difference principle in California

2018There is a difference in the analysis relevant here. " Evidence Code section 352 must bow to the due process right of a defendant to a fair trial and his right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his defense. [Citations.]" ( People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593 , 599, 237 Cal.Rptr. 654 .) The "trial court's discretion should 'favor the defendant in cases of doubt' [citation.]" ( Id . at p. 600, 237 Cal.Rptr. 654 ; see People v. Mizer (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 261 , 269, 15 Cal.Rptr. 272 ["We believe that it is fundamental in our system of jurisprudence th

2018There is a difference in the analysis relevant here. " Evidence Code section 352 must bow to the due process right of a defendant to a fair trial and his right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his defense. [Citations.]" ( People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593 , 599, 237 Cal.Rptr. 654 .) The "trial court's discretion should 'favor the defendant in cases of doubt' [citation.]" ( Id . at p. 600, 237 Cal.Rptr. 654 ; see People v. Mizer (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 261 , 269, 15 Cal.Rptr. 272 ["We believe that it is fundamental in our system of jurisprudence th

2002(Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 187 , 505 P.2d 1027 ] [‘That standard [of clear and convincing evidence] was adopted, however, for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. . . . “[I]f there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’]; accord In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 546 , 710 P.2d 346 ].)” ( Patrick, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1576 ; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1997) Appeal,

2002(Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 187 , 505 P.2d 1027 ] [‘That standard [of clear and convincing evidence] was adopted, however, for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. . . . “[I]f there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’]; accord In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 546 , 710 P.2d 346 ].)” ( Patrick, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1576 ; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1997) Appeal,

2002(Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 187 , 505 P.2d 1027 ] [‘That standard [of clear and convincing evidence] was adopted, however, for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. . . . “[I]f there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’]; accord In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 546 , 710 P.2d 346 ].)” ( Patrick, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1576 ; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1997) Appeal,

2002(Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 187 , 505 P.2d 1027 ] [‘That standard [of clear and convincing evidence] was adopted, however, for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. . . . “[I]f there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’]; accord In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 546 , 710 P.2d 346 ].)” ( Patrick, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1576 ; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1997) Appeal,

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2017After describing its prior decision in Walder , the court observed, "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder ." ( Harris , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 225 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ; see Walder , supra , 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 .) In highlighting the necessity of allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant's statements to police, despite having been obtained in violation of Miranda , the court explained, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately

2016(See Palafox, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 83 ; People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fn. 7 .) Under both standards, courts look to the “‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 102 , quoting Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plur. opn. of Warren, J.); People v. Clark (1970) 3 Cal.3d 97, 99 .) Over the last decade, the United States and California Supreme Courts have construed the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment to place ever-greater limits on the range of sentences tha

2016(See Palafox, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 83 ; People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fn. 7 .) Under both standards, courts look to the “‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 102 , quoting Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plur. opn. of Warren, J.); People v. Clark (1970) 3 Cal.3d 97, 99 .) Over the last decade, the United States and California Supreme Courts have construed the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment to place ever-greater limits on the range of sentences tha

2013(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 742 [with respect to whether presence at certain proceedings would have made a difference to the defense, court concluded that "[t]he only possible basis for a conclusion favorable to [defendant] in this regard would be speculation.

2002(Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 187 , 505 P.2d 1027 ] [‘That standard [of clear and convincing evidence] was adopted, however, for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. . . . “[I]f there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’]; accord In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 546 , 710 P.2d 346 ].)” ( Patrick, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1576 ; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1997) Appeal,

2000(See Bunnett v. Regents of University of California (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 843, 848 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ].) But we fail to see the relevance of this argument because Aquafarm was entitled to bring a traditional mandate action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. 5 This holding is fully consistent with our decision in Bradley v. Medical Board (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 445 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ], where we held a doctor was not entitled to recover monetary damages for an alleged violation of his state constitutional due process rights during an administrative investigation.

2000(See Bunnett v. Regents of University of California (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 843, 848 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ].) But we fail to see the relevance of this argument because Aquafarm was entitled to bring a traditional mandate action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. 5 This holding is fully consistent with our decision in Bradley v. Medical Board (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 445 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ], where we held a doctor was not entitled to recover monetary damages for an alleged violation of his state constitutional due process rights during an administrative investigation.

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1993It is settled that the guaranty of due process extends to rights created under the Constitution or state law. ( Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 ]; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ]; Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674 [ 184 P. 431 ]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ]; see Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 768 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 910 ].) The due process clause may be invoked "`to insure that [a] state-created righ

1990And, because appellants concede that respondent "is without question entitled to one-half" of the joint tenancy accounts the decedent had closed, this case does not present any issue concerning the respective interests of the parties immediately following the decedent's unilateral severance of the accounts. [2] Harris II held only that personal property acquired with joint tenancy proceeds is deemed held in joint tenancy in the absence of a contrary agreement, noting that all of the decisions that had followed Harris I affected personal property only. ( Harris II, supra, 9 Cal.2d at pp. 654-65

1990And, because appellants concede that respondent "is without question entitled to one-half" of the joint tenancy accounts the decedent had closed, this case does not present any issue concerning the respective interests of the parties immediately following the decedent's unilateral severance of the accounts. [2] Harris II held only that personal property acquired with joint tenancy proceeds is deemed held in joint tenancy in the absence of a contrary agreement, noting that all of the decisions that had followed Harris I affected personal property only. ( Harris II, supra, 9 Cal.2d at pp. 654-65