suspected violation in Pennsylvania

2026However, a stop based on reasonable suspicion under [Section] 6308(b) must “serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2026Under Pennsylvania law, the quantum of cause required for a vehicle stop depends on the nature of the offense: reasonable suspicion is required for an offense that requires further investigation, and probable cause is required “when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285 , 1290–91 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc).

2026However, a stop based on reasonable suspicion under [Section] 6308(b) must “serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2024However, a stop based on reasonable suspicion under [Section] 6308(b) must “serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2022“Thus, there is a distinction between the investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 541 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 393 (Pa. 2019); see also Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008) (stating that “[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally feasible”); Sands, 887 A.2d at 270 (st

2021See Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 , quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).] Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.

2021“Thus, there is a distinction between the investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 541 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 393 (Pa. 2019); see also Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008) (stating that “[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally feasible”); Sands, 887 A.2d at 270 (st

2019Thus, there is a "distinction between the investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code." Commonwealth v. Busser , 56 A.3d 419 , 423 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Chase , 599 Pa. 80 , 960 A.2d 108 , 116 (2008) (noting "[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally feasible."); Commonwealth v. Sands , 887 A.2d 261 , 270 (Pa.Super. 2005)

2023Thus, “mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 327 (Pa. 2011).

2022This court has long recognized that “mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 327 (Pa. 2011).

2025See Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 703 (Pa. Super. 2014); Enick, 70 A.3d at 846-47 .

2022See Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 482 (Pa. 2014).

2021Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2021See Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2022In such an instance, “it is incumbent upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (superseded by statute) (citation omitted); see also Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (reaffirming Gleason’s probable cause standard for non-investigative detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations.

2015Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation; In such an instance, “it is encum-bent [sic ] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” [Commonwealth v.] Gleason, [ 567 Pa. 111 ], 785 A.2d [983], 989 [ (2001) ]. (superseded by subsection 6308(b); emphasis. in Gleason).

2018Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011).

2018See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Shabazz, 18 A.3d 1217 (Pa. Super. 2011).

2022Therefore, in circumstances where the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation, the officer must possess probable cause before initiating the traffic stop.8 See Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017). ____________________________________________ 6 To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer “must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, [lead] him to reasonably conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity is afoot” and that the item to be searched was involved

2020However, inasmuch as we conclude Detective Crawford had a reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial investigative detention, we find this averment to be meritless. - 20 - J-A28012-19 Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017).

2022“Thus, there is a distinction between the investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 541 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 393 (Pa. 2019); see also Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008) (stating that “[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally feasible”); Sands, 887 A.2d at 270 (st

2021“Thus, there is a distinction between the investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 541 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 393 (Pa. 2019); see also Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008) (stating that “[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally feasible”); Sands, 887 A.2d at 270 (st

2019Thus, there is a "distinction between the investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code." Commonwealth v. Busser , 56 A.3d 419 , 423 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Chase , 599 Pa. 80 , 960 A.2d 108 , 116 (2008) (noting "[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally feasible."); Commonwealth v. Sands , 887 A.2d 261 , 270 (Pa.Super. 2005)

2018Thus, there is a “distinction between the investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 423 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (noting that “[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is normally feasible.”); Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 270 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating that “a suspected violation

2017Commonwealth v. Bush, 2017 WL 3046959 (Pa. Super. filed July 19, 2017) (some quotation marks omitted). -4- J-S45040-17 At the suppression hearing, Officer Reid testified that he stopped Appellant’s vehicle due to the car’s heavily tinted windows, which the officer suspected was a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1) (“No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.”).

2017Commonwealth v. Bush, 166 A.3d 1278, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2017).

2010We stated: Whereas our Supreme Court identified Whitmyer as a case where further investigation would not lead to a discovery of a violation of the Vehicle Code because there was no further evidence that could be obtained from a subsequent stop and investigation that would warrant a citation for driving at an unsafe speed, see Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 at 1118 , a suspected violation for DUI is in fact a scenario where further investigation almost invariably leads to the most incriminating type of evidence, i.e., strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and blood shot eyes.

2005See id. at 1116. ¶ 9 In Whitmyer , the defendant was stopped for a suspected violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3861, which prohibits driving at an unsafe speed.

2025“To secure the right of citizens to be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions compromise individual liberty.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

2025“Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. ____________________________________________ 5 The record reflects that Trooper Green conducted a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle for a suspected violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2) of the MVC, for extremely dark window tint. -7- J-S01037-25 Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009).

2025To meet this standard, an “officer must be able to articulate specific facts possessed by him at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in some violation of some provision of the Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d 604, 607 (Pa. Super. 2004).

2025See Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 703 (Pa. Super. 2014); Enick, 70 A.3d at 846-47 .

2024See Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908 , 912 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”) (citation omitted). -6- J-S22011-24 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (“Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.”).

2024Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016).

2022However, a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation “must ‘serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.’” Commonwealth v. Ruffin, No. 1913 EDA 2021, 2022 PA Super 146, at *2 (Aug. 23, 2022) (quoting Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291 ).

2021Moreover, “a police officer may stop a motor vehicle if he or she reasonably believes that a provision of the [] Vehicle Code is being or has been violated.” Commonwealth v. Dewitt, 608 A.2d 1030, 1032 (Pa. 1992). -7- J-S23011-21 Probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, is required to justify a vehicle stop for a suspected Vehicle Code violation when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.

2021See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (investigation by police officers); see also Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (holding vehicle stop could not serve investigative purpose relevant to driver suspected of using multiple lanes); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34-35 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding vehicle stop following suspected violation of driving too closely could not serve investigative purpose and, therefore, required probable cause).