reason underlying rule in California

2023“Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.” [Citation.]’ ” (Regents of University of Cal. v. Superior Court of Alameda County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 533, 536 (Regents); cf. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 74 Cal.App.2d at p. 300 [“It is well established that general terms of a statute will not be construed as including government if the statute would operate

2009(Ibid.) “ ‘ “Where ... no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 533, 536 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 551 P.2d 844 ].) Nevertheless, “[w]hile the ‘sovereign powers’ principle can help resolve an unclear legislative intent, it cannot override positive indicia of a contrary legislative intent.” (Wells v. One2One L

2023As explained in Los Angeles v. San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199 (Los Angeles), the rule Kaiser invokes here—excluding governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions—applies “only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.’ ” (Id. at pp. 276-277.)

2023As explained in Los Angeles v. San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199 (Los Angeles), the rule Kaiser invokes here—excluding governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions—applies “only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.’ ” (Id. at pp. 276-277.)

1992"Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only." (Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 399 , 402 . . . .)' (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 276-277 .)" Applying these governing principles of statutory interpretation, we find that the Act uses only general language in describing the persons and entities that are

1992In City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 276-297 , the Supreme Court observed: "[I]n the absence of express words to the contrary, neither the state nor its subdivisions are included within the general words of a statute. [Citations.] But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. `Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may

1965(Work v. Associated Almond Growers, 102 Cal.App. 232, 235 [ 282 P. 965 ].) The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.

1965(Work v. Associated Almond Growers, 102 Cal.App. 232, 235 [ 282 P. 965 ].) The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.

1960Co., 20 Cal.2d 751 at page 761 [ 128 P.2d 665 ] as follows: “Also applicable here is the familiar rule that when a contract is ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court.” The court explained the rationale of this rule as follows ( 20 Cal.2d at p. 761 ) : “The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not whol

1960Co., 20 Cal.2d 751 at page 761 [ 128 P.2d 665 ] as follows: “Also applicable here is the familiar rule that when a contract is ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court.” The court explained the rationale of this rule as follows ( 20 Cal.2d at p. 761 ) : “The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not whol

1992In City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 276-297 , the Supreme Court observed: "[I]n the absence of express words to the contrary, neither the state nor its subdivisions are included within the general words of a statute. [Citations.] But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. `Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may

1975“Where ... no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.” (Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 399, 402 [ 132 P.2d 804 ]; see Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 933 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 496 P.2d 480 ]; Flournoy v. State of California (1962) 57 Cal.2d 497, 498-499 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 627 , 370 P.2d 331 ]; State of California v. Marin Mun.

1969Co. (1942) supra, 20 Cal.2d 751, 761 ; Kales v. Houghton (1923) 190 Cal. 294, 300 [ 212 P. 21 ].) “The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon *401 the instrument is the best evidence of their intention. ” (Rosen v. E.

1962Co., 20 Cal.2d 751, 761 [ 128 P.2d 665 ].) The rule is thus rationalized in the cited case (p. 761) : “The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention [citations].

1985Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 302, 305 [ 202 P. 37 , 19 A.L.R. 452 ].) But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.’ ” (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199,

1985Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 302, 305 [ 202 P. 37 , 19 A.L.R. 452 ].) But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.’ ” (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199,

2023We reach the same conclusion with respect to the other purportedly omitted material terms identified by Perdue--terms related to Perdue’s responsibility to maintain and repair the Suckle well. 19 Finally, we reject Perdue’s contention that the postclosing conduct of the parties demonstrates that the terms of section 3.6 of the PSA were not binding. “ ‘[W]hen a contract is ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when reasonable, be adopted

2013(Rest.2d Contracts, § 134.) Second, to the extent the Trial Plan Agreement is ambiguous, the April 5, 2010 letter is relevant under the practical construction doctrine in determining Chase Bank’s intent. “ ‘[W]hen a contract is ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court. [Citation.] The reason underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the p

1994The prejudice factor toward the defendant, although much less than the situation where the defendant is shackled, provides a valid point of comparison even though the shackled witness cases do not directly affect the presumption of innocence.” ( 487 F.2d at p. 105, fn. 5 , italics added.) In People v. Valenzuela, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 180 , the limited effect restraints have upon a jury’s perception of an incarcerated witness’s credibility was discussed: “Assuming, arguendo, that knowledge a person is currently incarcerated in prison permits an inference of diminished credibility, that inferen

1984The prejudice factor toward the defendant, although much less than the situation where the defendant is shackled, provides a valid point of comparison even though the shackled witness cases do not directly affect the presumption of innocence.” (Kennedy, supra, 487 F.2d at p. 105, fn. 5 .) Assuming, arguendo, that knowledge a person is currently incarcerated in prison permits an inference of diminished credibility, that inference is drawn by the jury as soon as they learn the witness is an inmate; the presence of shackles is superfluous to that concern.

1976There is a general rule of statutory interpretation that, in the absence of a specific expression of legislative intent, statutory language should not be construed to apply to governmental bodies where such interpretation would result in the infringement of “sovereign governmental powers.” (Estate of Miller, 5 Cal.2d 588, 597 [ 55 P.2d 491 ]; Bayshore Sanitary Dist. v. San Mateo, 48 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 [ 119 P.2d 752 ], and cases there cited.) “But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement

1976There is a general rule of statutory interpretation that, in the absence of a specific expression of legislative intent, statutory language should not be construed to apply to governmental bodies where such interpretation would result in the infringement of “sovereign governmental powers.” (Estate of Miller, 5 Cal.2d 588, 597 [ 55 P.2d 491 ]; Bayshore Sanitary Dist. v. San Mateo, 48 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 [ 119 P.2d 752 ], and cases there cited.) “But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement

1976(People v. Centr-O-Mart, 34 Cal.2d 702, 703 [ 214 P.2d 378 ]; Estate of Miller, 5 Cal.2d 588, 597 [ 55 P.2d 491 ].) However, this broad statement has received narrower application, so that governmental agencies are excluded “from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where ... no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even

1976(People v. Centr-O-Mart, 34 Cal.2d 702, 703 [ 214 P.2d 378 ]; Estate of Miller, 5 Cal.2d 588, 597 [ 55 P.2d 491 ].) However, this broad statement has received narrower application, so that governmental agencies are excluded “from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where ... no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even

1962(See Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.2d 140, 150 [ 82 P.2d 434 , 126 A.L.R. 838 ].) However, it has been held that, where no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist.

1962(See Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.2d 140, 150 [ 82 P.2d 434 , 126 A.L.R. 838 ].) However, it has been held that, where no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist.

2023“Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.” [Citation.]’ ” (Regents of University of Cal. v. Superior Court of Alameda County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 533, 536 (Regents); cf. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 74 Cal.App.2d at p. 300 [“It is well established that general terms of a statute will not be construed as including government if the statute would operate

1976(People v. Centr-O-Mart, 34 Cal.2d 702, 703 [ 214 P.2d 378 ]; Estate of Miller, 5 Cal.2d 588, 597 [ 55 P.2d 491 ].) However, this broad statement has received narrower application, so that governmental agencies are excluded “from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where ... no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even

1992Water District (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 699, 704-705 ; Fair Political Practices Com. v. Suitee (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 125, 132-133 ; Siegel v. City of Oakland (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 351, 356-357 ; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 595, 602 ; see also Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 533, 536-537 .) For purposes of the Vehicle Code, a "person" is defined in section 470 as follows: "`Person' includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation." We have previously determined, after applying the governing principles of statutory construction, t

1965(See State of California v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., 17 Cal.2d 699, 704 [ 111 P.2d 651 ].) For reasons set forth hereafter we think that the latter rule is the one which applies under the facts of the present ease.

1985Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 302, 305 [ 202 P. 37 , 19 A.L.R. 452 ].) But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.’ ” (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199,

1985Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 302, 305 [ 202 P. 37 , 19 A.L.R. 452 ].) But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the operation of general statutory provisions only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. ‘Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.’ ” (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199,

2008Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 761-762 [ 128 P.2d 665 ].) “The conduct of the parties after execution of the contract and before any controversy has arisen as to its effect affords the most reliable evidence of the parties’ intentions.” (Kennecott Corp. v. Union Oil Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1179, 1189 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 403 ].) “This rule of practical construction is predicated on the common sense concept that ‘actions speak louder than words.’ Words are frequently but an imperfect medium to convey thought and intention.

2008Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 761-762 [ 128 P.2d 665 ].) “The conduct of the parties after execution of the contract and before any controversy has arisen as to its effect affords the most reliable evidence of the parties’ intentions.” (Kennecott Corp. v. Union Oil Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1179, 1189 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 403 ].) “This rule of practical construction is predicated on the common sense concept that ‘actions speak louder than words.’ Words are frequently but an imperfect medium to convey thought and intention.

2008Code, § 1303, subd. (f); see Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1379, 1388 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 ] [conduct antithetical to a term of a written contract which induces the other party to rely on the conduct can amount to a modification of the contract].) The rationale for the admission of course of performance evidence is a practical one. “[W]hen a contract is ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when reason

2008Code, § 1303, subd. (f); see Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1379, 1388 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 ] [conduct antithetical to a term of a written contract which induces the other party to rely on the conduct can amount to a modification of the contract].) The rationale for the admission of course of performance evidence is a practical one. “[W]hen a contract is ambiguous, a construction given to it by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when reason