Lawson claim in Texas

2017Under the Lawson rule, the Texas Supreme Court held that where the Legislature had waived the university's immunity in the Whistleblower Act, the university could not "claim immunity from a suit brought to enforce a settlement agreement reached to dispose of a claim brought under the Act." 7 Id. at 522-23 .

2017Under the Lawson rule, the Texas Supreme Court held that where the Legislature had waived the university's immunity in the Whistleblower Act, the university could not "claim immunity from a suit brought to enforce a settlement agreement reached to dispose of a claim brought under the Act." 7 Id. at 522-23 .

2022See City of Pharr v. Garcia, 581 S.W.3d 930 , 932 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, no pet.) (“Although Lawson was a plurality opinion, the supreme court cited it with approval in Texas A & M Univ[ersity] Sys[tem] v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 , 838–39 (Tex. 2007), and then adopted the holding in Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2019).”).

2017Sys. v. Koseoglu , 233 S.W.3d 835 , 838-39 (Tex. 2007) (applying Lawson rule and concluding it was not implicated on facts of case).

2024See Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 521 (“Hence, identity was a hotly contested issue, and the integrity of appellant’s ‘Bertha’ confessions was of critical importance to the State.”); Lawson v. State, No. 13-22-00182-CR, 2023 WL 5124697 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding extraneous-offense evidence was “of critical importance to the State” based on the State’s argument that the extraneous-offense testimony “was the main evidence it had to rebut Lawson’s claim of self-defense”). 14 Next, we analyze the potential for the ex

2024See Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 521 (“Hence, identity was a hotly contested issue, and the integrity of appellant’s ‘Bertha’ confessions was of critical importance to the State.”); Lawson v. State, No. 13-22-00182-CR, 2023 WL 5124697 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding extraneous-offense evidence was “of critical importance to the State” based on the State’s argument that the extraneous-offense testimony “was the main evidence it had to rebut Lawson’s claim of self-defense”).

2002In Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. , this court stated that A jurisdiction over an individual generally cannot be based on jurisdiction over a corporation with which he is associated unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual. @ 909 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex. App .

2002In Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., this court stated that “jurisdiction over an individual generally cannot be based on jurisdiction over a corporation with which he is associated unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual.” 909 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

2023See Render, 347 S.W.3d at 921 .

2022See City of Pharr v. Garcia, 581 S.W.3d 930 , 932 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, no pet.) (“Although Lawson was a plurality opinion, the supreme court cited it with approval in Texas A & M Univ[ersity] Sys[tem] v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 , 838–39 (Tex. 2007), and then adopted the holding in Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2019).”).

2021Cf. Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 459 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (“When a cause of action is dismissed and later refiled, limitations are calculated to run from the time the cause of action accrued until the date that the claim is refiled.

2019Silverado relies on KSNG Architects, Inc. v. Beasley, 109 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2003, no pet.), to argue that even after the trial court struck its answer, it was entitled to notice and a hearing on Lawson’s motion for default judgment.

2016See Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 377 (observing that Reata court merely applies principles promulgated as early as 1943 in the Humble Oil case); cf. Federal Sign v. TSU., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 (Tex. 1997) (the three times this Court considered sovereign immunity in the breach of contract context, we held that the State is immune from suit arising from breach of contract suits). 48 If Reata’s judicially implemented limitation on the contours of immunity is engrafted onto the Lawson waiver rule, then logic weighs in favor of likewise engrafting and applying Reata’s limited scope of jurisdiction: the trial

2011See generally Sands v. State, 64 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (concluding the absence of a mistake of fact instruction did not deprive appellant of the right to have the jury consider her defense).

2009See id. 2 the completed settlement (in Singer) and at the time the parties were exchanging conflicting settlement proposals (in this case).2 See Singer, 232 S.W.3d at 797 (describing that “a genuine effort to purchase the land by agreement between the parties, and the failure to do so, is a condition precedent to instituting eminent domain proceedings”); see also Tex. Prop.