Moore instruction in California

2026Under option two, the court would either give the jury a “Moore instruction,” from the case People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105 (Moore), or it would read the jury CALCRIM No. 3551, which, like a Moore instruction, contains suggestions for overcoming difficulty reaching a verdict.

2026Under option two, the court would either give the jury a “Moore instruction,” from the case People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105 (Moore), or it would read the jury CALCRIM No. 3551, which, like a Moore instruction, contains suggestions for overcoming difficulty reaching a verdict.

2026Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 , 349- 350.) Moore does not cite any portion of the settlement agreement that suggests the Bank had an implied duty to assist him in meeting his obligations under the settlement agreement.

2024Moore went on to cite McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279 for its holding that to prove prejudicial discrimination there must be specific evidence of racist motivation or intent in the prosecution of the case.

2020The trial court denied Moore’s motion to consolidate the two matters and found in favor of [Bragg] in the unlawful detainer action.” (Moore II, supra, B276366, at p. 2.) In August 2013, we reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded to the trial court “for determination of the parties’ rights to legal and beneficial title to the property, and their respective rights to possession based on that determination.” (Moore I, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 395 .) “Meanwhile, having been evicted from the property without his personal belongings and with the appeal in Moore [I] pending, Moore initia

2020(See rule 4.409; rule 4.423 [setting forth mitigating circumstances “relating to the defendant”]; Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117 ; Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310 .) Moreover, by stating that it had received and reviewed Moore’s motion, which was based solely on his conduct in prison, the trial court implicitly indicated it had considered at least this individualized characteristic.

2020(See rule 4.409; rule 4.423 [setting forth mitigating circumstances “relating to the defendant”]; Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117 ; Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310 .) Moreover, by stating that it had received and reviewed Moore’s motion, which was based solely on his conduct in prison, the trial court implicitly indicated it had considered at least this individualized characteristic.

2020(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 751 ; see People v. Yanez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 452 , 460 [applying the forfeiture doctrine to the same claim at issue here], review granted Apr. 22, 2020, S260819 (Yanez).) Moore filed his motion in October 2018.

2020The trial court denied Moore’s motion to consolidate the two matters and found in favor of [Bragg] in the unlawful detainer action.” (Moore II, supra, B276366, at p. 2.) In August 2013, we reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded to the trial court “for determination of the parties’ rights to legal and beneficial title to the property, and their respective rights to possession based on that determination.” (Moore I, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 395 .) “Meanwhile, having been evicted from the property without his personal belongings and with the appeal in Moore [I] pending, Moore initia

2020(See rule 4.409; rule 4.423 [setting forth mitigating circumstances “relating to the defendant”]; Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117 ; Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310 .) Moreover, by stating that it had received and reviewed Moore’s motion, which was based solely on his conduct in prison, the trial court implicitly indicated it had considered at least this individualized characteristic.

2020(See rule 4.409; rule 4.423 [setting forth mitigating circumstances “relating to the defendant”]; Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117 ; Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310 .) Moreover, by stating that it had received and reviewed Moore’s motion, which was based solely on his conduct in prison, the trial court implicitly indicated it had considered at least this individualized characteristic.

2018Moore conflates rebuttable presumptions with permissible inferences, as defendant would have us do here.5 Moore’s error was explained in detail in People v. Beltran (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 235 , a drunk driving case.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1127 .) 2 We provide an abbreviated summary of the facts of the underlying offenses because they are not relevant to Moore's claim on appeal. 3 A. Governing law "In California, a single act or course of conduct can lead to convictions 'of any number of the offenses charged.' [Citations.] However, a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses." (Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 984 .) In applying the bar against multiple convictions for necessarily included offenses, a court

2016(See, e.g., People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1127 .) 2 We provide an abbreviated summary of the facts of the underlying offenses because they are not relevant to Moore's claim on appeal. 3 A. Governing law "In California, a single act or course of conduct can lead to convictions 'of any number of the offenses charged.' [Citations.] However, a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses." (Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 984 .) In applying the bar against multiple convictions for necessarily included offenses, a court

2016(People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 358 .) Defendant therefore fails to show improper coercion from Moore’s immunity agreement.

2015(People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 815 ; see also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 774 [finding no coercion where the trial court instructed the jury to continue deliberating after four expressions of impasse and a note expressing the jury was “ ‘hopelessly deadlocked’ ”].) Here, we conclude the Moore instruction is an appropriate and proper reminder to the jurors of their duties; it is not coercive.

2015(People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 815 ; see also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 774 [finding no coercion where the trial court instructed the jury to continue deliberating after four expressions of impasse and a note expressing the jury was “ ‘hopelessly deadlocked’ ”].) Here, we conclude the Moore instruction is an appropriate and proper reminder to the jurors of their duties; it is not coercive.

2015In People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , the California Supreme Court observed that such an instruction need not be given because it could “improperly diminish[] the jury’s duty to deliberate and reach a verdict if possible.” (Id. at p. 660.) Accordingly, there was no error in not so instructing the jury.

2015In People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , the California Supreme Court observed that such an instruction need not be given because it could “improperly diminish[] the jury’s duty to deliberate and reach a verdict if possible.” (Id. at p. 660.) Accordingly, there was no error in not so instructing the jury.

2014And with this view, it is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do so.” (Cf. People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471 , 1475–1476 [predeliberation instruction that jury should reach a verdict, if it can, is not coercive].) The challenged portion of the Moore instruction given in this case was no more coercive than the one given in People v. Butler.

2014And with this view, it is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do so.” (Cf. People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471 , 1475–1476 [predeliberation instruction that jury should reach a verdict, if it can, is not coercive].) The challenged portion of the Moore instruction given in this case was no more coercive than the one given in People v. Butler.

2014The disputed portions of the Moore instruction are as follows: (1) the admonition that “In the course of your further deliberations, you should not hesitate to re-examine your own views or to request your fellow jurors to re-examine theirs”; (2) the statement that “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with the goal of arriving at a verdict on a charge if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment”; and (3) the suggestion, given as one example of possible alternative deliberation techniques, that the jury might “wish to experiment with reverse role playing by having those on

2014The disputed portions of the Moore instruction are as follows: (1) the admonition that “In the course of your further deliberations, you should not hesitate to re-examine your own views or to request your fellow jurors to re-examine theirs”; (2) the statement that “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with the goal of arriving at a verdict on a charge if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment”; and (3) the suggestion, given as one example of possible alternative deliberation techniques, that the jury might “wish to experiment with reverse role playing by having those on

2014In People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 82 , the Supreme Court expressly approved an instruction that, like the Moore instruction here, “did not in any way single out minority jurors” and “encouraged members of both the majority and the minority . . . to ‘reweigh [their] positions’ in light of the ‘arguments’ and to ‘have an open mind . . . to reevaluating.’ ” (Id. at p. 162, fn. omitted.) Here, like the Supreme Court in People v. Valdez, we conclude that “[v]iewing the instructions as a whole, there is little, if any, likelihood the jurors understood that the court was asking jurors in the min

2014In People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 82 , the Supreme Court expressly approved an instruction that, like the Moore instruction here, “did not in any way single out minority jurors” and “encouraged members of both the majority and the minority . . . to ‘reweigh [their] positions’ in light of the ‘arguments’ and to ‘have an open mind . . . to reevaluating.’ ” (Id. at p. 162, fn. omitted.) Here, like the Supreme Court in People v. Valdez, we conclude that “[v]iewing the instructions as a whole, there is little, if any, likelihood the jurors understood that the court was asking jurors in the min