Moore claim in Florida

2015All four grounds were based on the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. , The trial court order denying Moore’s motion specifically granted Moore leave to file an amendment with regard to two of the grounds alleged pursuant to Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007). -The trial court’s order ap *386 peared final as to the third ground, while the fourth ground was based on the alleged cumulative effect of the other three grounds.

2008However, pursuant to Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007), we conclude that Moore is entitled to an opportunity to file an amended motion, if he can do so in good faith.

2022Accordingly, the portion of the postconviction court's order denying Moore's claim as to the general sentence for the multiple grand theft counts is reversed. "[T]he remedy for such an error is not the withdrawal of the underlying plea, but a vacation of the general sentence and entry of a separate, distinct sentence for each of the individual counts." Secong v. State, 225 So. 3d 909, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes, 100 So. 3d at 283 ).

2018Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 , 644–45 (Fla. 1999))); Walker v. Cash Register Auto Ins. of Leon Cty., Inc., 946 So. 2d 66, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (affirming an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105(1) based on the tipsy coachman rule). 5 Moore’s motion for section 57.105 attorney’s fees specifically placed Flaire Mae’s estate and its attorney on notice that Moore contended that the estate’s entire action was “barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.”2 At that point, section 57.105(4) provided Flaire Mae’s estate and its counsel with a twenty-one-day “safe harbor” per

2015The trial court properly denied Moore’s motion for a mistrial, as the testimony at issue was not so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, see id., did not become a feature of trial, cf. Ward v. State, 59 So.3d 1220, 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and did not reveal any new facts to the jury regarding an uncharged crime.

2014Regarding the prosecutor’s comments about the timing of the Moore defense, Davis relies on Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir.1994), and Jackson v. State, 933 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

2014In Zant , the prosecutor responded to the defendant’s statement that codefendant Underwood had confessed by announcing to the jury that the defendant’s statement was “not true” — when it was — and argued that the defendant’s testimony that Underwood was guilty was the “first time in living memory” that the defendant had told that defense to anyone. 36 F.3d at 1546-47 .

2014Once Davis testified on direct examination that Moore committed the charged offenses and about why Davis did not immediately implicate Moore, the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Davis about the timing of his allegations, Evans, 838 So.2d at 1095 , and to use closing argument to highlight the inconsistencies and weaknesses in Davis’s testimony, Bertolotti, 476 So.2d at 184 .

2014Once Davis testified on direct examination that Moore committed the charged offenses and about why Davis did not immediately implicate Moore, the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Davis about the timing of his allegations, Evans, 838 So.2d at 1095 , and to use closing argument to highlight the inconsistencies and weaknesses in Davis’s testimony, Bertolotti, 476 So.2d at 184 .

2014Regarding the prosecutor’s comments about the timing of the Moore defense, Davis relies on Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir.1994), and Jackson v. State, 933 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

2014Once Davis testified on direct examination that Moore committed the charged offenses and about why Davis did not immediately implicate Moore, the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Davis about the timing of his allegations, Evans, 838 So.2d at 1095 , and to use closing argument to highlight the inconsistencies and weaknesses in Davis’s testimony, Bertolotti, 476 So.2d at 184 .

2014Once Davis testified on direct examination that Moore committed the charged offenses and about why Davis did not immediately implicate Moore, the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Davis about the timing of his allegations, Evans, 838 So.2d at 1095 , and to use closing argument to highlight the inconsistencies and weaknesses in Davis’s testimony, Bertolotti, 476 So.2d at 184 .

2011Id. at 1178 .

2011Id. at 1179 .

2005In making this argument, State Farm relied on Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828 (Fla.1990), for the proposition that a court-awarded statutory fee cannot exceed the amount otherwise permitted under the fee agreement between the attorney and client.

2002See id. [2] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993). [3] The eleven claims are: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to order state agencies to comply with Moore's request for additional public records; (2) the trial court erred by denying Moore an evidentiary hearing on his rule 3.850 claims regarding newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to consider Moore's third amended 3.850 motion; (4) the trial court erred by denying Moore's motion to disqualify the trial judge; (5) the omission of a pretrial conference fro

2002See id. [2] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993). [3] The eleven claims are: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to order state agencies to comply with Moore's request for additional public records; (2) the trial court erred by denying Moore an evidentiary hearing on his rule 3.850 claims regarding newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to consider Moore's third amended 3.850 motion; (4) the trial court erred by denying Moore's motion to disqualify the trial judge; (5) the omission of a pretrial conference fro

1997The United States Supreme Court has stated that "trial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also State v. Ford, 626 So.2d 1338, 1347 (Fla.1993).

1997The United States Supreme Court has stated that "trial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also State v. Ford, 626 So.2d 1338, 1347 (Fla.1993).

1995The Fifth Circuit in Yohey , applying the Eleventh Circuit's Moore test, found the defendant had failed to establish a reasonable probability that the requested experts would have assisted the defense and that denial of such assistance resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. 985 F.2d at 227 .

1993In Prieto v. State, 573 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), we found potential ineffectiveness in the alleged failure to locate and produce a witness who could testify that no crime occurred.

1980The cases cited by the majority, State v. Coyle, 181 So.2d 671 (Fla.2d DCA 1966) and Moore v. State, 355 So.2d 1219 (Fla.1st DCA 1978), followed principles enunciated prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Katz, supra. Moore, supra, is distinguishable from the case at bar since in Moore defendants were in plain view, and the officer was in a place where he had the legal right to be.

1980The cases cited by the majority, State v. Coyle, 181 So.2d 671 (Fla.2d DCA 1966) and Moore v. State, 355 So.2d 1219 (Fla.1st DCA 1978), followed principles enunciated prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Katz, supra. Moore, supra, is distinguishable from the case at bar since in Moore defendants were in plain view, and the officer was in a place where he had the legal right to be.

1980The cases cited by the majority, State v. Coyle, 181 So.2d 671 (Fla.2d DCA 1966) and Moore v. State, 355 So.2d 1219 (Fla.1st DCA 1978), followed principles enunciated prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Katz, supra. Moore, supra, is distinguishable from the case at bar since in Moore defendants were in plain view, and the officer was in a place where he had the legal right to be.