14 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1990–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 790405green2 sentences2024"A state may properly rely on a defendant's prior convictions to extend a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, and the factual question of whether the defendant has previously been convicted need not be submitted to a jury." Id ; see also Brown v. Greiner , 409 F.3d 523, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding, under AEDPA, that it was not unreasonable for the state court to have concluded that the 'judicial finding of at least two predicate felony convictions comported with the dictates of Apprendi ', given that a determination of prior felony convictions 'clearly falls within Apprendi 's 'f 2024"A state may properly rely on a defendant's prior convictions to extend a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, and the factual question of whether the defendant has previously been convicted need not be submitted to a jury." Id ; see also Brown v. Greiner , 409 F.3d 523, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding, under AEDPA, that it was not unreasonable for the state court to have concluded that the 'judicial finding of at least two predicate felony convictions comported with the dictates of Apprendi ', given that a determination of prior felony convictions 'clearly falls within Apprendi 's 'f | 2 | 2 |
Gomez v. Katzgreen2 sentences2013Co., LLC v CMA Design Studio P.C., 68 AD3d at 503 ; see Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 112 [2009]). 2013Co., LLC v CMA Design Studio P.C., 68 AD3d at 503 ; see Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 112 [2009]). | 2 | 2 |
Hall & Co. v. Steiner & Mondoregreen2 sentences2013Not only must the recurrent performance of professional services be specifically related to the matter upon which the alleged malpractice is based (see Hall & Co. v Steiner & Mondore, 147 AD2d 225, 228-229 [1989]), but the services must be deemed continuous within the meaning of the tolling doctrine (see Sendar Dev. 2013Not only must the recurrent performance of professional services be specifically related to the matter upon which the alleged malpractice is based (see Hall & Co. v Steiner & Mondore, 147 AD2d 225, 228-229 [1989]), but the services must be deemed continuous within the meaning of the tolling doctrine (see Sendar Dev. | 2 | 2 |
Massie v. Crawfordgreen2 sentences2008To the contrary, in Massie v Crawford ( 78 NY2d 516, 519 [1991]), the Court noted that an interval between visits of almost three years “is not per se dispositive of defendant’s claim that the statute [of limitations] has run, but because of it the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that her examinations constituted ‘continuous treatment’ and that the tolling exception was applicable.” In so noting, the Court (id.) cited its statement in Rizk v Cohen ( 73 NY2d at 103 ) that “if continuous treatment is found to exist, the Statute of Limitations was tolled during the SVs years between plai 1995It then became incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that her post-March 22, 1989, visits constituted "continuous treatment” and that the tolling exception was applicable (see, Massie v Crawford, supra). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Quinonesgreen1 sentence2024In contrast to the case [*8]before them, the Quinones court said, sentencing schemes which violate Apprendi provide "for an increase to defendant's punishment — beyond the range authorized by the jury's finding of guilt or defendant's admission — based on additional facts found by a judge". 12 NY3d at 123 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knobelgreen1 sentence2024If the legislature intended this tolling - 15 - - 16 - No. 24 provision to apply only to nonresidents or that courts should factor residency into a tolling analysis, it would have said so expressly, as have several other jurisdictions. 5 Defendant argues that CPL 30.10 (4) (a) has only been applied to cases involving nonresidents, relying principally on People v Knobel, where a nonresident defendant remained continually outside of New York, which this Court concluded thereby tolled the limitations period, adding that “all periods of a day or more that a nonresident defendant is out-of-State sh | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tattagreen1 sentence2010(See People v Tatta, 196 AD2d 328, 331 [2d Dept 1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 972 [1994] [holding that where a defendant absconds from custody, the period during which he is at large does not count toward the tolling rule].) As the Tatta Court noted, “[a] statute ‘must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise’ ” (id. at 331 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Grellet v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2008Although the Second Department has held that “the continuous treatment doctrine is inapplicable where the interval of time between visits or treatments exceeds the applicable period of limitations” (Marmol v Green, 7 AD3d 682, 682 [2004], quoting Grellet v City of New York, 118 AD2d 141, 149 [2d Dept 1986]), that rule is contrary to the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement in Massie and is not followed in the other Departments (see e.g. | 1 | 1 |
Marmol v. Greengreen1 sentence2008Although the Second Department has held that “the continuous treatment doctrine is inapplicable where the interval of time between visits or treatments exceeds the applicable period of limitations” (Marmol v Green, 7 AD3d 682, 682 [2004], quoting Grellet v City of New York, 118 AD2d 141, 149 [2d Dept 1986]), that rule is contrary to the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement in Massie and is not followed in the other Departments (see e.g. | 1 | 1 |
Gielow v. Rosa Coplon Homegreen1 sentence2004Moreover, a court “should not . . . grant[ ] [a] plaintiffs . . . motion for leave to amend the complaint to add [a] defendant [where] [t]he Statute of Limitations had already expired, and plaintiff may not benefit from the relation back doctrine” (Gielow v Rosa Coplon Home, 251 AD2d 970, 973 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1042 [1999]; see also Karmel v White Plains Common Council, 284 AD2d 464, 465 [2001] [petition dismissed where court could not order the joinder of a necessary party because the statute of limitations had already expired and said party could only be joined if the relation-back do | 1 | 1 |
K.C. Service Inc. v. New York State Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence2004Moreover, a court “should not . . . grant[ ] [a] plaintiffs . . . motion for leave to amend the complaint to add [a] defendant [where] [t]he Statute of Limitations had already expired, and plaintiff may not benefit from the relation back doctrine” (Gielow v Rosa Coplon Home, 251 AD2d 970, 973 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1042 [1999]; see also Karmel v White Plains Common Council, 284 AD2d 464, 465 [2001] [petition dismissed where court could not order the joinder of a necessary party because the statute of limitations had already expired and said party could only be joined if the relation-back do | 1 | 1 |
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parkergreen1 sentence1990Nor does it necessarily guarantee intervention for all members of the purported class.” (Supra, 414 US, at 561 .) In Crown, Cork & Seal, that admonition was echoed by three members of the court who stated that American Pipe was a generous rule "inviting abuse” and that the rule should not be read as leaving a plaintiff "free to raise different or peripheral claims following denial of class status.” (Supra, 462 US, at 354 [Powell, J., concurring].) Rather, as the court warned, "when a plaintiff invokes American Pipe in support of a separate lawsuit, the district court should take care to ensure | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Donnell W.
green
2 sentences2024People v. Adelman, 36 AD3d 926 (2d Dept. 2007) In Adelman , the defendant was convicted of a burglary committed on January 31, 2002. 2024People v. Adelman, 36 AD3d 926 (2d Dept. 2007) In Adelman , the defendant was convicted of a burglary committed on January 31, 2002. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Sendar Development Co. v. CMA Design Studio P.C.
green
2 sentences2013Co., LLC v CMA Design Studio P.C., 68 AD3d at 503 ; see Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 112 [2009]). 2013Co., LLC v CMA Design Studio P.C., 68 AD3d at 503 ; see Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 112 [2009]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Rizk v. Cohen
green
2 sentences2008To the contrary, in Massie v Crawford ( 78 NY2d 516, 519 [1991]), the Court noted that an interval between visits of almost three years “is not per se dispositive of defendant’s claim that the statute [of limitations] has run, but because of it the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that her examinations constituted ‘continuous treatment’ and that the tolling exception was applicable.” In so noting, the Court (id.) cited its statement in Rizk v Cohen ( 73 NY2d at 103 ) that “if continuous treatment is found to exist, the Statute of Limitations was tolled during the SVs years between plai 1991That interval between visits is not per se dispositive of defendant’s claim that the statute has run, but because of it the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that her examinations constituted "continuous treatment” and that the tolling exception was applicable (Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98 ; and see, Werner v Kwee, 148 AD2d 701, 702 ; Valenti v Trunfio, 118 AD2d 480, 483 ; Barrella v Richmond Mem. | 2 | 1991–2008 |
Carney v. Philippone
green
1 sentence2010(Carney v Philippone, 1 NY3d 333 [2004], rearg denied 2 NY3d 794 [2004].) In this case the Legislature’s intent with respect to the disputed provision can be gleaned from the words used in the substantive statute defining the tolling rule, the obvious mean ing of those words in the context in which they appear, the language of the procedural statute pursuant to which determinations about predicate felony status are made (CPL 400.21), legislative history concerning the 1973 enactment of the law, case law interpreting the statute and the statute’s purposes. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bynog v. Cipriani Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010(Carney v Philippone, 1 NY3d 333 [2004], rearg denied 2 NY3d 794 [2004].) In this case the Legislature’s intent with respect to the disputed provision can be gleaned from the words used in the substantive statute defining the tolling rule, the obvious mean ing of those words in the context in which they appear, the language of the procedural statute pursuant to which determinations about predicate felony status are made (CPL 400.21), legislative history concerning the 1973 enactment of the law, case law interpreting the statute and the statute’s purposes. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Transport Workers Union of America Local 100 v. Schwartz
green
1 sentence2008Local 100 AFL-CIO v Schwartz, 17 AD3d 218 [2005]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Gielow v. Rosa Coplon Home
green
1 sentence2004Moreover, a court “should not . . . grant[ ] [a] plaintiffs . . . motion for leave to amend the complaint to add [a] defendant [where] [t]he Statute of Limitations had already expired, and plaintiff may not benefit from the relation back doctrine” (Gielow v Rosa Coplon Home, 251 AD2d 970, 973 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1042 [1999]; see also Karmel v White Plains Common Council, 284 AD2d 464, 465 [2001] [petition dismissed where court could not order the joinder of a necessary party because the statute of limitations had already expired and said party could only be joined if the relation-back do | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Toussie v. United States
red
1 sentence1999Invoking the general rule of construction that criminal Statutes of Limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of defendant (see, Toussie v United States, 397 US 112, 115 ), he suggests that the People should have the benefit of the toll only when a known defendant thwarts the investigation of the crime, as by fleeing the State, assuming an alias or going underground within the State. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Barrella v. Richmond Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence1991Hosp., 88 AD2d 379, 380 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Cintron
neutral
1 sentence1991That interval between visits is not per se dispositive of defendant’s claim that the statute has run, but because of it the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that her examinations constituted "continuous treatment” and that the tolling exception was applicable (Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98 ; and see, Werner v Kwee, 148 AD2d 701, 702 ; Valenti v Trunfio, 118 AD2d 480, 483 ; Barrella v Richmond Mem. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Werner v. Kwee
green
1 sentence1991That interval between visits is not per se dispositive of defendant’s claim that the statute has run, but because of it the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that her examinations constituted "continuous treatment” and that the tolling exception was applicable (Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98 ; and see, Werner v Kwee, 148 AD2d 701, 702 ; Valenti v Trunfio, 118 AD2d 480, 483 ; Barrella v Richmond Mem. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah
green
2 sentences1990Nor does it necessarily guarantee intervention for all members of the purported class.” (Supra, 414 US, at 561 .) In Crown, Cork & Seal, that admonition was echoed by three members of the court who stated that American Pipe was a generous rule "inviting abuse” and that the rule should not be read as leaving a plaintiff "free to raise different or peripheral claims following denial of class status.” (Supra, 462 US, at 354 [Powell, J., concurring].) Rather, as the court warned, "when a plaintiff invokes American Pipe in support of a separate lawsuit, the district court should take care to ensure 1990Nor does it necessarily guarantee intervention for all members of the purported class.” (Supra, 414 US, at 561 .) In Crown, Cork & Seal, that admonition was echoed by three members of the court who stated that American Pipe was a generous rule "inviting abuse” and that the rule should not be read as leaving a plaintiff "free to raise different or peripheral claims following denial of class status.” (Supra, 462 US, at 354 [Powell, J., concurring].) Rather, as the court warned, "when a plaintiff invokes American Pipe in support of a separate lawsuit, the district court should take care to ensure | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.