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9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haber v. Habergreen2 sentences2022We explained our reasoning in Haber as follows: The reason underlying this rule is that the very theory and constitution of a court of appellate jurisdiction is only the correction of errors which a court below may have committed, and a court below cannot be said to have committed an error when its judgment was never called into exercise, and the point of law was never taken into consideration, but was abandoned by acquiescence or default of the party who raised it. [Haber, 253 N.J. 2022We explained our reasoning in Haber as follows: The reason underlying this rule is that the very theory and constitution of a court of appellate jurisdiction is only the correction of errors which a court below may have committed, and a court below cannot be said to have committed an error when its judgment was never called into exercise, and the point of law was never taken into consideration, but was abandoned by acquiescence or default of the party who raised it. [Haber, 253 N.J. | 1 | 5 |
Matter of Estate of Siegelgreen1 sentence2025In McDermott, we explained: The reason underlying this rule is that the very theory and constitution of a court of appellate jurisdiction is only the correction of errors[,] which a [trial] court . . . may have committed, and a [trial] court . . . cannot be said to have committed an error when its judgment was never called into exercise, and the point of law was never taken into consideration, but was abandoned by acquiescence or default of the party who raised it. [ 122 N.J.L. at 84 (citing Walter, 98 N.J.L. at 826 ); see In re Est. of Siegel, 214 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDermott v. City of Paterson
green
2 sentences2025In McDermott, we explained: The reason underlying this rule is that the very theory and constitution of a court of appellate jurisdiction is only the correction of errors[,] which a [trial] court . . . may have committed, and a [trial] court . . . cannot be said to have committed an error when its judgment was never called into exercise, and the point of law was never taken into consideration, but was abandoned by acquiescence or default of the party who raised it. [ 122 N.J.L. at 84 (citing Walter, 98 N.J.L. at 826 ); see In re Est. of Siegel, 214 N.J. 2022Super. at 416 (quoting McDermott, 122 N.J.L. at 84 ).] Thus, "[t]he proper course is to apply to the trial court to vacate the judgment[]"under Rule 4:50-1.2 Ibid. (citing Walter, 98 N.J.L. at 827 ). | 4 | 1992–2025 |
Walter v. Keuthe
green
2 sentences2025In McDermott, we explained: The reason underlying this rule is that the very theory and constitution of a court of appellate jurisdiction is only the correction of errors[,] which a [trial] court . . . may have committed, and a [trial] court . . . cannot be said to have committed an error when its judgment was never called into exercise, and the point of law was never taken into consideration, but was abandoned by acquiescence or default of the party who raised it. [ 122 N.J.L. at 84 (citing Walter, 98 N.J.L. at 826 ); see In re Est. of Siegel, 214 N.J. 2022Super. at 416 (quoting McDermott, 122 N.J.L. at 84 ).] Thus, "[t]he proper course is to apply to the trial court to vacate the judgment[]"under Rule 4:50-1.2 Ibid. (citing Walter, 98 N.J.L. at 827 ). | 3 | 1992–2025 |
Biro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
green
1 sentence1988Biro, 110 N.J. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Coster v. Coster
green
2 sentences1950Therefore, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a right of action in one spouse against the other for the commission of a personal tort existing prior to the marriage is extinguished by the marriage." The same line of reasoning was used in the case of Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415 , 55 S.W. 2d 263 , and Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438 , 46 N.E. 2d 509 . 1950Therefore, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a right of action in one spouse against the other for the commission of a personal tort existing prior to the marriage is extinguished by the marriage." The same line of reasoning was used in the case of Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415 , 55 S.W. 2d 263 , and Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438 , 46 N.E. 2d 509 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Raines v. Mercer
green
2 sentences1950Therefore, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a right of action in one spouse against the other for the commission of a personal tort existing prior to the marriage is extinguished by the marriage." The same line of reasoning was used in the case of Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415 , 55 S.W. 2d 263 , and Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438 , 46 N.E. 2d 509 . 1950Therefore, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a right of action in one spouse against the other for the commission of a personal tort existing prior to the marriage is extinguished by the marriage." The same line of reasoning was used in the case of Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415 , 55 S.W. 2d 263 , and Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438 , 46 N.E. 2d 509 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Bowen v. State Highway Commission
green
1 sentence1928The reason underlying the rule of practice as above indicated, is tersely stated in Donnelly v. State, supra, by Chief Justice Green, who, speaking for the Supreme Court (at p. 512), said: “So in the assignment the grounds or errors should be specified. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.