15 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Town of Killington v. Stategreen2 sentences2006“If the statute [to be interpreted] is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102, ¶ 14 (citing Town of Killington v. State, 172 Vt. 182, 188 (2001)). 4 Because our analysis here does not reach the merits of the pending enforcement action, we need not address Neighbors’ suggestion that because the Supreme Court previously ruled that parcels 1 and 2 had merged as of 1981, Developer’s subsequent conveyance of parcel 1 should be viewed as an illegal s 2004Town of Killington v. State, 172 Vt. 182, 188 , 776 A.2d 395, 400 (2001). | 3 | 3 |
Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrellgreen2 sentences2025As we have frequently articulated, we presume that the Legislature “intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the adopted statutory language” and when a “statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102, ¶ 14 , 177 Vt. 287 , 865 A.2d 350 (citation omitted). 2025As we have frequently articulated, we presume that the Legislature “intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the adopted statutory language” and when a “statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102, ¶ 14 , 177 Vt. 287 , 865 A.2d 350 (citation omitted). | 2 | 7 |
Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Agency of Transportationgreen2 sentences2019"If the statute is unambiguous and the words have plain meaning, we accept that plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further." Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Agency of Transp ., 174 Vt. 341 , 346, 816 A.2d 448 , 453 (2002). 2019"If the statute is unambiguous and the words have plain meaning, we accept that plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further." Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Agency of Transp ., 174 Vt. 341 , 346, 816 A.2d 448 , 453 (2002). | 2 | 3 |
Reed Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Departmentgreen2 sentences2021“If the statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep’t, 2019 VT 66, ¶ 5 , 211 Vt. 10 , 219 A.3d 326 (quotation omitted). “[W]e presume that all language in a statute was drafted advisedly,” State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 91 , 759 A.2d 991, 993 (2000) (quotation omitted), and we will not “read into a statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective,” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 68 2020See Doyle v. City of Burlington, 2019 VT 66, ¶ 5 , ___ Vt. ___, 219 A.3d 326 (“If the statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.”). | 1 | 2 |
Town of Pawlet v. Daniel Banyaigreen1 sentence2024“In determining that intent, we begin by looking at the plain language of the statute.” Flint v. Dep’t of Labor, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 5 , 205 Vt. 558 . “[W]hen a statute is unambiguous and has a plain meaning, we ‘accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.’” Town of Pawlet v. Banyai, 2022 VT 4, ¶ 21 (quoting Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102, ¶ 14 , 177 Vt. 287 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. LeBlancgreen2 sentences2021“If the statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep’t, 2019 VT 66, ¶ 5 , 211 Vt. 10 , 219 A.3d 326 (quotation omitted). “[W]e presume that all language in a statute was drafted advisedly,” State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 91 , 759 A.2d 991, 993 (2000) (quotation omitted), and we will not “read into a statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective,” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 68 2021“If the statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep’t, 2019 VT 66, ¶ 5 , 211 Vt. 10 , 219 A.3d 326 (quotation omitted). “[W]e presume that all language in a statute was drafted advisedly,” State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 91 , 759 A.2d 991, 993 (2000) (quotation omitted), and we will not “read into a statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective,” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 68 | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'NEILLgreen2 sentences2021“If the statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep’t, 2019 VT 66, ¶ 5 , 211 Vt. 10 , 219 A.3d 326 (quotation omitted). “[W]e presume that all language in a statute was drafted advisedly,” State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 91 , 759 A.2d 991, 993 (2000) (quotation omitted), and we will not “read into a statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective,” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 68 2021“If the statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.” Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep’t, 2019 VT 66, ¶ 5 , 211 Vt. 10 , 219 A.3d 326 (quotation omitted). “[W]e presume that all language in a statute was drafted advisedly,” State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 91 , 759 A.2d 991, 993 (2000) (quotation omitted), and we will not “read into a statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective,” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 , 68 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Paul Flint v. Department of Labor
green
1 sentence2024“In determining that intent, we begin by looking at the plain language of the statute.” Flint v. Dep’t of Labor, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 5 , 205 Vt. 558 . “[W]hen a statute is unambiguous and has a plain meaning, we ‘accept the statute’s plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further.’” Town of Pawlet v. Banyai, 2022 VT 4, ¶ 21 (quoting Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102, ¶ 14 , 177 Vt. 287 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
U.S. Right to Know v. University of Vermont
neutral
1 sentence2024U.S. Right to Know v. Univ. of Vermont, 2021 VT 33, ¶ 17 , 214 Vt. 543 , 550–51. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Tarrant v. Department of Taxes
green
2 sentences2019If a statute is ambiguous, however, "legislative intent must be determined through consideration of the entire statute, including its subject matter, effects and consequences, as well as the reason and spirit of the law." Tarrant v. Dep't of Taxes , 169 Vt. 189 , 197, 733 A.2d 733 , 739 (1999). ¶ 13. 2019If a statute is ambiguous, however, "legislative intent must be determined through consideration of the entire statute, including its subject matter, effects and consequences, as well as the reason and spirit of the law." Tarrant v. Dep't of Taxes , 169 Vt. 189 , 197, 733 A.2d 733 , 739 (1999). ¶ 13. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.