easement privilege in New York

2013Furthermore, since the documentary evidence submitted by those parties in support of their motions demonstrated that the easement was recorded and a matter of public record, the Netzer defendants and the Netzers’ agents established, as a matter of law, that they did not actively conceal the easement from the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs were not thwarted in their efforts to fulfill their responsibilities imposed by the doctrine of caveat emptor (see Rojas v Paine, 101 AD3d 843 [2012]; Home-side Dev.

2013Furthermore, since the documentary evidence submitted by those parties in support of their motions demonstrated that the easement was recorded and a matter of public record, the Netzer defendants and the Netzers’ agents established, as a matter of law, that they did not actively conceal the easement from the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs were not thwarted in their efforts to fulfill their responsibilities imposed by the doctrine of caveat emptor (see Rojas v Paine, 101 AD3d 843 [2012]; Home-side Dev.

1979This is a sitúa tian where the easement provides that it was to be "as the same is now used.” (Lattimer v Sokolowski, 31 NYS2d 880 , 881.) Nor is this easement one that was to be used "for all ordinary purposes of ingress and egress” (Board of Educ. v Nielsen, 21 Misc 2d 368, 370 ).

1979"The omission from the grant here of any words limiting the use of this easement * * * must control the construction of the grant, for a limitation upon the existence and continuance of an easement privilege can be predicated upon a change in the character or use of the dominant property only when an intention to impose such limitation is found in the language of the grant itself.” (Mittnacht v Montana, 205 App Div 643, 646 .) The court does not find, as plaintiff would have it, that the references in the easement of the right to erect two signs with the occupants’ names and/or addresses is ev

1977In reversing an order of Special Term and denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, this court held, in Ilemar Corp. v Krochmal ( 48 AD2d 693 ), decided on May 21, 1975: "We are of the view that, under the circumstances, the buyer’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied in its entirety.

1927(Saratoga State Waters Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 443 .) It has also been held herein that such easement in gross constitutes an exception to the general rule in that it is not only severable from the dock property but that it is also assignable.

1920(Nellis v. Munson, 108 N. Y. 453 ; Long Island R.

1884Its policy of grants to individuals conditioned to be held for public purposes enabled it to accomplish that object; and by the Sinking Fund Ordinance, which was a law of its own mailing, it acknowledged and protected the riparian interest, upon certain conditions which it reserved the power to impose, by authorizing all grants of land under water to be made at a fixed price and “ to the parties legally entitled.” It thus assumed, what was entirely true, “ that in all eases ” of its water grants there were riparian owners who had just claims to consideration, subject only to the paramount publ