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15 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kahl v. DIRECTOR, NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONgreen2 sentences1997“However, the ultimate conclusion of whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause, is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.” Id.; see Kahl, 1997 ND 147, ¶ 16 , 567 N.W.2d 197 . 1997“However, the ultimate conclusion of whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause, is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.” Id.; see Kahl, 1997 ND 147, ¶ 16 , 567 N.W.2d 197 . | 1 | 2 |
Stanton v. Mooregreen2 sentences2002See Stanton v. Moore, 1998 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 587 N.W.2d 148 . 2002See Stanton v. Moore, 1998 ND 213, ¶ 10 , 587 N.W.2d 148 . | 1 | 1 |
Salter v. North Dakota Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence1997Kahl v. Director, North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 1997 ND 147, ¶ 16 , 567 N.W.2d 197 ; Salter v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 112 (N.D.1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aamodt v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2012“We defer to the hearing officer’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. ‘Whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause or reasonable and articu-lable suspicion, is a question of law fully renewable on appeal.” Id. (quoting Dottier v. Sprynczynatyk, 2004 ND 54, ¶ 10 , 676 N.W.2d 799 ). 2012“We defer to the hearing officer’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. ‘Whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause or reasonable and articu-lable suspicion, is a question of law fully renewable on appeal.” Id. (quoting Dottier v. Sprynczynatyk, 2004 ND 54, ¶ 10 , 676 N.W.2d 799 ). | 7 | 2012–2020 |
Dettler v. Sprynczynatyk
green
2 sentences2012“We defer to the hearing officer’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. ‘Whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause or reasonable and articu-lable suspicion, is a question of law fully renewable on appeal.” Id. (quoting Dottier v. Sprynczynatyk, 2004 ND 54, ¶ 10 , 676 N.W.2d 799 ). 2012“We defer to the hearing officer’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. ‘Whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause or reasonable and articu-lable suspicion, is a question of law fully renewable on appeal.” Id. (quoting Dottier v. Sprynczynatyk, 2004 ND 54, ¶ 10 , 676 N.W.2d 799 ). | 4 | 2012–2017 |
Sonsthagen v. Sprynczynatyk
green
2 sentences2013“We defer to the agency’s ruling by not making independent findings of fact or by substituting our own judgment for the agency’s, but ‘the ultimate conclusion of whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause, is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.’ ” Hawes , at ¶ 14 (quoting Sonsthagen v. Sprynczynatyk, 2003 ND 90, ¶ 7 , 663 N.W.2d 161 ). 2013“We defer to the agency’s ruling by not making independent findings of fact or by substituting our own judgment for the agency’s, but ‘the ultimate conclusion of whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause, is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.’ ” Hawes , at ¶ 14 (quoting Sonsthagen v. Sprynczynatyk, 2003 ND 90, ¶ 7 , 663 N.W.2d 161 ). | 3 | 2007–2013 |
Marman v. Levi
green
2 sentences2020“Whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion, is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal.” Marman, 2017 ND 133, ¶ 7 , 896 N.W.2d 241 (quoting Aamodt v. N.D. 2020“Whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion, is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal.” Marman, 2017 ND 133, ¶ 7 , 896 N.W.2d 241 (quoting Aamodt v. N.D. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Painte v. Director, Dep't of Transportation
green
2 sentences2015We defer to the agency’s ruling by not making independent findings of fact or by substituting our own judgment for the agency’s, but the ultimate conclusion of whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause, is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.” 2013 ND 95, ¶ 7 , 832 N.W.2d 319 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 2015We defer to the agency’s ruling by not making independent findings of fact or by substituting our own judgment for the agency’s, but the ultimate conclusion of whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause, is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.” 2013 ND 95, ¶ 7 , 832 N.W.2d 319 (citations and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Vanlishout v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
neutral
2 sentences2013III [¶8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if . . . [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the 2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Rist v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the 2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Hawes v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the 2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Vanlishout v. N.D. Department of Transportation
neutral
2 sentences2013III [¶8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if . . . [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the 2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Wheeling v. Director of North Dakota Department of Transportation
neutral
1 sentence2003“However, the ultimate conclusion of whether the facts meet the legal standard, *165 rising to the level of probable cause, is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.” Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.