first ground error in Texas

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994) ( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . 20 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 21 See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). 22 For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is “barely distinguishable” from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual-sufficiency review is that

2015This, however, arguably describes a situation where " the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove its case" and " an acquittal was the only proper verdict." See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41-42 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 .

2015This, however, arguably describes a situation where " the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove its case" and " an acquittal was the only proper verdict." See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41-42 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 .

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994) ( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . 20 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 21 See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). 22 For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is “barely distinguishable” from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual-sufficiency review is that

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

1983This meets with the modern reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals in 1982 in the case of Wilhoit v. State, 638 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), where Judge Clinton has stated (page 495), that Lyons, supra, has been so “weakened by explanations and distinctions that it is futile for an accused to invoke it if he has merely ‘attempted to impeach an eyewitness.’ ” The first ground of error is overruled.

1982With respect to the first ground of error, if appellant’s questions and her answers, made more difficult since the complainant was testifying through an interpreter, are to be regarded as an attempt to impeach her identification such that bolstering testimony then becomes admissible, then the rule of Lyons v. State, 388 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.Cr.App.1965) has lost its vitality.

1985In reviewing this ground of error, we will, at the onset, follow the dictates of Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment.” Next, because this is a circumstantial evidence case; we will look to the pronouncements in Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S

1985See and compare the noted and celebrated cases: Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing).

1985In reviewing this ground of error, we will, at the onset, follow the dictates of Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment.” Next, because this is a circumstantial evidence case; we will look to the pronouncements in Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S

1985See and compare the noted and celebrated cases: Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing).

1985In reviewing this ground of error, we will, at the onset, follow the dictates of Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment.” Next, because this is a circumstantial evidence case; we will look to the pronouncements in Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S

1985See and compare the noted and celebrated cases: Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing).

1985In reviewing this ground of error, we will, at the onset, follow the dictates of Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment.” Next, because this is a circumstantial evidence case; we will look to the pronouncements in Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S

1985See and compare the noted and celebrated cases: Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Crim.App.1983—Opinion on Rehearing).

1984After sustaining the first ground of error on federal constitutional grounds, the court added footnote # 1: "In Gate v. Illinois (sic), no. 81-430, U.S. Supreme Court, decided June 8, 1983 [ 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 ], abolished two-prong standard set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [ 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ], but said, however, that the states could retain and follow the-two-prong standard at its election.

1984After sustaining the first ground of error on federal constitutional grounds, the court added footnote # 1: "In Gate v. Illinois (sic), no. 81-430, U.S. Supreme Court, decided June 8, 1983 [ 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 ], abolished two-prong standard set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [ 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 ], but said, however, that the states could retain and follow the-two-prong standard at its election.

1981In the second ground of error the appellant asks us to overrule Davis v. State, 499 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and to follow the opinion dissenting on rehearing.

1978The first ground of error is overruled. *4 In his other ground of error the appellant argues that the trial court reversibly erred by failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the volun-tariness of the confession as required by Art. 38.22, supra, and Jackson v. Denno, supra. See Davis v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 499 S.W.2d 303 . 4 In Jackson v. Denno, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated: “Where pure factual considerations are an important ingredient, which is true in the usual case, appellate review in this Court is, as a practical matter, an inadequate substitute for

1976In disposing of the contention, the Court held the evidence to be sufficient to sustain the conviction of the offense of assault with intent to murder with malice, saying: “The first ground of error is overruled. 4 Branch 2d 168, Sec. 1797; Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 547 ; McIntire v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 403 , 289 S.W. 48 ; Perez v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 473 , 22 S.W.2d 309 .” In Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 546-547 (1874), cited in Williams v. State, supra, we find this language: “The indictment in effect charges the defendant with having shot John Dickson with a pistol, with intent to murder

1976In disposing of the contention, the Court held the evidence to be sufficient to sustain the conviction of the offense of assault with intent to murder with malice, saying: “The first ground of error is overruled. 4 Branch 2d 168, Sec. 1797; Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 547 ; McIntire v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 403 , 289 S.W. 48 ; Perez v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 473 , 22 S.W.2d 309 .” In Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 546-547 (1874), cited in Williams v. State, supra, we find this language: “The indictment in effect charges the defendant with having shot John Dickson with a pistol, with intent to murder

1976In disposing of the contention, the Court held the evidence to be sufficient to sustain the conviction of the offense of assault with intent to murder with malice, saying: “The first ground of error is overruled. 4 Branch 2d 168, Sec. 1797; Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 547 ; McIntire v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 403 , 289 S.W. 48 ; Perez v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 473 , 22 S.W.2d 309 .” In Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 546-547 (1874), cited in Williams v. State, supra, we find this language: “The indictment in effect charges the defendant with having shot John Dickson with a pistol, with intent to murder

1976In disposing of the contention, the Court held the evidence to be sufficient to sustain the conviction of the offense of assault with intent to murder with malice, saying: “The first ground of error is overruled. 4 Branch 2d 168, Sec. 1797; Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 547 ; McIntire v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 403 , 289 S.W. 48 ; Perez v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 473 , 22 S.W.2d 309 .” In Carr v. State, 41 Tex. 543, 546-547 (1874), cited in Williams v. State, supra, we find this language: “The indictment in effect charges the defendant with having shot John Dickson with a pistol, with intent to murder

1974Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [ 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 ], that I may now place my client on the stand to testify concerning these threats and coercions made by the various officers and offices of the State of Texas with immunity as to the testimony being used at a later time.

1974Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [ 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 ], that I may now place my client on the stand to testify concerning these threats and coercions made by the various officers and offices of the State of Texas with immunity as to the testimony being used at a later time.

1970In the first ground of error, appellant contends that the confession did not meet the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 .

1970In the first ground of error, appellant contends that the confession did not meet the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 .

1970The first ground of error is overruled. 5 Tex.Jur.2d 43, Sec. 23; Morrow v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 396 S.W.2d 386 .

1970The first ground of error is overruled. 5 Tex.Jur.2d 43, Sec. 23; Morrow v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 396 S.W.2d 386 .

1988Jackson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 74 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1983).

1988Jackson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 74 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1983).

1986Martin Dies, Jr., stated and held all that was necessary in sustaining the appellant's first ground of error, viz: "The trial court erred in failing to, sua sponte, withdraw Appellant's plea of guilty before the jury upon his testimony reasonably raising a fact issue as to his innocence." Griffin v. State, 692 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1984).

1986Martin Dies, Jr., stated and held all that was necessary in sustaining the appellant’s first ground of error, viz: “The trial court erred in failing to, sua sponte, withdraw Appellant’s plea of guilty before the jury upon his testimony reasonably raising a fact issue as to his innocence.” Griffin v. State, 692 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1984).

1985In reviewing this ground of error, we will, at the onset, follow the dictates of Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment.” Next, because this is a circumstantial evidence case; we will look to the pronouncements in Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing) and Wilson v. State, 654 S

1985Henrich v. State, 666 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983).

1985Henrich v. State, 666 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1983).

1985The only issue remaining, the issue which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded for this court to determine, is the appellants’ contention that the evidence fails to establish that their exercise of control of the affected property was “without the owner’s effective consent.” In the remand opinion, 687 S.W.2d at 350 , the Court of Criminal Appeals fully set out the salient stipulated facts.

1985Nevertheless, we caution counsel for the State to keep its remarks in summation within the framework announced in Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) or risk the often unnecessary and always unpopular and costly necessity of reversal and retrial.

1985Nevertheless, we caution counsel for the State to keep its remarks in summation within the framework announced in Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) or risk the often unnecessary and always unpopular and costly necessity of reversal and retrial.

1984Although I agree with the majority as to the disposition of the first ground of error, I must dissent to the reversal for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Bogany v. State, 661 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.Cr.

1984Although I agree with the majority as to the disposition of the first ground of error, I must dissent to the reversal for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Bogany v. State, 661 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).