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11 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2010People v. Montgomery, 373 Ill. 2010People v. Montgomery, 373 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2007App. 3d at 649 , 847 N.E.2d at 910 ; see also United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 165 L. 2007App. 3d at 649 , 847 N.E.2d at 910 ; see also United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 , 165 L. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez, Also Known as Tomasgreen2 sentences2006See Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 934 . 2006See Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d at 934 . | 2 | 2 |
Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrettgreen2 sentences1997Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395, 401 , 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960); People ex rel Hawthorne v. Bartlow, 111 Ill.App.3d 513, 520 , 67 Ill.Dec. 243 , 444 N.E.2d 282 (1983). 1997Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d 395, 401 (1960); People ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maynard v. Cartwright
green
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d at 379 , 108 S. Ct. at 1857 , quoting Cartwright v. Maynard (10th Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1477 , 1491.) The Supreme Court explained that “our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” (Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362 , 100 L. 1992Ed. 2d at 379 , 108 S. Ct. at 1857 , quoting Cartwright v. Maynard (10th Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1477 , 1491.) The Supreme Court explained that “our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” (Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362 , 100 L. | 3 | 1988–1992 |
People v. Bingham
green
2 sentences2007"Instead, it is a fundamental constitutional error affecting a substantial right that defies harmless-error analysis." Bingham, 364 Ill. 2007“Instead, it is a fundamental constitutional error affecting a substantial right that defies harmless-error analysis.” Bingham, 364 Ill. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Cartwright v. Maynard
green
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d at 379 , 108 S. Ct. at 1857 , quoting Cartwright v. Maynard (10th Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1477 , 1491.) The Supreme Court explained that “our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” (Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362 , 100 L. 1989Ed. 2d at 379 , 108 S. Ct. at 1857 , citing Cartwright v. Maynard (10th Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1477 , 1483, 1492.) The Supreme Court explained that “our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” (Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362 , 100 L. | 2 | 1989–1992 |
People Ex Rel. Hawthorne v. Bartlow
green
2 sentences1997Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395, 401 , 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960); People ex rel Hawthorne v. Bartlow, 111 Ill.App.3d 513, 520 , 67 Ill.Dec. 243 , 444 N.E.2d 282 (1983). 1997Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett, 20 Ill.2d 395, 401 , 169 N.E.2d 769 (1960); People ex rel Hawthorne v. Bartlow, 111 Ill.App.3d 513, 520 , 67 Ill.Dec. 243 , 444 N.E.2d 282 (1983). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Del Vecchio
green
1 sentence1986Once again, we observe that these issues have been raised and rejected in prior cases. ( People v. Del Vecchio (1985), 105 Ill.2d 414, 445-46 , cert. denied (1985), 474 U.S. 883 , 88 L.Ed.2d 173 , 106 S.Ct. 204 ; People v. Jones (1982), 94 Ill.2d 275, 283-84 .) The death penalty statute meets the fundamental constitutional requirement that the sentencer weigh all relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation and determine that none of the mitigating factors precludes imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 533-34 .) We decline to impose a further requireme | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Brownell
green
2 sentences1986Once again, we observe that these issues have been raised and rejected in prior cases. ( People v. Del Vecchio (1985), 105 Ill.2d 414, 445-46 , cert. denied (1985), 474 U.S. 883 , 88 L.Ed.2d 173 , 106 S.Ct. 204 ; People v. Jones (1982), 94 Ill.2d 275, 283-84 .) The death penalty statute meets the fundamental constitutional requirement that the sentencer weigh all relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation and determine that none of the mitigating factors precludes imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 533-34 .) We decline to impose a further requireme 1986(People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508, 533-34 .) We decline to impose a further requirement that the sentencer specifically find death to be the appropriate penalty. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences1986Once again, we observe that these issues have been raised and rejected in prior cases. ( People v. Del Vecchio (1985), 105 Ill.2d 414, 445-46 , cert. denied (1985), 474 U.S. 883 , 88 L.Ed.2d 173 , 106 S.Ct. 204 ; People v. Jones (1982), 94 Ill.2d 275, 283-84 .) The death penalty statute meets the fundamental constitutional requirement that the sentencer weigh all relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation and determine that none of the mitigating factors precludes imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 533-34 .) We decline to impose a further requireme 1986Ed. 2d 173 , 106 S. Ct. 204 ; People v. Jones (1982), 94 Ill. 2d 275, 283-84 .) The death penalty statute meets the fundamental constitutional requirement'that the sentencer weigh all relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation and determine that none of the mitigating factors precludes imposition of the death pen-ally. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Del Vecchio v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1986Once again, we observe that these issues have been raised and rejected in prior cases. ( People v. Del Vecchio (1985), 105 Ill.2d 414, 445-46 , cert. denied (1985), 474 U.S. 883 , 88 L.Ed.2d 173 , 106 S.Ct. 204 ; People v. Jones (1982), 94 Ill.2d 275, 283-84 .) The death penalty statute meets the fundamental constitutional requirement that the sentencer weigh all relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation and determine that none of the mitigating factors precludes imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 533-34 .) We decline to impose a further requireme | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.