summarized doctrine in Maryland

1984Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 543-5 , 404 A.2d 1045 (1979), the Court summarized the factors to be considered in relying upon the administrative interpretation of a statute.

1984Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 543-5 , 404 A.2d 1045 (1979), the Court summarized the factors to be considered in relying upon the administrative interpretation of a statute.

2020Desser v. Woods, 266 Md. 696 (1972); Rettaliata v. Sullivan, 208 Md. 617 (1956); Brashears v. Collision, 207 Md. 339 (1955).

2020Desser v. Woods, 266 Md. 696 (1972); Rettaliata v. Sullivan, 208 Md. 617 (1956); Brashears v. Collision, 207 Md. 339 (1955).

2020Desser v. Woods, 266 Md. 696 (1972); Rettaliata v. Sullivan, 208 Md. 617 (1956); Brashears v. Collision, 207 Md. 339 (1955).

2013Based on the holding in Turner , the Court summarized the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants as follows: [A]t least under certain circumstances, ... when a common grantor develops land for sale in lots, pursues a course of conduct indicating an intention to follow a general plan or scheme of development with respect to the land, and imposes substantially uniform restrictions on the lots conveyed, those same restrictions may be enforced against the land retained by the common grantor if that land is found to be part of the general plan of development and the buyers purchased thei

2013Based on the holding in Turner , the Court summarized the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants as follows: [A]t least under certain circumstances, ... when a common grantor develops land for sale in lots, pursues a course of conduct indicating an intention to follow a general plan or scheme of development with respect to the land, and imposes substantially uniform restrictions on the lots conveyed, those same restrictions may be enforced against the land retained by the common grantor if that land is found to be part of the general plan of development and the buyers purchased thei

2008The Court summarized defense coun *69 sel’s proffered reasoning as to the need to prove that the witness was on probation for a juvenile offense, id. at 311, 94 S.Ct. 1105 : From this petitioner would seek to show — or at least argue — that [the juvenile] acted out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to his probation.

2006Co., 166 Md.App. 321, 340 , 888 A.2d 1189 (2005), this Court summarized the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: [T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ... prohibits a litigant from “blowing hot and cold,” by taking one position that is accepted by one court and advocating a completely contrary position in another court, to try to gain advantage.

2006Co., 166 Md.App. 321, 340 , 888 A.2d 1189 (2005), this Court summarized the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: [T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ... prohibits a litigant from “blowing hot and cold,” by taking one position that is accepted by one court and advocating a completely contrary position in another court, to try to gain advantage.

2001Acknowledging that “the inquiry is a highly fact-specific one,” the Court summarized the factors that other courts have identified as “probative of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave,” id. at 377 , 735 A.2d 491 , as follows: the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated *107 him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the

2001Acknowledging that “the inquiry is a highly fact-specific one,” the Court summarized the factors that other courts have identified as “probative of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave,” id. at 377 , 735 A.2d 491 , as follows: the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated *107 him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the

1994The court summarized the doctrine of ratification in sole shareholder cases where no creditors were harmed: “[In cases involving the usurpation of a corporate opportunity], as with other acts involving interested directors, the shareholders of the corporation ordinarily can ratify the transaction ... [and] the ratification is valid unless the transaction itself violates a statute or public policy.... [E]ven when the transaction is detrimental to the corporation, no cause of action will lie if all of the shareholders have ratified the transaction.... [and] the rights of [the corporation’s] cred

1988In Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582 , 248 A.2d 455 (1968), this Court summarized the doctrine as follows: “[UJnder Maryland tort law, an owner because of his presumed control over his car when present though not physically handling the wheel, may be held liable in the event of a collision, to the same extent as if he were manually controlling or operating the vehicle.

1988In Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582 , 248 A.2d 455 (1968), this Court summarized the doctrine as follows: “[UJnder Maryland tort law, an owner because of his presumed control over his car when present though not physically handling the wheel, may be held liable in the event of a collision, to the same extent as if he were manually controlling or operating the vehicle.