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15 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waffle House, Inc. v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011See 313 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. 2010). 2011See 313 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex.2010). | 2 | 2 |
Baker v. Coegreen2 sentences1975In discussing the question of presumption from the standpoint of the rule laid down by Judge Wheeler, in Baker v. Coe, 20 Tex. 429, 437 (1857), we quoted from the opinion wherein it stated: “Presumptions must be indulged in favor of those proceedings, especially when they are ancient, and titles have been acquired and transmitted under them, or it would indeed be true that time, instead of healing, as it should, the defects of these titles, would gradually undermine, and eventually destroy them.” In summarizing, Judge Green of this Court said: “If the necessity for a legal presumption existed 1964“We approach this question from the standpoint of the rule laid down by Judge Wheeler in Baker v. Coe, 20 Tex. 429 : “ ‘Presumptions must be indulged in favor of those proceedings, especially when they are ancient, and titles have been acquired and transmitted under them, or it would indeed be true that time, instead of healing, as it should, the defects of these titles, would gradually undermine, and eventually destroy them.’ “It is difficult to assume a state of facts which' would call more strongly for the indulgence of a presumption of the very existence of the judgment, if this were neces | 1 | 3 |
Hinojosa v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Jones v. State, 693 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Hinojosa v. State, 788 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Jones v. State, 693 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Hinojosa v. State, 788 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Charles Milton v. Raymond K. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondentgreen2 sentences1990In Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1095-97 (CA5 1984), the Fifth Circuit held that disallowing questions to veniremen as to their understandings of the meaning of the word “deliberate” did not so disable trial counsel as to render him ineffective for Sixth Amendment purposes. 1990In Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1095-97 (CA5 1984), the Fifth Circuit held that disallowing questions to veniremen as to their understandings of the meaning of the word "deliberate" did not so disable trial counsel as to render him ineffective for Sixth Amendment purposes. | 1 | 1 |
Clements v. Texas Co.green1 sentence1975Ordinarily, such a presumption is one of fact, but as the court said in Clements v. Texas Co., 273 S.W. 993, 998 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1925, writ ref’d): “. . . but such a presumption, having to do with a transaction 80 years in the past, becomes, for all practical purposes, one of law, for generally the great age which raises the presumption also obliterates the evidence which might have overthrown it.” Stated in a different way the former great Chief Justice of the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals, the Honorable W. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Kenneth Godkins
green
1 sentence2015Godldns, 527 F.2d 1321 (CA5, 1976), that this (5) Considered solely from the standpoint of privilege (which actually is a privilege of the its utility in eliciting relevant testimony, the in government) may be Invoked only when the camera method has both advantages and dlsad· government seeks to avoid disclosure of an vantages when compared with an Inquiry in informer's Identity; when an accused person open court. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2011Tex. Dep’t. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 , 1 The trial court also noted that it was concerned that ―other than argument, there’s been absolutely no evidence presented on any of [the jurisdictional] issues, including beginning date, the date of termination, when [Landsfeld] knew from the standpoint of a claim dealing with jurisdiction.‖ However, the record reflects that Landsfeld testified that Barnes presented him with the option of resignation or termination on March 1, 2005, and that in an email, Landsfeld resigned effective March 31, 2005. 3 226 (Tex. 2004). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
TEXAS EMPLOYERS'INS. ASS'N v. Haywood
green
2 sentences1966Ass’n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242 , 266 S.W.2d 856 , as follows: “The true test is the degree of prejudice flowing from the argument — whether the argument, considered in its proper setting, was reasonably calculated to cause such prejudice to the opposing litigant that a withdrawal by counsel or an instruction by the court, or both, could not eliminate the probability that it resulted in an improper verdict.” We hold that such arguments were not so inflammatory that they could not have been cured by an instruction from the court. 1966Ass’n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242 , 266 S.W.2d 856 , as follows: “The true test is the degree of prejudice flowing from the argument — whether the argument, considered in its proper setting, was reasonably calculated to cause such prejudice to the opposing litigant that a withdrawal by counsel or an instruction by the court, or both, could not eliminate the probability that it resulted in an improper verdict.” We hold that such arguments were not so inflammatory that they could not have been cured by an instruction from the court. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Brewer v. State
green
2 sentences1965Brewer v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 9 , 143 S.W.2d 599 * * *” The pertinent facts from the standpoint of the defense are quoted from his brief: “Sometime after 7 P.M., Tuesday, April 7, 1964, George Williams, the helper of the Appellant Marble Setter arrived at Doc’s Drive-Inn on Second Avenue, Dallas, Texas. 1965Brewer v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 9 , 143 S.W.2d 599 * * *” The pertinent facts from the standpoint of the defense are quoted from his brief: “Sometime after 7 P.M., Tuesday, April 7, 1964, George Williams, the helper of the Appellant Marble Setter arrived at Doc’s Drive-Inn on Second Avenue, Dallas, Texas. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
McDonald v. Alamo Motor Lines
neutral
1 sentence1961McDonald v. Alamo Motor Lines, Tex.Civ.App., 222 S.W.2d 1013 ; Moore et al. v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., Tex.Civ. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Gulf Casualty Co. v. Fields
neutral
1 sentence1951King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, supra; Gulf Casualty Co. v. Fields, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 661 , writ dismissed. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Marcus v. Armer
neutral
2 sentences1935“Plaintiff’s petition) however, contains sufficient allegations, to constitute a basis for recovery of the damages claimed, and. each of the litigants, in making his respective contentions, herein, does so in view of the opinion of our Supreme Court, in Marcus v. Armer, 117 Texas, 368 , 5 S. W. (2d) 960 , to-the effect that goods sent shipper’s order, bill of lading and; draft attached, notify purchaser’s etc., evidences a writtem obligation of seller to deliver the contemplated product to the; *238 purchaser who takes up the draft, receives the bill of lading and the shipment of goods by virt 1935“Plaintiff’s petition) however, contains sufficient allegations, to constitute a basis for recovery of the damages claimed, and. each of the litigants, in making his respective contentions, herein, does so in view of the opinion of our Supreme Court, in Marcus v. Armer, 117 Texas, 368 , 5 S. W. (2d) 960 , to-the effect that goods sent shipper’s order, bill of lading and; draft attached, notify purchaser’s etc., evidences a writtem obligation of seller to deliver the contemplated product to the; *238 purchaser who takes up the draft, receives the bill of lading and the shipment of goods by virt | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Smith v. Dupree
neutral
1 sentence1911There is no element of estoppel shown in this case, such as was shown in Elijah Smith v. Blake Dupree, 140 S. W. 367 , decided by this court October 11, 1911, to prevent a suit, or any new promise based upon any consideration whatever in this record, that prevented appellant from timely suing, or that took the case out of the bar. [5] But appellant contends there is no limitation in this cause because the suit was instituted within two years after note was paid, and by agreement has brought up and had filed a verified copy of the original petition, which we shall now consider from the standpoi | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.