somewhat different test in New York

1998This statement ignores the conclusion reached herein on the issue of "definiteness" prior to any mention of the at-will presumption. [3] In interpreting New York law, Federal courts have applied a somewhat different analysis when the "employees" are corporations ( see , Don King Prods. v Douglas , 742 F Supp 741 ; Warner-Lambert Pharm.

1998In interpreting New York law, Federal courts have applied a somewhat different analysis when the “employees” are corporations (see, Don King Prods. v Douglas, 742 F Supp 741 ; Warner-Lambert Pharm.

1998However, prior to Strickland , we had “developed a somewhat different test for ineffective assistance of counsel under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution from that employed by the Supreme Court in applying the Sixth Amendment” (People v Claudio, 83 NY2d 76, 79 ).

1996In Arakelyan v Fiallo ( 32 AD2d 626 ), the First Department reversed an order denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment where there was proof that the defendant was tired but continued to drive.

1993Moreover, any implication that the language employed in Skinner to which defendant cites was intended broadly to extend the right to effective legal assistance to the preaccusatory stage, is dispelled by the more specific effective representation cases decided by this Court subsequent to Skinner . * To be sure, we have developed a somewhat different test for ineffective assistance of counsel under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution from that employed by the Supreme Court in applying the Sixth Amendment (compare, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 , supra, with Strickland v Washington, 4

1993Moreover, any implication that the language employed in Skinner to which defendant cites was intended broadly to extend the right to effective legal assistance to the preaccusatory stage, is dispelled by the more specific effective representation cases decided by this Court subsequent to Skinner . [*] To be sure, we have developed a somewhat different test for ineffective assistance of counsel under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution from that employed by the Supreme Court in applying the Sixth Amendment ( compare , People v Baldi , 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147 , supra, with Strickland v Washin

1993Moreover, any implication that the language employed in Skinner to which defendant cites was intended broadly to extend the right to effective legal assistance to the preaccusatory stage, is dispelled by the more specific effective representation cases decided by this Court subsequent to Skinner . * To be sure, we have developed a somewhat different test for ineffective assistance of counsel under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution from that employed by the Supreme Court in applying the Sixth Amendment (compare, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 , supra, with Strickland v Washington, 4

1993Moreover, any implication that the language employed in Skinner to which defendant cites was intended broadly to extend the right to effective legal assistance to the preaccusatory stage, is dispelled by the more specific effective representation cases decided by this Court subsequent to Skinner . [*] To be sure, we have developed a somewhat different test for ineffective assistance of counsel under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution from that employed by the Supreme Court in applying the Sixth Amendment ( compare , People v Baldi , 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147 , supra, with Strickland v Washin

1993Nonetheless, the basic purposes and constitutional interests at stake under both constitutional guarantees of an adequate legal defense in a criminal case are the same: (1) the preservation of our unique adversarial system of criminal justice, the underlying presupposition of which " 'is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free’ ” (United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 655 [quoting Herring v New York, 422 US 853, 862 ]); and (2) the correlative necessity to provide a defendant with an advocate su

1993Nonetheless, the basic purposes and constitutional interests at stake under both constitutional guarantees of an adequate legal defense in a criminal case are the same: (1) the preservation of our unique adversarial system of criminal justice, the underlying presupposition of which "`is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free'" ( United States v Cronic , 466 US 648, 655 [quoting Herring v New York , 422 US 853, 862 ]); *80 and (2) the correlative necessity to provide a defendant with an advoca

1992The difference is set out in Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Hoffman ( 43 NY2d 598 [1978]).

1989We recognize that the Appellate Division for the First Department, concerned about preserving the right to appeal, has fashioned a somewhat different rule with respect to the appealability of certain pretrial orders made by IAS Judges (see, Matter of Grisi v Shainswit, 119 AD2d 418 ).

1985A somewhat different standard was articulated several months later by the Third Circuit in Resident Advisory Bd. v R izzo (564 F2d 126, cert denied 435 US 908 ), but we find the approach adopted in the Arlington Heights case to be preferable.

1980Since such statutes are in derogation of the sovereign authority, they must be strictly construed (Matter of City of Lackawanna v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment of State of N. Y., 16 NY2d 222 ; People ex rel.

1975In Brinegar v United States ( 338 US 160, 175-176 ), Justice Rutledge said: "Since Marshall’s time * * * it [probable cause] has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.

1963The decision in Matter of White v. Consolidated Aircraft Gorp. ( 266 N. Y. 554 ) turned upon a somewhat different principle.

1935(Brooks v. Wyman, 220 App. Div. 204 ; affd., 246 N. Y. 534 .) A somewhat different rule obtains in the city of New York in respect to the fiscal affairs of the district, where control is given by statute to city officers who have charge of the fixing of salaries, the disbursement of funds and general supervisory powers over the amount of expenditures for school purposes, but without limitation on the general management and control of educational affairs (Matter of Hirshfield v. Cook, 227 N. Y. 297, 304 ); and it may be that in that city a taxpayer’s action may be maintained, although the quest

1935(Lewis v. Board of Education of City of New York, 258 N. Y. 117 .) Whatever the rule may be as to New York city, it cannot be doubted that in districts like the one here considered such a taxpayer’s action cannot be maintained.

1935(Brooks v. Wyman, 220 App. Div. 204 ; affd., 246 N. Y. 534 .) A somewhat different rule obtains in the city of New York in respect to the fiscal affairs of the district, where control is given by statute to city officers who have charge of the fixing of salaries, the disbursement of funds and general supervisory powers over the amount of expenditures for school purposes, but without limitation on the general management and control of educational affairs (Matter of Hirshfield v. Cook, 227 N. Y. 297, 304 ); and it may be that in that city a taxpayer’s action may be maintained, although the quest

1935(Brooks v. Wyman, 220 App. Div. 204 ; affd., 246 N. Y. 534 .) A somewhat different rule obtains in the city of New York in respect to the fiscal affairs of the district, where control is given by statute to city officers who have charge of the fixing of salaries, the disbursement of funds and general supervisory powers over the amount of expenditures for school purposes, but without limitation on the general management and control of educational affairs (Matter of Hirshfield v. Cook, 227 N. Y. 297, 304 ); and it may be that in that city a taxpayer’s action may be maintained, although the quest

1932(Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 624 .) A somewhat different rule applies in the case of a public official and in matters of public concern.

1883It may be observed that one of the two cases which the court mentioned as holding a somewhat different doctrine, viz.: Matteson v. Noyes, 25 Ill. 591 , has been explained in Morgan v. People, 59 Ill. 58 , as merely deciding that a copy of a telegram is not evidence, but that the original must be produced.

1883The doctrine in that State is the same as that recognized in the Wisconsin decision, “ Where a party sending a "message is the responsible party, and sends a message for the purpose of giving directions to be acted upon, the message delivered at the end of the line is the original.” Morgan v. People, 59 Ill. 58 .

1883It may be observed that one of the two cases which the court mentioned as holding a somewhat different doctrine, viz.: Matteson v. Noyes, 25 Ill. 591 , has been explained in Morgan v. People, 59 Ill. 58 , as merely deciding that a copy of a telegram is not evidence, but that the original must be produced.