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21 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leslie Wayne Yohey v. James A. Collins, Director Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Divisiongreen2 sentences2004As the Yohey court explained, "[a]n indigent defendant requesting non-psychiatric experts must demonstrate something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a requested expert." Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir.1993). 2004As the Yohey court explained, “[a]n indigent defendant requesting non-psychiatric experts must demonstrate something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a requested expert.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir.1993). | 3 | 3 |
DOUBLE QUICK, INC. v. Mooregreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding that the instant case was not a premises-liability case.” Double Quick, 73 So. 3d at 1166 (¶ 10). 2015Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding that the instant case was not a premises-liability case.” Double Quick, 73 So.3d at 1166 (¶ 10). | 2 | 2 |
Walker v. Stategreen2 sentences2006In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming *921 weight of the evidence, the reviewing court "must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial." Walker v. State, 881 So.2d 820, 831 (Miss.2004) ( citing Hubbard v. State, 819 So.2d 1192, 1196 (Miss.2001)). 2005In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the reviewing court “must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial.” Walker v. State, 881 So.2d 820, 831 (Miss. 2004) (citing Hubbard v. State, 819 So.2d 1192, 1196 (Miss. 2001)). | 2 | 2 |
Hubbard v. Stategreen2 sentences2006In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming *921 weight of the evidence, the reviewing court "must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial." Walker v. State, 881 So.2d 820, 831 (Miss.2004) ( citing Hubbard v. State, 819 So.2d 1192, 1196 (Miss.2001)). 2005In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the reviewing court “must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial.” Walker v. State, 881 So.2d 820, 831 (Miss. 2004) (citing Hubbard v. State, 819 So.2d 1192, 1196 (Miss. 2001)). | 2 | 2 |
Glasper v. Stategreen2 sentences2006In reviewing the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress a confession, this Court applies "the familiar general rule that since the trial court sits as the fact-finder when determining the issue of whether the accused's confession has been intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily given, we will only reverse the trial court's determination of this issue when such determination is manifestly wrong." Glasper v. State, 914 So.2d 708, 716 (Miss.2005). 2005In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress a confession, this Court applies “the familiar general rule that since the trial court sits as the fact-finder when determining the issue of whether the accused’s confession has been intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily given, we will only reverse the trial court’s determination of this issue when such determination is manifestly wrong.” Glasper v. State, 914 So.2d 708, 716 (Miss. 2005). | 2 | 2 |
Manix v. Stategreen2 sentences2006As the fact finder when determining whether a confession was voluntary, the circuit court's determination "will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong." Manix, 895 So.2d at 180-81 (testimony by officer that defendant voluntarily confessed was enough to affirm trial court's overruling of defendant's motion to suppress the confession). 2005As the fact finder when determining whether a confession was voluntary, the circuit court’s determination “will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong.” Manix, 895 So.2d at 16 180-81 (testimony by officer that defendant voluntarily confessed was enough to affirm trial court’s overruling of defendant’s motion to suppress the confession). | 1 | 2 |
Glover v. Jackson State Universitygreen1 sentence2026Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So. 2d 1267, 1274 (¶19) (Miss. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Joiner v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Moore’s plea was found to be “freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered,” and he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced in accord with the plea-bargain agreement. “[A] knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives an indictment’s failure to include habitual offender status.” Joiner v. State, 61 So.3d 156, 159-60 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Rushing v. Stategreen1 sentence2015During the hearing on Moore’s motion to sever, the State met its “burden to make out a prima facie case showing the offenses charged are within the language of the statute.” Rushing, 911 So.2d at 533 (¶ 14) (citing Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 772 (Miss.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Bush v. Statered2 sentences2015See Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss.2005). ¶ 26. 2015See Bush, 895 So.2d at 844 (¶ 18). | 1 | 1 |
Corley v. Stategreen1 sentence2015During the hearing on Moore’s motion to sever, the State met its “burden to make out a prima facie case showing the offenses charged are within the language of the statute.” Rushing, 911 So.2d at 533 (¶ 14) (citing Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 772 (Miss.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
City of Tupelo v. Martingreen1 sentence2005Following entry of the chancellor's September 24, 2003, order dismissing the complaint for injunctive relief, Moore file a motion to intervene requesting "an opportunity to present evidence and be fully heard prior to any adjudication which impacts her rights." After hearing argument of counsel, the chancellor overruled Moore's motion to intervene "for purposes for retrying the merits in this case" but allowed the intervention for the purpose of post-trial motions. ¶ 23. "[A] trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to intervene." City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So.2d 822, 8 | 1 | 1 |
Cummings v. Bendermangreen1 sentence2005Following entry of the chancellor's September 24, 2003, order dismissing the complaint for injunctive relief, Moore file a motion to intervene requesting "an opportunity to present evidence and be fully heard prior to any adjudication which impacts her rights." After hearing argument of counsel, the chancellor overruled Moore's motion to intervene "for purposes for retrying the merits in this case" but allowed the intervention for the purpose of post-trial motions. ¶ 23. "[A] trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to intervene." City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So.2d 822, 8 | 1 | 1 |
Dye v. Stategreen1 sentence2000Dye v. State, 498 So.2d 343, 344 (Miss.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Odom v. Stategreen1 sentence1995Odom v. State, 483 So. 2d 343, 344 (Miss. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Puckettgreen1 sentence1995Under Section 47-5-139(1)(e) "an inmate shall not be eligible for the earned time allowance if the inmate has not served the mandatory time required for parole eligibility for a conviction of armed robbery or attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon." This amendment, along with the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Williams v. Puckett, 624 So. 2d 496, 500 (Miss. 1993), holding that one "does not 'earn' time during the service of mandatory time," has prompted the Mississippi Department of Corrections to take away time credits earned during the mandatory portion of an inmate's sen | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen1 sentence1981On appeal the State, in support of the action of the trial judge, cites Thomas v. State, 377 So.2d 593, 595 (Miss. 1979), a case in which this Court dealt with Rule 4.06. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
2 sentences1998Moore, 578 A.2d at 609 . 1997Moore, 578 A.2d at 609 . | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Moore v. State
green
1 sentence2022In Moore, the Alabama court’s non-binding decision was that “[b]ecause the State presented nothing to indicate that the [defendant’s] prior convictions were relevant to Moore’s mental state at the time of the present offense, the prior convictions were not admissible to rebut Moore’s defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.” Moore, 878 So. 2d at 337 . ¶55. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Jolyn Cullum v. Jan McCool
green
2 sentences2020Hill also contends that Moore should have watched to see if Wofford would drive her car “in defiance of Moore’s warnings,” at which point Moore “could have called the police 8 and advised that an intoxicated person was taking to the streets in a motor vehicle.” To support her argument, Hill cites Cullum v. McCool, 432 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. 2013), where a store’s customer was injured in a parking lot accident with another patron who had been kicked out of the store for being intoxicated and belligerent. 2020Id. at 831 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
McGowen v. State
green
1 sentence2016In McGowen v. State, 859 So.2d 320 (Miss.2003), the Mississippi Supreme Court considered whether a defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when a crime-lab serologist testified on behalf of her coworker. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Moore v. State
green
1 sentence2009On review, the court found that the victim’s testimony about the stabbing and photographs of the victim’s neck injuries were sufficient to support the verdict *47 and that “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant Moore’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.” Id. at (¶ 39). ¶22. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Pittman
green
1 sentence2005Co. v. Pittman, 501 So.2d 377 , 381 n. 1 (Miss. 1987)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 2004Id. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.