difference standard in Texas

2002Gillam , 287 S.W.2d at 497 .

2002Gillam, 287 S.W.2d at 497 .

1982This difference in the rule, dependent upon the time when the objection to the action of the court is made, is in harmony with the rules of judicial proceedings generally, that a party who makes his objection at the proper time, which is usually the first practical opportunity, shall have his objection more favorably considered than if it had been inopportunely delayed.’ But again he says: ‘In this court on appeal, as well as in the District Court on a motion for a new trial, a material misdirection of the law as applicable to the case, calculated to mislead the jury, would be error justifying

1982This difference in the rule, dependent upon the time when the objection to the action of the court is made, is in harmony with the rules of judicial proceedings generally, that a party who makes his objection at the proper time, which is usually the first practical opportunity, shall have his objection more favorably considered than if it had been inopportunely delayed.' But again he says: `In this court on appeal, as well as in the District Court on a motion for a new trial, a material misdirection of the law as applicable to the case, calculated to mislead the jury, would be error justifying

2019In Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 481–82, the Texas Supreme Court explained that “[p]roving the employer’s stated reason for the firing is pretext is ordinarily sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the employer was actually motivated by discrimination [emphasis added].” In contrast, the jury instruction provided here states: “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an employment action is false is ordinarily sufficient to permit you to find that the employer was actually motivated by discrimination [emphasis added].” We find that this difference in

2015STATE, 300 SW 3d 763 (Tex.Crim.App.2009), which is the opinion relied upon by the court of appeals in the present appeal.

2012See, e.g., Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1160 ; Yeager, 454 F.3d at 933-34 ; Morrow, 152 F.3d at 562 .

2012See, e.g., Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1160 ; Yeager, 454 F.3d at 933-34 ; Morrow, 152 F.3d at 562 .

1981Interstate Theatres, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1977, writ refd n. r. e.), upholding a difference in taxation on the basis of a difference in the principle business of the taxpayers.

1975See: Thornton v. McReynolds, 156 S.W. 1144 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1913, writ ref’d); Singleton v. Carmichael, 305 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Meyers v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 26 , 19 S.W.2d 317 (1929) and Moeling v. Russell, 483 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1972, no writ).

1975See: Thornton v. McReynolds, 156 S.W. 1144 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1913, writ ref’d); Singleton v. Carmichael, 305 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Meyers v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 26 , 19 S.W.2d 317 (1929) and Moeling v. Russell, 483 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1972, no writ).

1975See: Thornton v. McReynolds, 156 S.W. 1144 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1913, writ ref’d); Singleton v. Carmichael, 305 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Meyers v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 26 , 19 S.W.2d 317 (1929) and Moeling v. Russell, 483 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1972, no writ).

1975See: Thornton v. McReynolds, 156 S.W. 1144 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1913, writ ref’d); Singleton v. Carmichael, 305 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Meyers v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 26 , 19 S.W.2d 317 (1929) and Moeling v. Russell, 483 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1972, no writ).

1971A county is liable only under statutory enactment, and there being no statute making the district liable in a case such as this, no liability can result. * * * ” See City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118 ; Anno. 56 A.L.R.2d 1416 , 1424.

1945Gibson & Johnson v. Ward, Tex.Civ.App., 35 S.W.2d 824 ; Hogan v. W.

1940The difference is not in principle, but only in degree.”- (Citation of authorities.) To the same effect, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1 , 174 N.W. 885 , 176 N.W. 159 , 162, 8 A.L.R. 585 , said: “Another reason is that giving the people a means to secure for that portion of a city, wherein they establish their homes, fit and harmonious surroundings, promotes contentment, induces further efforts to enhance the appearance and value of the home, fosters civic pride, and thus tends to produce a better type of citizens.

1940The difference is not in principle, but only in degree.”- (Citation of authorities.) To the same effect, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1 , 174 N.W. 885 , 176 N.W. 159 , 162, 8 A.L.R. 585 , said: “Another reason is that giving the people a means to secure for that portion of a city, wherein they establish their homes, fit and harmonious surroundings, promotes contentment, induces further efforts to enhance the appearance and value of the home, fosters civic pride, and thus tends to produce a better type of citizens.

1926App.) 213 S. W. at page 683: “It is oft-repeated and familiar law that in cases of fraud the purchaser has a choice of .remedies, either to stand upon the bargain and recover damages, or to rescind the contract, return the thing bought, and get back what he has paid (Blythe v. Speake, 23 Tex. 429 ; Scalf v. Tompkins, 61 Tex. 476 ); the measure of damages being the difference between the value bf the property and the price paid (Davenport v. Anderson [Tex. Civ.

1926App.) 213 S. W. at page 683: “It is oft-repeated and familiar law that in cases of fraud the purchaser has a choice of .remedies, either to stand upon the bargain and recover damages, or to rescind the contract, return the thing bought, and get back what he has paid (Blythe v. Speake, 23 Tex. 429 ; Scalf v. Tompkins, 61 Tex. 476 ); the measure of damages being the difference between the value bf the property and the price paid (Davenport v. Anderson [Tex. Civ.