreement with the debtor, by which one advances money to pay a claim for. the security of which there exists a lien, by which agreement he is to have an equal lien to that paid off, whereupon he is entitled to the benefit of the security which he has satisfied, with the expectation of receiving an equal lien.’ The reason underlying the rule was stated as follows: ‘ This equitable principle is enforced solely for the accomplishment o 1938This doctrine was defined by this court in Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt, 168 Ill. 618 , as that “which results from an equitable right springing from an express agreement with the debtor, by which one advances money to pay a claim for the security of which there exists a lien, by which agreement he is to have an equal lien to that paid off, whereupon he is entitled to the benefit of the security which he has satisfied, with the expectation of receiving an equal lien.” The reason underlying the rule was stated as follows: “This equitable principle is enforced solely for the accomplishment of | 2 | 1938–1943 |
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co.
green
2 sentences1943(Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102 ; Thompson on Trials, — 2d ed. — .sec. 1081.) The reason underlying this rule is manifest. 1923(Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co. 301 Ill. 102 ; Thompson on Trials, — 2d ed. — sec. 1081.) The reason underlying this rule is manifest. | 2 | 1923–1943 |
Balough v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad
green
1 sentence2019"An inconsistency exists where the special finding and the general verdict are clearly and absolutely irreconcilable. [Citation.] Where the court finds the answer to the special interrogatory absolutely irreconcilable with the verdict, and if the answer to the special finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the special finding controls, and a judgment may be entered based on the special finding rather than on the general verdict. [Citations.] Our supreme court has explained that the reason underlying this rule is based upon a recognition that a jury more clearly understands | 1 | 2019–2019 |
The People v. Halkens
green
1 sentence1966People v. Halkens, 386 Ill 167, 179, 53 NE2d 923 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
People Ex Rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman
green
1 sentence1964The reason underlying this principle was well expressed in People v. Goodman, 366 Ill 346, 8 NE2d 941 (1937). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.