Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1843–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jean Dupuis v. Stanley G. Ellingwoodgreen2 sentences2020See Dupuis v. Ellingwood, 2017 ME 132 , ,J,19-16, 166 A.3d 112 . 2020See Dupuis v. Ellingwood, 2017 ME 132 , ,J,19-16, 166 A.3d 112 . | 1 | 1 |
Wentworth v. Sebragreen2 sentences2004J 16, 829 A.2d at 525 (citation and quotations omitted). 2004“More recently, in Stickney, we considered a reserved right-of-way and determined that even though the easement clause omitted the term heirs, the easement was perpetual because the grantor’s intent to make it perpetual could be presumed from the facts at play.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Hallgreen2 sentences2003Id. [¶ 15] However, in O’Neill, we explained that we have long recognized that this technical requirement often frustrated the parties’ intent; therefore, we have “routinely construed a provision in a deed purporting to reserve an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as the creation of an easement appurtenant to that land ... obviat[ing] the requirement of the technical word ‘heirs’ to preserve an interest of perpetual duration.” O’Neill, 527 A.2d at 324 ; see e.g., Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 392-93 , 76 A. 705, 707 (1910). [¶ 16] More recently, in Stickney , we considered 2003Id. [¶ 15] However, in O’Neill, we explained that we have long recognized that this technical requirement often frustrated the parties’ intent; therefore, we have “routinely construed a provision in a deed purporting to reserve an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as the creation of an easement appurtenant to that land ... obviat[ing] the requirement of the technical word ‘heirs’ to preserve an interest of perpetual duration.” O’Neill, 527 A.2d at 324 ; see e.g., Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 392-93 , 76 A. 705, 707 (1910). [¶ 16] More recently, in Stickney , we considered | 1 | 1 |
Nollan v. California Coastal Commissiongreen2 sentences1998See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 , 107 S.Ct. at 3148 (coastal housing commission’s power to forbid construction of a house to protect a public interest *660 includes the power to impose a condition affecting property rights that serves the same end); See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 265 , 911 P.2d 429, 452 (Mosk, J. concurring) (1996) (an “otherwise unconstitutional imposition of a public easement on private property derives its constitutional legitimacy from the fact that a prohibition on development is constitutionally justified”). [¶7] The next determinati 1998See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 , 107 S.Ct. at 3148 (coastal housing commission’s power to forbid construction of a house to protect a public interest *660 includes the power to impose a condition affecting property rights that serves the same end); See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 265 , 911 P.2d 429, 452 (Mosk, J. concurring) (1996) (an “otherwise unconstitutional imposition of a public easement on private property derives its constitutional legitimacy from the fact that a prohibition on development is constitutionally justified”). [¶7] The next determinati | 1 | 1 |
Ehrlich v. City of Culver Citygreen2 sentences1998See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 , 107 S.Ct. at 3148 (coastal housing commission’s power to forbid construction of a house to protect a public interest *660 includes the power to impose a condition affecting property rights that serves the same end); See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 265 , 911 P.2d 429, 452 (Mosk, J. concurring) (1996) (an “otherwise unconstitutional imposition of a public easement on private property derives its constitutional legitimacy from the fact that a prohibition on development is constitutionally justified”). [¶7] The next determinati 1998See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 , 107 S.Ct. at 3148 (coastal housing commission’s power to forbid construction of a house to protect a public interest *660 includes the power to impose a condition affecting property rights that serves the same end); See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 265 , 911 P.2d 429, 452 (Mosk, J. concurring) (1996) (an “otherwise unconstitutional imposition of a public easement on private property derives its constitutional legitimacy from the fact that a prohibition on development is constitutionally justified”). [¶7] The next determinati | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dombkowski v. Ferland
green
2 sentences2017To demonstrate that he possesses property under a claim of right, a party must prove that he “is in possession as owner, with intent to claim the land as [his] own, and not in recognition of or subordination to the record title owner.” Dombkowski v. Ferland, 2006 ME 24, ¶ 12 , 893 A.2d 599 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 16] Dupuis argues that he proved that he treated the property wholly as his own through the evidence presented at trial detailing his use of and improvements to the property. 2017To demonstrate that he possesses property under a claim of right, a party must prove that he “is in possession as owner, with intent to claim the land as [his] own, and not in recognition of or subordination to the record title owner.” Dombkowski v. Ferland, 2006 ME 24, ¶ 12 , 893 A.2d 599 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 16] Dupuis argues that he proved that he treated the property wholly as his own through the evidence presented at trial detailing his use of and improvements to the property. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
James N. Levis v. Gustav Konitzky
green
2 sentences2017Thus, it was Dupuis’s burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 6 that his use and possession of the shorefront portion of the easement to the Beach Area was “(1) actual, (2) open, (3) visible, (4) notorious, (5) hostile, (6) under claim of right, (7) continuous, (8) exclusive, and (9) of a duration of at least twenty years.” Levis v. Konitzky, 2016 ME 167, ¶ 21 , 151 A.3d 20 . [¶ 15] The court determined that Dupuis failed to establish that he possessed the easement under a claim of right. 2017Thus, it was Dupuis’s burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 6 that his use and possession of the shorefront portion of the easement to the Beach Area was “(1) actual, (2) open, (3) visible, (4) notorious, (5) hostile, (6) under claim of right, (7) continuous, (8) exclusive, and (9) of a duration of at least twenty years.” Levis v. Konitzky, 2016 ME 167, ¶ 21 , 151 A.3d 20 . [¶ 15] The court determined that Dupuis failed to establish that he possessed the easement under a claim of right. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
O'NEILL v. Williams
green
2 sentences2003Id. [¶ 15] However, in O’Neill, we explained that we have long recognized that this technical requirement often frustrated the parties’ intent; therefore, we have “routinely construed a provision in a deed purporting to reserve an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as the creation of an easement appurtenant to that land ... obviat[ing] the requirement of the technical word ‘heirs’ to preserve an interest of perpetual duration.” O’Neill, 527 A.2d at 324 ; see e.g., Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 392-93 , 76 A. 705, 707 (1910). [¶ 16] More recently, in Stickney , we considered 2003He relies on our decisions in Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 , 770 A.2d 592 ; O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322 (Me.1987); and O’Donovan, 1999 ME 71 , 728 A.2d 681 , to support his argument that the court should have disregarded the technical failure of the easement clause and determined the parties’ intent from the wording of the entire deed or from the surrounding facts. [¶ 12] The law recognizes two different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Stickney v. City of Saco
green
2 sentences2003He relies on our decisions in Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 , 770 A.2d 592 ; O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322 (Me.1987); and O’Donovan, 1999 ME 71 , 728 A.2d 681 , to support his argument that the court should have disregarded the technical failure of the easement clause and determined the parties’ intent from the wording of the entire deed or from the surrounding facts. [¶ 12] The law recognizes two different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. 2003He relies on our decisions in Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 , 770 A.2d 592 ; O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322 (Me.1987); and O’Donovan, 1999 ME 71 , 728 A.2d 681 , to support his argument that the court should have disregarded the technical failure of the easement clause and determined the parties’ intent from the wording of the entire deed or from the surrounding facts. [¶ 12] The law recognizes two different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
O'Donovan v. McIntosh
green
2 sentences2003He relies on our decisions in Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 , 770 A.2d 592 ; O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322 (Me.1987); and O’Donovan, 1999 ME 71 , 728 A.2d 681 , to support his argument that the court should have disregarded the technical failure of the easement clause and determined the parties’ intent from the wording of the entire deed or from the surrounding facts. [¶ 12] The law recognizes two different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. 2003He relies on our decisions in Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69 , 770 A.2d 592 ; O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322 (Me.1987); and O’Donovan, 1999 ME 71 , 728 A.2d 681 , to support his argument that the court should have disregarded the technical failure of the easement clause and determined the parties’ intent from the wording of the entire deed or from the surrounding facts. [¶ 12] The law recognizes two different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Peters
neutral
1 sentence1843Terms de la Ley, a book of great antiquity, defines an easement to be a privilege, that one neighbor has of another by charter or preemption without profit, and instances, “ as a way or sink through his land or such like.” In Comm. v. Peters, 2 Mass. R. 125 , Sedgwick J. remarks, “ where land is appropriated to the use of a highway, the use only is taken; and except so far as that goes, the right of soil remains precisely as it was before. | 1 | 1843–1843 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.