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11 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Trustyred2 sentences2010"Fair and reasonable notice of the charges against an accused is a fundamental constitutional requirement." State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 1996). 2001"Fair and reasonable notice of the charges against an accused is a fundamental constitutional requirement." State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 1996). | 7 | 7 |
Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistrygreen2 sentences2015It asserts, No Tennessee court has ever held that the UAPA divests courts of original jurisdiction to decide disputes between private citizens over the. interpretation- or applicability of agency rules.” Erlanger’s argument goes further: “Divesting the-courts of such jurisdiction in favor of administrative agencies violates the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers that ‘it is the sole obligation of the judiciary -to interpret the law.... ’” (Quoting Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn.1995)}. 2008In Richardson v. Board of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn.1995), this Court observed that the facial constitutionality of a statute may not be determined by an administrative tribunal due to “the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers.” Id. at 453 (citing State ex rel. | 1 | 2 |
McEwen v. Tennessee Department of Safetygreen1 sentence2015Erlanger insists that this case “is no different than other disputes that the courts of this State hear -and properly decide every day.” Therefore, Erlanger claims, the trial court had jurisdiction and erred in surrendering its jurisdiction to a state agency. “[0]ne of the chief purposes of the [UAPA is] to provide a single method for obtaining judicial review of the decisions of state agencies.” Pickard v. Tenn. Dep’t of Env't and Conservation, No. M2011-01172-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3329618 , at *9 (quoting McEwen v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005)); see Tenn.Code An | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Town of South Carthage v. Barrettgreen2 sentences2008Town of S. Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1992)). 7 In Rich *843 ardson, we recognized that “it has been the sole obligation of the judiciary to interpret the law and determine the constitutionality of actions taken by the other two branches of government.” Id. at 453 (citing Tenn. Small Sch. 2008Town of S. Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1992)). 7 In Rich *843 ardson, we recognized that “it has been the sole obligation of the judiciary to interpret the law and determine the constitutionality of actions taken by the other two branches of government.” Id. at 453 (citing Tenn. Small Sch. | 1 | 1 |
Summers v. Thompsongreen1 sentence1995VI, § 4 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides that “The Judges of the ... inferior courts shall be elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they are assigned ...” We concluded that this conflict potentially threatened the independence of the judiciary, see Summers v. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 182, 196 (Tenn.1988) (Drowota, J. concurring), and therefore violated the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Poland v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1996Relying on Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct. 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), the majority concludes that "resentencing in these consolidated cases [presumably based on new aggravating circumstances] is not prohibited by either the state or federal constitutional provision against double jeopardy." While I acknowledge the federal interpretation of the double jeopardy clause that leads to such a conclusion and accordingly base my dissent on the more fundamental constitutional principle of due process, I do not wholeheartedly accept the analysis behind the cases relied on by the majority. 1996Relying on Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct. 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), the majority concludes that "resentencing in these consolidated cases [presumably based on new aggravating circumstances] is not prohibited by either the state or federal constitutional provision against double jeopardy." While I acknowledge the federal interpretation of the double jeopardy clause that leads to such a conclusion and accordingly base my dissent on the more fundamental constitutional principle of due process, I do not wholeheartedly accept the analysis behind the cases relied on by the majority. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bullington v. Missouri
green
2 sentences1996In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 , 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that in sentencing proceedings that are akin to guilt determinations "the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available ... with respect to the death penalty, at ... retrial." 451 U.S. at 446 , 101 S.Ct. at 1862. 1996In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 , 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that in sentencing proceedings that are akin to guilt determinations "the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available ... with respect to the death penalty, at ... retrial." 451 U.S. at 446 , 101 S.Ct. at 1862. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.