11 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1998–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hartgreen1 sentence2025See Wlodarz, 361 S.W.3d at 499 (“[A]s a general rule, newly discovered evidence which is merely cumulative or ‘serves no other purpose than to contradict or impeach’ does not warrant the issuance of a writ.”) (emphasis added) (citing Hart, 911 S.W.2d at 375 ). | 1 | 1 |
Stephen Bernard Wlodarz v. State of Tennesseegreen1 sentence2025See Wlodarz, 361 S.W.3d at 499 (“[A]s a general rule, newly discovered evidence which is merely cumulative or ‘serves no other purpose than to contradict or impeach’ does not warrant the issuance of a writ.”) (emphasis added) (citing Hart, 911 S.W.2d at 375 ). | 1 | 1 |
Tommy Nunley v. State of Tennesseegreen2 sentences2024For context, we provide a brief background on error coram nobis generally, and then address the tolling exception to the coram nobis statute of limitations. -8- Error Coram Nobis As discussed by this Court in Nunley v. State, the writ of error coram nobis has ancient roots in the common law of England. 552 S.W.3d at 810 (citations omitted). 2024Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 . | 1 | 1 |
Sherrill v. Soudergreen1 sentence2024Tennessee has codified the common law discovery rule such that “[i]n the event the alleged injury is not discovered within [the one-year statute of limitations], the period of limitations shall be one (1) year from the date of such discovery.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29 - 26-116(a)(2); see also Sherrill v. Souder, 325 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Tenn. 2010) (outlining the history of Tennessee’s discovery rule). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 723881green1 sentence2017But the usual and it seems to us the correct characterization of the doctrine of continuing violation is that it is a doctrine governing accrual, e.g., Wilson v. Giesen, [] 956 F.2d [738, 743 (7th Cir. 1992)]; Taylor v. Meirick, [] 712 F.2d [1112, 1118-19, (7th Cir. 1983)]; Newell Recycling Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2000); Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroadgreen1 sentence2017Nunn signed a document agreeing to abide by the Halloween restrictions and curfew on September 16, 2009, more than one year before he filed his complaint on September 29, 2010. 12 The Seventh Circuit noted this disagreement in Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001): Some cases say that the doctrine of continuing violation is a tolling doctrine, Davis v. United States Dept. of Justice, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984); Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. | 1 | 1 |
Dawn Guba v. Huron County, Ohiogreen1 sentence2017Id.; see also Katz v. Vill. of Beverly Hills, 677 F. App’x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2017) (“the running of the limitations period can be tolled under the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine”); Printup v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 654 F. App'x 781 , 790 n.8 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “continuing violations . . . toll the applicable statute of limitations” but ultimately concluding that “the continuing violation doctrine did not delay the accrual of Printup’s causes of action”); Guba v. Huron Cty., 600 F. App’x 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2015) (referencing “the continuing violation doctrine - | 1 | 1 |
Donald D. Fletcher v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporationgreen1 sentence2017Nunn signed a document agreeing to abide by the Halloween restrictions and curfew on September 16, 2009, more than one year before he filed his complaint on September 29, 2010. 12 The Seventh Circuit noted this disagreement in Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001): Some cases say that the doctrine of continuing violation is a tolling doctrine, Davis v. United States Dept. of Justice, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984); Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Shelby State Community Collegegreen1 sentence2017Id.; see also Katz v. Vill. of Beverly Hills, 677 F. App’x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2017) (“the running of the limitations period can be tolled under the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine”); Printup v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 654 F. App'x 781 , 790 n.8 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “continuing violations . . . toll the applicable statute of limitations” but ultimately concluding that “the continuing violation doctrine did not delay the accrual of Printup’s causes of action”); Guba v. Huron Cty., 600 F. App’x 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2015) (referencing “the continuing violation doctrine - | 1 | 1 |
Darrell R. Page v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2017But the usual and it seems to us the correct characterization of the doctrine of continuing violation is that it is a doctrine governing accrual, e.g., Wilson v. Giesen, [] 956 F.2d [738, 743 (7th Cir. 1992)]; Taylor v. Meirick, [] 712 F.2d [1112, 1118-19, (7th Cir. 1983)]; Newell Recycling Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2000); Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Frank HERMAN and Frank Mullaney, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence2017Nunn signed a document agreeing to abide by the Halloween restrictions and curfew on September 16, 2009, more than one year before he filed his complaint on September 29, 2010. 12 The Seventh Circuit noted this disagreement in Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001): Some cases say that the doctrine of continuing violation is a tolling doctrine, Davis v. United States Dept. of Justice, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984); Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. | 1 | 1 |
Brian E. Davis v. United States Department of Justicegreen1 sentence2017Nunn signed a document agreeing to abide by the Halloween restrictions and curfew on September 16, 2009, more than one year before he filed his complaint on September 29, 2010. 12 The Seventh Circuit noted this disagreement in Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001): Some cases say that the doctrine of continuing violation is a tolling doctrine, Davis v. United States Dept. of Justice, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984); Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. | 1 | 1 |
Newell Recycling Company, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agencygreen1 sentence2017But the usual and it seems to us the correct characterization of the doctrine of continuing violation is that it is a doctrine governing accrual, e.g., Wilson v. Giesen, [] 956 F.2d [738, 743 (7th Cir. 1992)]; Taylor v. Meirick, [] 712 F.2d [1112, 1118-19, (7th Cir. 1983)]; Newell Recycling Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2000); Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Delbert Heard v. Michael F. Sheahangreen1 sentence2017Nunn signed a document agreeing to abide by the Halloween restrictions and curfew on September 16, 2009, more than one year before he filed his complaint on September 29, 2010. 12 The Seventh Circuit noted this disagreement in Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001): Some cases say that the doctrine of continuing violation is a tolling doctrine, Davis v. United States Dept. of Justice, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984); Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. | 1 | 1 |
Donald Katz v. Village of Beverly Hillsgreen1 sentence2017Id.; see also Katz v. Vill. of Beverly Hills, 677 F. App’x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2017) (“the running of the limitations period can be tolled under the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine”); Printup v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 654 F. App'x 781 , 790 n.8 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “continuing violations . . . toll the applicable statute of limitations” but ultimately concluding that “the continuing violation doctrine did not delay the accrual of Printup’s causes of action”); Guba v. Huron Cty., 600 F. App’x 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2015) (referencing “the continuing violation doctrine - | 1 | 1 |
Fahrner v. SW Manufacturing, Inc.green1 sentence2015See Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn.2001) (“In a discovery rule case, the plaintiff may claim that .the defendant intentionally prevented him from discovering his injury. | 1 | 1 |
Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennesseered1 sentence2013Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d, 560 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 14 In fact, two members of this Court have described due process tolling under the Burford line of cases as “equitable tolling.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d at 148-49, 153 (Koch, J., concurring in part). -14- The United States Supreme Court found the Eleventh Circuit’s tolling standard “too rigid,” and reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Holland v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d, 560 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 14 In fact, two members of this Court have described due process tolling under the Burford line of cases as “equitable tolling.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d at 148-49, 153 (Koch, J., concurring in part). -14- The United States Supreme Court found the Eleventh Circuit’s tolling standard “too rigid,” and reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Shadrick v. Cokergreen1 sentence1998See Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 736 (Tenn. 1998)(holding that a plaintiff relying upon the doctrine of fraudulent concealment must show, among other things, that it could not have discovered the wrong despite exercising reasonable care and diligence). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pervis Tyrone Payne v. State of Tennessee
green
2 sentences2025After all, the relief sought by a writ of error coram nobis is the setting aside of the conviction and the granting of a new trial, Payne, 493 S.W.3d at 485 , and for a petition that seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, this may be many years down the road. 2024After all, the relief sought by a writ of error coram nobis is the setting aside of the conviction and the granting of a new trial, Payne, 493 S.W.3d at 485 , and for a petition that seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, this may be many years down the road. | 2 | 2024–2025 |
State v. Nix
green
2 sentences2018Nix, 40 S.W.3d at 464 . 2016Nix, 40 S.W.3d at 464 . | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Workman v. State
green
2 sentences2024The petition was filed under the tolling exception to the coram nobis statute of limitations adopted by this Court in Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001). 2024Under the tolling analysis adopted in Workman, the coram nobis court must weigh the State’s interest against the petitioner’s private interests. 41 S.W.3d at 103 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Printup v. Director, Ohio Department of Job & Family Services
green
1 sentence2017Id.; see also Katz v. Vill. of Beverly Hills, 677 F. App’x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2017) (“the running of the limitations period can be tolled under the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine”); Printup v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 654 F. App'x 781 , 790 n.8 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “continuing violations . . . toll the applicable statute of limitations” but ultimately concluding that “the continuing violation doctrine did not delay the accrual of Printup’s causes of action”); Guba v. Huron Cty., 600 F. App’x 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2015) (referencing “the continuing violation doctrine - | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Holland v. Florida
green
2 sentences2013Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2563 . 2013Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d, 560 U.S. ___ , ___, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 14 In fact, two members of this Court have described due process tolling under the Burford line of cases as “equitable tolling.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d at 148-49, 153 (Koch, J., concurring in part). -14- The United States Supreme Court found the Eleventh Circuit’s tolling standard “too rigid,” and reversed. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Norman Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis
green
1 sentence2013Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 459 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Joseph F. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation
green
2 sentences2001It implies that a defendant is guilty of [concealment or other misconduct justifying equitable estoppel] unless it tells the plaintiff, We’re firing you because of your age.’ It would eliminate the statute of limitations in age discrimination cases.” Cada, 920 F.2d at 451 . 2001It implies that a defendant is guilty of [concealment or other misconduct justifying equitable estoppel] unless it tells the plaintiff, `We're firing you because of your age.' It would eliminate the statute of limitations in age discrimination cases." Cada, 920 F.2d at 451 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.