summarized analysis in Ohio

2003In State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172 , 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717 , the court summarized the standard of review for a sufficiency claim: "* * * The test is whether after viewing the probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2003In State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172 , the court summarized the standard of review for a sufficiency claim: "* * * The test is whether after viewing the probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2018The court summarized its analysis in the subsequent decision of State v. Harris, 142 Ohio St.3d 211 , 2015-Ohio-166 , 28 N.E.3d 1256 , ¶ 37: Recently, in Morris, a four-to-three decision, we examined the harmless- error rule in the context of a defendant's claim that the erroneous admission of certain evidence required a new trial.

2018The court summarized its analysis in the subsequent decision of State v. Harris, 142 Ohio St.3d 211 , 2015-Ohio-166 , 28 N.E.3d 1256 , ¶ 37: Recently, in Morris, a four-to-three decision, we examined the harmless- error rule in the context of a defendant's claim that the erroneous admission of certain evidence required a new trial.

2016In most cases, in order to be viewed as “affecting substantial rights,” “‘the error must have been prejudicial.’ (Emphasis added.)” State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2003-Ohio-2761 , 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7 , quoting Olano at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 .

2016In most cases, in order to be viewed as “affecting substantial rights,” “‘the error must have been prejudicial.’ (Emphasis added.)” State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2003-Ohio-2761 , 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7 , quoting Olano at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 .

2016In most cases, in order to be viewed as “affecting substantial rights,” “‘the error must have been prejudicial.’ (Emphasis added.)” State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2003-Ohio-2761 , 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7 , quoting Olano at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 .

2016In most cases, in order to be viewed as “affecting substantial rights,” “‘the error must have been prejudicial.’ (Emphasis added.)” State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2003-Ohio-2761 , 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7 , quoting Olano at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 .

2016The court summarized its analysis in the subsequent decision of State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166 , ––– N.E.3d ––––, ¶ 37: Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error in the context of criminal cases and provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Under the harmless-error standard of review, “the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15 , citing United States v. Ola

2016The court summarized its analysis in the subsequent decision of State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166 , ––– N.E.3d ––––, ¶ 37: Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error in the context of criminal cases and provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Under the harmless-error standard of review, “the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15 , citing United States v. Ola

2003The law does not recognize a parallel entitlement of a parent to manage a minor's finances." Id. at 552 . {¶ 20} And, the court summarized the standard in a review of guardian appointment: {¶ 21} "In matters relating to guardianships, the probate court is required to act in the best interest of the minor or incompetent.

2001City Bank of Columbus (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 26, 29 , 729 N.E.2d 1285 : “A motion to dismiss is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.

2001City Bank of Columbus (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 26, 29 , 729 N.E.2d 1285 : “A motion to dismiss is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.

2001Co. v. Triskett Ill., Inc. (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 228 , 646 N.E.2d 528 , the court summarized the standard of good faith: `Good faith' is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of [a contract's] drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.

2001Co. v. Triskett Ill., Inc. (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 228 , 646 N.E.2d 528 , the court summarized the standard of good faith: `Good faith' is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of [a contract's] drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.

1995Scott v. Marshall (1951), 90 Ohio App. 347 [ 48 O.O. 12 , 105 N.E.2d 281 ]; Stremanos v. Cleveland Transit Co. (App.1947), 50 Ohio Law Abs. 123 [ 77 N.E.2d 504 ]. “ Tn a negligence action, the so-called “emergency doctrine” applies only where there was a sudden and unexpected occurrence of a transitory nature which demanded immediate action without time for reflection or deliberation and does not comprehend a static condition which lasted over a period of time.’ Miller v. McAllister (1959), 169 Ohio St. 487 [ 8 O.O.2d 485 , 160 N.E.2d 231 ], paragraph six of the syllabus.

1995Scott v. Marshall (1951), 90 Ohio App. 347 [ 48 O.O. 12 , 105 N.E.2d 281 ]; Stremanos v. Cleveland Transit Co. (App.1947), 50 Ohio Law Abs. 123 [ 77 N.E.2d 504 ]. “ Tn a negligence action, the so-called “emergency doctrine” applies only where there was a sudden and unexpected occurrence of a transitory nature which demanded immediate action without time for reflection or deliberation and does not comprehend a static condition which lasted over a period of time.’ Miller v. McAllister (1959), 169 Ohio St. 487 [ 8 O.O.2d 485 , 160 N.E.2d 231 ], paragraph six of the syllabus.

1995Scott v. Marshall (1951), 90 Ohio App. 347 [ 48 O.O. 12 , 105 N.E.2d 281 ]; Stremanos v. Cleveland Transit Co. (App.1947), 50 Ohio Law Abs. 123 [ 77 N.E.2d 504 ]. “ Tn a negligence action, the so-called “emergency doctrine” applies only where there was a sudden and unexpected occurrence of a transitory nature which demanded immediate action without time for reflection or deliberation and does not comprehend a static condition which lasted over a period of time.’ Miller v. McAllister (1959), 169 Ohio St. 487 [ 8 O.O.2d 485 , 160 N.E.2d 231 ], paragraph six of the syllabus.

1995Scott v. Marshall (1951), 90 Ohio App. 347 [ 48 O.O. 12 , 105 N.E.2d 281 ]; Stremanos v. Cleveland Transit Co. (App.1947), 50 Ohio Law Abs. 123 [ 77 N.E.2d 504 ]. “ Tn a negligence action, the so-called “emergency doctrine” applies only where there was a sudden and unexpected occurrence of a transitory nature which demanded immediate action without time for reflection or deliberation and does not comprehend a static condition which lasted over a period of time.’ Miller v. McAllister (1959), 169 Ohio St. 487 [ 8 O.O.2d 485 , 160 N.E.2d 231 ], paragraph six of the syllabus.

1995The standard for determining when these circumstances exist to preclude liability was established in Lehman v. Haynam (1956), 164 Ohio St. 595 , 59 O.O. 5 , 133 N.E.2d 97 , wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held that: “Where the driver of an automobile is suddenly stricken by a period of unconsciousness which he has no reason to anticipate and which renders it impossible for him to control the car he is driving, he is not chargeable with negligence as to such lack of control.” Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. *369 This court summarized this standard in Mapes v. Opper (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 1

1995The standard for determining when these circumstances exist to preclude liability was established in Lehman v. Haynam (1956), 164 Ohio St. 595 , 59 O.O. 5 , 133 N.E.2d 97 , wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held that: “Where the driver of an automobile is suddenly stricken by a period of unconsciousness which he has no reason to anticipate and which renders it impossible for him to control the car he is driving, he is not chargeable with negligence as to such lack of control.” Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. *369 This court summarized this standard in Mapes v. Opper (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 1