15 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensengreen2 sentences2024We only recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations if: “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 238 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207 , 229–30 15 (2013). 2022And, the Court has applied the doctrine of “judicial tolling” when “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Christensen, 394 Md. at 238 .48 Certainly, the tolling of a statute of limitations is a subject that also lies within the sphere of the legislative branch; as this Court has noted, “the harshness” of the general rule that the limitations period runs upon the occurren | 3 | 11 |
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utahgreen2 sentences2006First, they contend that this Court’s precedents preclude judicial recognition of a tolling exception to a statute of limitations such as the class action tolling exception *236 recognized by the Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 , 94 S.Ct. 756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), maintaining that the creation of such an exception is the exclusive prerogative of the General Assembly. 2006First, they contend that this Court’s precedents preclude judicial recognition of a tolling exception to a statute of limitations such as the class action tolling exception *236 recognized by the Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 , 94 S.Ct. 756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), maintaining that the creation of such an exception is the exclusive prerogative of the General Assembly. | 2 | 4 |
Cain v. Midland Fundinggreen2 sentences2022Judicial tolling is appropriate in a particular case if a two-part test is met: “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Id.; see also Cain, 475 Md. at 53-69 . 2022Judicial tolling is appropriate in a particular case if a two-part test is met: “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Id.; see also Cain, 475 Md. at 53-69 . | 2 | 2 |
Poffenberger v. Rissergreen2 sentences2022And, the Court has applied the doctrine of “judicial tolling” when “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Christensen, 394 Md. at 238 .48 Certainly, the tolling of a statute of limitations is a subject that also lies within the sphere of the legislative branch; as this Court has noted, “the harshness” of the general rule that the limitations period runs upon the occurren 2022And, the Court has applied the doctrine of “judicial tolling” when “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Christensen, 394 Md. at 238 .48 Certainly, the tolling of a statute of limitations is a subject that also lies within the sphere of the legislative branch; as this Court has noted, “the harshness” of the general rule that the limitations period runs upon the occurren | 2 | 2 |
Burket v. Aldridge, Adm'rgreen2 sentences2021We noted the several instances in which we declined to recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations where the exception in question failed to meet one or more of the Bertonazzi requirements.26 Id. at 240–41. 26 See, e.g., Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207 (1977) (declining to recognize a tolling exception to the three-year statute of limitations on tolling actions where the appellant argued that the statute was tolled during the pendency of its motion to intervene in another suit involving the appellee in the United States District Court for the District of Columb 2006See, e.g., Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 624-25 , 500 A.2d 641, 645-46 (1985) (declining to recognize a tolling exception that would suspend the running of the statute of limitations applicable to a claim based on negligent installation of a product during the time that the installer of the product attempted to repair the product because there was *241 authority only for the proposition that the initiation of repairs suspends the running of the statute of limitations on a theory of equitable estoppel, and, under Maryland law, equitable estoppel can suspend the running of | 2 | 2 |
Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2021We noted the several instances in which we declined to recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations where the exception in question failed to meet one or more of the Bertonazzi requirements.26 Id. at 240–41. 26 See, e.g., Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207 (1977) (declining to recognize a tolling exception to the three-year statute of limitations on tolling actions where the appellant argued that the statute was tolled during the pendency of its motion to intervene in another suit involving the appellee in the United States District Court for the District of Columb 2006For instance, in Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef, 281 Md. 207 , 378 A.2d 1100 (1977), we declined to recognize a tolling exception to the default three year statute of limitations on civil actions. | 1 | 4 |
Bertonazzi v. Hillman, Adm'xgreen2 sentences2011It discussed Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361 , 216 A.2d 723 (1966), in which it had recognized a tolling exception. 2011It discussed Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361 , 216 A.2d 723 (1966), in which it had recognized a tolling exception. | 1 | 4 |
Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp.green2 sentences2021We noted the several instances in which we declined to recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations where the exception in question failed to meet one or more of the Bertonazzi requirements.26 Id. at 240–41. 26 See, e.g., Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207 (1977) (declining to recognize a tolling exception to the three-year statute of limitations on tolling actions where the appellant argued that the statute was tolled during the pendency of its motion to intervene in another suit involving the appellee in the United States District Court for the District of Columb 2006See, e.g., Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 624-25 , 500 A.2d 641, 645-46 (1985) (declining to recognize a tolling exception that would suspend the running of the statute of limitations applicable to a claim based on negligent installation of a product during the time that the installer of the product attempted to repair the product because there was *241 authority only for the proposition that the initiation of repairs suspends the running of the statute of limitations on a theory of equitable estoppel, and, under Maryland law, equitable estoppel can suspend the running of | 1 | 3 |
McDonald v. Boslowgreen1 sentence2016McDonald v. Boslow, 363 F.Supp. 493, 496 (D.Md.1973) (“commitment to Patuxent is not, in and of itself, an adjudication of non compos status sufficient to toll the statute”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Fosamax Products Liability Litigationgreen1 sentence2013Liability Litigation, 694 F.Supp.2d 253, 258 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“The Court has no reason to believe that Virginia would join the few states that currently recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, and thus it refuses to expand Virginia law in that manner.”); In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 663 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1082 (D.Kan.2009) (“[Because] Indiana courts have not considered the issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling[,] ... the Court decline[d] to import a new tolling rule into the state’s limitations law.”) (additional citations omitted); Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Vioxx Products Liability Litigationgreen1 sentence2013Liability Litigation, 522 F.Supp.2d 799, 809-811 (E.D.La.2007) (Although both Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico recognized class action tolling, their doctrines did not extend to cross-jurisdictional tolling). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Urethane Antitrust Litigationgreen1 sentence2013Liability Litigation, 694 F.Supp.2d 253, 258 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“The Court has no reason to believe that Virginia would join the few states that currently recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, and thus it refuses to expand Virginia law in that manner.”); In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 663 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1082 (D.Kan.2009) (“[Because] Indiana courts have not considered the issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling[,] ... the Court decline[d] to import a new tolling rule into the state’s limitations law.”) (additional citations omitted); Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1 | 1 | 1 |
Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.green1 sentence2013Liability Litigation, 694 F.Supp.2d 253, 258 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“The Court has no reason to believe that Virginia would join the few states that currently recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, and thus it refuses to expand Virginia law in that manner.”); In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 663 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1082 (D.Kan.2009) (“[Because] Indiana courts have not considered the issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling[,] ... the Court decline[d] to import a new tolling rule into the state’s limitations law.”) (additional citations omitted); Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1 | 1 | 1 |
Swam v. Upper Chesapeake Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2012The second component of the Philip Morris test was met because recognizing a tolling exception “would not contravene the general purpose of the statute of limitations” as the hospital had notice of the Swams’ claims within three years of the injury such that the claims were not “so stale as to be *207 unjust.” Swam, 397 Md. at 544 , 919 A.2d at 42 (quotation omitted). 2012The second component of the Philip Morris test was met because recognizing a tolling exception “would not contravene the general purpose of the statute of limitations” as the hospital had notice of the Swams’ claims within three years of the injury such that the claims were not “so stale as to be *207 unjust.” Swam, 397 Md. at 544 , 919 A.2d at 42 (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Weaver v. Leimangreen1 sentence2006See id. at 366-67 , 216 A.2d at 726 (noting that our interpretation of the statute of limitations at issue in Bertonazzi “is consistent with the purposes and aims of limitation statutes generally” and “is supported by eminent and persua *239 sive authority”); see also Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708, 718 (1880) (observing that running of a statute of limitations may be suspended if there is a “certain and well-defined exception clearly established by judicial authority” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jinks v. Richland County
green
1 sentence2025“To prevent the limitations period” for supplemental claims “from expiring while the plaintiff was fruitlessly pursuing them in federal court, § 1367(d) provides a tolling rule that must be applied by state courts[.]” Jinks v. Richland County, S.C., 538 U.S. at 459 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mummert v. Alizadeh
green
1 sentence2024We only recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations if: “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 238 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207 , 229–30 15 (2013). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co.
green
2 sentences2021We observed that “[c]lass action procedures are designed to promote these ends by preventing duplication, permitting when possible the claims of large classes of persons to be litigated at once[,]” as opposed to individual claims “or as a joint action in order to avoid unnecessary repeated litigation year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions upon the alleged tortfeasor’s death because the absence of an express statute provision providing for such tolling was understandable in “light of the purposes of [the] Statute of Limitations”); McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 15 2021We observed that “[c]lass action procedures are designed to promote these ends by preventing duplication, permitting when possible the claims of large classes of persons to be litigated at once[,]” as opposed to individual claims “or as a joint action in order to avoid unnecessary repeated litigation year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions upon the alleged tortfeasor’s death because the absence of an express statute provision providing for such tolling was understandable in “light of the purposes of [the] Statute of Limitations”); McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 15 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Funk v. Wingert
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 526 , 107 A. 345 . 2016Id. at 526 , 107 A. 345 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Pepper
green
2 sentences2016Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 216 , 808 A.2d 508 (2002) (“if the parents’ failure to bring a claim before the expiration of limitations had the effect of barring the minor child’s claim, the child would be twice victimized — once at the hands of the *488 tortfeasor, and once by parents who, for whatever reason, failed to timely prosecute the claims”) (quoting Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 695 , 697 A.2d 1358 (1997) (quotations omitted)). 2016Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 216 , 808 A.2d 508 (2002) (“if the parents’ failure to bring a claim before the expiration of limitations had the effect of barring the minor child’s claim, the child would be twice victimized — once at the hands of the *488 tortfeasor, and once by parents who, for whatever reason, failed to timely prosecute the claims”) (quoting Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 695 , 697 A.2d 1358 (1997) (quotations omitted)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Piselli v. 75th Street Medical
green
2 sentences2016Given the distinctions discussed above, our holding in this case does not affect the tolling exception relevant to minor children as discussed in, among others, Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. at 212 , 808 A.2d 508 , and Mason v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. 2016Given the distinctions discussed above, our holding in this case does not affect the tolling exception relevant to minor children as discussed in, among others, Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. at 212 , 808 A.2d 508 , and Mason v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mason v. Board of Education of Baltimore County
green
2 sentences2016Cty., 143 Md.App. at 515 , 795 A.2d 211 . 2016Cty., 143 Md.App. at 515 , 795 A.2d 211 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Christensen v. Philip Morris USA Inc.
green
2 sentences2012We are equally aware that Maryland courts “have long maintained a rule of strict construction concerning the tolling of the statute of limitations.” To that end, the Court of Appeals has “long adhered to the principle that where the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.” 162 Md.App. at 655 , 875 A.2d 823 (emphasis supplied). 2012We are equally aware that Maryland courts “have long maintained a rule of strict construction concerning the tolling of the statute of limitations.” To that end, the Court of Appeals has “long adhered to the principle that where the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.” 162 Md.App. at 655 , 875 A.2d 823 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kumar v. Dhanda
green
2 sentences2012In Kumar v. Dhanda, 198 Md.App. at 348 , 17 A.3d 744 Judge Deborah Eyler explained how the policy consideration favoring class action suits was the critical factor in Christensen’s recognition of the tolling exception: The Court concluded that the tolling exception principle was satisfied because tolling was necessary to protect the class action procedure adopted by rule in Maryland, and therefore policy considerations militated in favor of tolling. 2012In Kumar v. Dhanda, 198 Md.App. at 348 , 17 A.3d 744 Judge Deborah Eyler explained how the policy consideration favoring class action suits was the critical factor in Christensen’s recognition of the tolling exception: The Court concluded that the tolling exception principle was satisfied because tolling was necessary to protect the class action procedure adopted by rule in Maryland, and therefore policy considerations militated in favor of tolling. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.