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5 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1915–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Briggs v. Clinton County Bank & Trust Co. of Frankfortgreen2 sentences2006Regarding privileges as applied to purportedly defamatory judicial complaints, we stated in Briggs v. Clinton County Bank & Trust Co., 452 N.E.2d 989, 997 (Ind.Ct.App.1983), trans. denied, that "parties ... are absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter in the course of judicial proceedings, with the qualification that the statements must be pertinent and relevant to the case." We explained the rationale for applying that privilege as follows: - The reason underlying this doctrine is that public interest in the freedom of expression by participants in judicial proceedings, uninhibited 2006Regarding privileges as applied to purportedly defamatory judicial complaints, we stated in Briggs v. Clinton County Bank & Trust Co., 452 N.E.2d 989, 997 (Ind.Ct.App.1983), trans. denied, that "parties . . . are absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter in the course of judicial proceedings, with the qualification that the statements must be pertinent and relevant to the case." We explained the rationale for applying that privilege as follows: The reason underlying this doctrine is that public interest in the freedom of expression by participants in judicial proceedings, uninhibited | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc.green1 sentence2015Specifically, requiring a party to raise an issue to the administrative agency first provides “an agency with an opportunity ‘to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of [the agency’s] experience and expertise, and to compile a [factual] record which is adequate for judicial review.” Johnson v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc., 829 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ind. 2005) (explaining the policy considerations of the exhaustion doctrine in administrative proceedings) (citations omitted) (brackets in original). [16] It simply is not clear whether DNR raised the issues in its pet | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cablevision of Chicago v. Colby Cable Corp.
green
1 sentence2015The reason underlying the rule is that ‘ “if laches, waiver or estoppel did apply against the public, a dishonest, incompetent or negligent public official could wreck the interests of the public.’” Id. (quoting State v. Roberts, 226 Ind. 106, 134 , 78 N.E.2d 440 , 446 (1948), disapproved on other grounds by State ex rel. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Roberts
green
1 sentence2015The reason underlying the rule is that ‘ “if laches, waiver or estoppel did apply against the public, a dishonest, incompetent or negligent public official could wreck the interests of the public.’” Id. (quoting State v. Roberts, 226 Ind. 106, 134 , 78 N.E.2d 440 , 446 (1948), disapproved on other grounds by State ex rel. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State Ex Rel. Indiana Department of Conservation v. Pulaski Circuit Court
green
2 sentences2015Indiana Dept. of Conservation v. Pulaski Circuit Court, 231 Ind. 245 , 108 N.E.2d 185 (1952)). 2015Indiana Dept. of Conservation v. Pulaski Circuit Court, 231 Ind. 245 , 108 N.E.2d 185 (1952)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Reissner v. Oxley
neutral
1 sentence1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Pate v. French
green
2 sentences1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Roush v. Roush
green
2 sentences1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Smith v. Board of Commissioners
neutral
2 sentences1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herrman
neutral
2 sentences1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 1915The reason underlying this rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention.” See, Pate v. French (1890), 122 Ind. 10 , 23 N. E. 673 ; Reissner v. Oxley (1881), 80 Ind. 580 ; Roush v. Roush (1900), 154 Ind. 562 , 55 N. E. 1017 ; Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herman (1893), 7 Ind. App. 462 , 34 N. E. 579 ; Smith v. Board, etc. (1893), 6 Ind. App. 1 | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Merchants' & Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Fraze
neutral
2 sentences1915Bank v. Fraze (1894), 9 Ind. App. 161 , 36 N. E. 378 , 53 Am. 1915Bank v. Fraze (1894), 9 Ind. App. 161 , 36 N. E. 378 , 53 Am. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.