15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sentell v. Williamson Countygreen2 sentences2010See Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas, 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no pet.) (no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist”). 2010See Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas, 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, no pet.) (no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist"). | 5 | 5 |
Roberts v. Allisongreen2 sentences2010See Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas, 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no pet.) (no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist”). 2010See Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas, 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, no pet.) (no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist"). | 5 | 5 |
LaTaste Enterprises v. City of Addisongreen2 sentences2025LaTaste Enter. v. City of Addison, 115 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). 2019LaTaste Enter. v.City of Addison, 115 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). | 3 | 3 |
Hubert v. Davisgreen2 sentences2008In other words, an easement is a privilege to use land that is completely distinct from ownership of the land, Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.), and an easement does not convey title to property, Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, writ denied). 2008In other words, an easement is a privilege to use land that is completely distinct from ownership of the land, Hubert v. Davis , 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2005, no pet.), and an easement does not convey title to property, Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn , 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc. , 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.--Austin 1988, writ denied). | 3 | 3 |
Daniel v. Foxgreen2 sentences2016Daniel v, Fox, 917 S.W.2d 106, 110 (TexApp. — San Antonio 1996, writ denied). 2003Daniel v. Fox, 917 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). | 2 | 2 |
Stephen F. Austin State University v. Flynngreen2 sentences2008In other words, an easement is a privilege to use land that is completely distinct from ownership of the land, Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.), and an easement does not convey title to property, Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, writ denied). 2008In other words, an easement is a privilege to use land that is completely distinct from ownership of the land, Hubert v. Davis , 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2005, no pet.), and an easement does not convey title to property, Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn , 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc. , 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.--Austin 1988, writ denied). | 2 | 2 |
Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc.green2 sentences2008In other words, an easement is a privilege to use land that is completely distinct from ownership of the land, Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.), and an easement does not convey title to property, Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, writ denied). 2008In other words, an easement is a privilege to use land that is completely distinct from ownership of the land, Hubert v. Davis , 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2005, no pet.), and an easement does not convey title to property, Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn , 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc. , 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.--Austin 1988, writ denied). | 2 | 2 |
Corley v. Entergy Corp.green1 sentence2017Even assuming the relevancy of the no-change-in-the-boundaries-of-the-Easement analysis, the majority’s holding—that because Campbell’s positioning of the new tower in a new location purportedly within the existing boundaries of the Easement caused no day-to-day change in Linde-mann’s day-to-day operations, the new tower’s change in location was not “substantial”—is incompatible with Texas case law. 8 The fact that the new location of the new; tower did not cause a change in Lin-demann’s operations does not authorize an expansion of the Easement’s express terms, which are limited to “a right f | 1 | 1 |
Samuelson v. Alvaradogreen1 sentence2009Moreover, "impassibility of a [second] road gives a party no right to an easement." Â Duff, 311 S.W.2d at 643 . Â See Roberts v. Allison , 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas , 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, no pet.) ( no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist"). Â "When one has access to a part of his tract of land by way of travel over his own property, this, as a matter of law, is a better and m | 1 | 1 |
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2009Laws, 2431, this suit is governed by the law in effect immediately before the effective date of the amendment, September 1, 2009.  Id. at § 2.  Further, for convenience, we will cite to section 16.034 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code throughout the remainder of this opinion simply as "section 16.034" or § 16.034."  [22] In general, attorney's fees are not recoverable unless provided for by statute or between the parties.  New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Texas Industries, Inc ., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967).  Such statutory provisions for the recovery of attorney fees m 2009Laws, 2431, this suit is governed by the law in effect immediately before the effective date of the amendment, September 1, 2009.  Id. at § 2.  Further, for convenience, we will cite to section 16.034 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code throughout the remainder of this opinion simply as "section 16.034" or § 16.034."  [22] In general, attorney's fees are not recoverable unless provided for by statute or between the parties.  New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Texas Industries, Inc ., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967).  Such statutory provisions for the recovery of attorney fees m | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Horner v. Heather
green
1 sentence2025“The gravity of a judicial means of acquiring an interest in land of another solely by parol evidence requires that [the doctrine of easement by] estoppel be strictly applied.” Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Othen v. Rosier
green
1 sentence2009Moreover, "impassibility of a [second] road gives a party no right to an easement." Â Duff, 311 S.W.2d at 643 . Â See Roberts v. Allison , 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas , 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, no pet.) ( no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist"). Â "When one has access to a part of his tract of land by way of travel over his own property, this, as a matter of law, is a better and m | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009Moreover, "impassibility of a [second] road gives a party no right to an easement." Â Duff, 311 S.W.2d at 643 . Â See Roberts v. Allison , 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas , 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, no pet.) ( no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist"). Â "When one has access to a part of his tract of land by way of travel over his own property, this, as a matter of law, is a better and m | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Duff v. Matthews
green
1 sentence2009Moreover, "impassibility of a [second] road gives a party no right to an easement." Â Duff, 311 S.W.2d at 643 . Â See Roberts v. Allison , 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1992, writ denied) (impassability of alternative route not notice of an easement claim); Sentell v. Williamson County, Texas , 801 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, no pet.) ( no matter that alternate route is "too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist"). Â "When one has access to a part of his tract of land by way of travel over his own property, this, as a matter of law, is a better and m | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mhoon v. Cain
green
1 sentence1921The inference may have been drawn by the court below that the inception and user of the right of way was in subordination to the owner, and in recognition of his superior rights in the premises, and if so we cannot hold, under well-settled rules of law, that the conclusion was unwarranted by the facts proved. ‘A single lisp of acknowledgment * * * ’ of the owner’s title is fatal to the right.” In the case of Mhoon v. Cain, 77 Tex. 318 , 14 S. W. 24 , the Supreme Court holds: “The possession must be adverse to meet the terms of the statute. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.