fundamental constitutional principle in New York

1984“The fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers among the three departments of government is included by implication in the pattern of government adopted by the State of New York * * * it being a basic part of the organic law that each department should be free from interference, in the discharge of its own functions and peculiar duties, by either of the others” (Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634,635 ).

1977On this record, the court should not attempt to do so.” (Emphasis supplied.) Even more basically, the pattern of our State government embodies the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers among three departments of government (see Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634 , affd 30 NY2d 807 , cert den 409 US 1008 ), and under said principle there is no warrant for our restriction of the scope of legislation in a manner that would thwart the constitutional and statutory policy or engraft restrictions on the executive department where none exist (see Matter of People [Lawy

1977On this record, the court should not attempt to do so.” (Emphasis supplied.) Even more basically, the pattern of our State government embodies the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers among three departments of government (see Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634 , affd 30 NY2d 807 , cert den 409 US 1008 ), and under said principle there is no warrant for our restriction of the scope of legislation in a manner that would thwart the constitutional and statutory policy or engraft restrictions on the executive department where none exist (see Matter of People [Lawy

1976The fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers among the three departments of government is included by implication in the pattern of government adopted by the State of New York (Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634 , affd 30 NY2d 807 , cert den 409 US 1008 ).

1977On this record, the court should not attempt to do so.” (Emphasis supplied.) Even more basically, the pattern of our State government embodies the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers among three departments of government (see Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634 , affd 30 NY2d 807 , cert den 409 US 1008 ), and under said principle there is no warrant for our restriction of the scope of legislation in a manner that would thwart the constitutional and statutory policy or engraft restrictions on the executive department where none exist (see Matter of People [Lawy

1976The fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers among the three departments of government is included by implication in the pattern of government adopted by the State of New York (Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634 , affd 30 NY2d 807 , cert den 409 US 1008 ).

2009While New York Constitution, article VI, § 25, known as the “Compensation Clause,” does not include justices of village courts in its prohibition against the diminishment of the compensation of judges during the term of office, courts have held that the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers also prohibits a legislative body from reducing the compensation of a judge or justice serving in a constitutional court (see Matter of Kelch v Town Bd. of Town of Davenport, 36 AD3d 1110, 1111 [2007]; Matter of Catanise v Town of Fayette, 148 AD2d 210 [1989]).

2002Nevertheless, that burden of proof is not easily explained (see Victor v Nebraska, 511 US 1, 5 ). “ ‘Attempts to explain the term “reasonable doubt” do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury’ ” (Holland v United States, 348 US 121, 140 [reh denied 348 US 932 ], quoting Miles v United States, 103 US 304, 312 ).

2002Nevertheless, that burden of proof is not easily explained (see Victor v Nebraska, 511 US 1, 5 ). “ ‘Attempts to explain the term “reasonable doubt” do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury’ ” (Holland v United States, 348 US 121, 140 [reh denied 348 US 932 ], quoting Miles v United States, 103 US 304, 312 ).

2002Nevertheless, that burden of proof is not easily explained (see Victor v Nebraska, 511 US 1, 5 ). “ ‘Attempts to explain the term “reasonable doubt” do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury’ ” (Holland v United States, 348 US 121, 140 [reh denied 348 US 932 ], quoting Miles v United States, 103 US 304, 312 ).

1994(See, Matter of King v Cuomo, 81 NY2d 247 [1993]; Matter of Board of Educ. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 535 [1977]; Matter of Anderson v Krupsak, 40 NY2d 397 [1976]; Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634 [3d Dept 1971], affd 30 NY2d 807 [1972].) Here, however, no such issue is presented since rule 6.00 of the Rules of the City Council is wholly inapplicable.

1994(See, Matter of King v Cuomo, 81 NY2d 247 [1993]; Matter of Board of Educ. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 535 [1977]; Matter of Anderson v Krupsak, 40 NY2d 397 [1976]; Matter of Gottlieb v Duryea, 38 AD2d 634 [3d Dept 1971], affd 30 NY2d 807 [1972].) Here, however, no such issue is presented since rule 6.00 of the Rules of the City Council is wholly inapplicable.

1990Accordingly, in the situation of a joint trial, a statement made by one defendant which inculpates a codefendant may not be received into evidence unless it can be, and is, effectively redacted (see, e.g., People v Smalls, 55 NY2d 407 ; People v Jackson, 22 NY2d 446 ; People v Burrelle, 21 NY2d 265 ).

1990The so-called Bruton rule (Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 ) recognizes the fundamental constitutional principle that extrajudicial statements made without the opportunity for cross-examination are admissible only against the person who made them.

1990Accordingly, in the situation of a joint trial, a statement made by one defendant which inculpates a codefendant may not be received into evidence unless it can be, and is, effectively redacted (see, e.g., People v Smalls, 55 NY2d 407 ; People v Jackson, 22 NY2d 446 ; People v Burrelle, 21 NY2d 265 ).

1990Accordingly, in the situation of a joint trial, a statement made by one defendant which inculpates a codefendant may not be received into evidence unless it can be, and is, effectively redacted (see, e.g., People v Smalls, 55 NY2d 407 ; People v Jackson, 22 NY2d 446 ; People v Burrelle, 21 NY2d 265 ).

1986Furthermore, the prosecution of a crime foreclosed by the protection of immunity implicates the propriety of the entire proceeding (accord, Matter of Brockway v Monroe, 89 AD2d 771 , affd on other grounds 59 NY2d 179 ; Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50 ).

1986Furthermore, the prosecution of a crime foreclosed by the protection of immunity implicates the propriety of the entire proceeding (accord, Matter of Brockway v Monroe, 89 AD2d 771 , affd on other grounds 59 NY2d 179 ; Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50 ).

1986Furthermore, the prosecution of a crime foreclosed by the protection of immunity implicates the propriety of the entire proceeding (accord, Matter of Brockway v Monroe, 89 AD2d 771 , affd on other grounds 59 NY2d 179 ; Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50 ).

1981While, for the reasons I advanced in my dissent in People v Thomas ( 46 NY2d 100, 110-113 ), I do not depart from my conviction that section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law runs afoul of the fundamental constitutional bar against testimonial compulsion, I am now constrained to concur on authority of the majority’s holding in that case.

1979It is a fundamental constitutional principle that in considering the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation, if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process of interrogation that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no subsequent questioning by the police (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; People v Buxton, 44 NY2d 33 ; People v Jackson, 41 NY2d 146 ; People v Rivers, 64 AD2d 834 ).

1979It is a fundamental constitutional principle that in considering the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation, if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process of interrogation that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no subsequent questioning by the police (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; People v Buxton, 44 NY2d 33 ; People v Jackson, 41 NY2d 146 ; People v Rivers, 64 AD2d 834 ).

1979On the record, it must be held as a matter of law that defendant requested the assistance of counsel (People v Dean, 47 NY2d 967 ; People v Hinton, 45 NY2d 941 ; People v Clark, 45 NY2d 432 ).

1979On the record, it must be held as a matter of law that defendant requested the assistance of counsel (People v Dean, 47 NY2d 967 ; People v Hinton, 45 NY2d 941 ; People v Clark, 45 NY2d 432 ).

1979On the record, it must be held as a matter of law that defendant requested the assistance of counsel (People v Dean, 47 NY2d 967 ; People v Hinton, 45 NY2d 941 ; People v Clark, 45 NY2d 432 ).