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15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences1998The Court’s opinion states the applicable law as the “doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied within the constitutional protection against a defendant being twice placed in jeopardy for the same crime.” See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). 1 Consistent with this, I understand the constitutional principle applicable here and announced in Ashe, which was a “successive prosecution” case to be the rule of collateral estoppel “as embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy” may preclude the government in a later criminal prosecution fr 1998The Court’s opinion states the applicable law as the “doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied within the constitutional protection against a defendant being twice placed in jeopardy for the same crime.” See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). 1 Consistent with this, I understand the constitutional principle applicable here and announced in Ashe, which was a “successive prosecution” case to be the rule of collateral estoppel “as embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy” may preclude the government in a later criminal prosecution fr | 6 | 7 |
Ex Parte Watkinsgreen2 sentences2015Clewis v. State, 222 S.W.3d 460 , 464–65 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. ref'd) (citing Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d 264, 267 (Tex. Crim. 2007Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied within the constitutional bar against double jeopardy, but the two *465 doctrines are not identical. [3] See Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d at 267 . | 3 | 4 |
Murphy v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. Crim. 2009Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Saucedagreen2 sentences2003See Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); State v. Sauceda , 980 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. Crim. 2003See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); State v. Sauceda, 980 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stevensgreen1 sentence2018Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). “[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” State v. Getman, 255 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 ); see Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Getmangreen1 sentence2018Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). “[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” State v. Getman, 255 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 ); see Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dixongreen2 sentences1998See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 573 (1993) (characterizing Ashe as holding the rule of collateral estoppel as “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy” may “bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts”); Ashe, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (when an “issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit”). 1998See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 573 (1993) (characterizing Ashe as holding the rule of collateral estoppel as “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy” may “bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts”); Ashe, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (when an “issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit”). | 1 | 1 |
Ladner v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Ladner v. State, 780 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clewis v. State
green
1 sentence2015Clewis v. State, 222 S.W.3d 460 , 464–65 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. ref'd) (citing Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d 264, 267 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |