Moore claim in Pennsylvania

2023The officer noted, while chasing the appellant, “that the object in the appellant’s hand was a wallet.” When the appellant stopped, “the officer approached him, frisked him, and took the wallet from his hand.” Id. [In affirming the denial of the Moore’s motion to suppress the seizure of the wallet,] the Superior Court reasoned that based on his observations of the appellant, the officer had “reasonable caution to suspect criminal activity was afoot.” This “justified the brief investigatory stop[,”] and “[t]he subsequent seizure and examination of the wallet was within the permissible scope of

2023The officer noted, while chasing the appellant, “that the object in the appellant’s hand was a wallet.” When the appellant stopped, “the officer approached him, frisked him, and took the wallet from his hand.” Id. [In affirming the denial of the Moore’s motion to suppress the seizure of the wallet,] the Superior Court reasoned that based on his observations of the appellant, the officer had “reasonable caution to suspect criminal activity was afoot.” This “justified the brief investigatory stop[,”] and “[t]he subsequent seizure and examination of the wallet was within the permissible scope of

2017We recognize that for a brief time case law added the requirement that an IME must also “substantially aid the insurer in evaluating the claim” in addition to the statutory requirement of “good cause shown.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Zachary, 569 A.2d 365 (Pa. Super. 1990).

2008This evidence included, inter alia, a "serious argument" between Moore and his counsel over his handling of Moore's defense, a belligerent threat by Moore to sue his counsel for malpractice, and testimony by Moore's counsel that he "felt physically threatened by Moore." Id. at 1159 .

2008This evidence included, inter alia, a “serious argument” between Moore and his counsel over his handling of Moore’s defense, a belligerent threat by Moore to sue his counsel for malpractice, and testimony by Moore’s counsel that he “felt physically threatened by Moore.” Id. at 1159 .

2007Moore’s claim, which is itself a matter of fact, see Corbin^ 716 A.2d at 617 , but upon the absence of any indication in the record that either T.S.

2004Complicating this matter, appellate counsel, who was the first counsel to represent Moore after trial counsel, was obliged to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal, see Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259 , 372 A.2d 687 (1977) (ineffectiveness claims must be raised at time defendant gets new counsel, or they are waived), even though there was no record of what mitigating evidence was available to trial counsel.

2004Complicating this matter, appellate counsel, who was the first counsel to represent Moore after trial counsel, was obliged to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal, see Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259 , 372 A.2d 687 (1977) (ineffectiveness claims must be raised at time defendant gets new counsel, or they are waived), even though there was no record of what mitigating evidence was available to trial counsel.

1980See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430 , 378 A.2d 1189 (1977); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449 , 377 A.2d 1199 (1977); and Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480 , 378 A.2d 1215 (1977).

1980See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430 , 378 A.2d 1189 (1977); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449 , 377 A.2d 1199 (1977); and Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480 , 378 A.2d 1215 (1977).

1980See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430 , 378 A.2d 1189 (1977); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449 , 377 A.2d 1199 (1977); and Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480 , 378 A.2d 1215 (1977).

1980Contracts to make a will in a specific manner, although recognized in Pennsylvania, are viewed “with misgivings and suspicion”: Vajentic Est., 453 Pa. 1, 7 .

1974In Moore Estate, 445 Pa. 17 , 283 A. 2d 50 (1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the “relation back” doctrine, concerning the exercise of a power of appointment, should not be applied in determining inheritance tax liability, under circumstances where a general power of appointment was created prior to the charitable exemption statute, but was exercised in favor of charities after the effective date of the Act.

1974In Moore Estate, 445 Pa. 17 , 283 A. 2d 50 (1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the “relation back” doctrine, concerning the exercise of a power of appointment, should not be applied in determining inheritance tax liability, under circumstances where a general power of appointment was created prior to the charitable exemption statute, but was exercised in favor of charities after the effective date of the Act.