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51 California opinions name it 4 courts 1905–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bailey v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2003We must presume from this history that the Legislature had the principle of grand jury secrecy in mind when it produced, and as it has continuously changed, section 827 and thus that the Legislature intentionally omitted grand juries from the select list found in the present version of subparts (A)-(L). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) And even if the omission was the product of legislative oversight, we cannot correct the mistake. ( Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 , 828 P.2d 672 ["Where the 2003We must presume from this history that the Legislature had the principle of grand jury secrecy in mind when it produced, and as it has continuously changed, section 827 and thus that the Legislature intentionally omitted grand juries from the select list found in the present version of subparts (A)-(L). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) And even if the omission was the product of legislative oversight, we cannot correct the mistake. ( Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 , 828 P.2d 672 ["Where the | 2 | 2 |
In Re Autumn H.green2 sentences2014(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The Legislature has provided an exception to this statutory preference when the record shows compelling reason to find termination would be detrimental to the child, the parent has maintained regular visitation and the child would benefit from continuing the parental relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) As we stated in In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 , this exception arises only when the parental relationship "promotes 10 the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with 2013(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 .) The Legislature has provided an exception to adoption as the permanent plan where the court finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to qualify for the exception, a parent must show that the beneficial relationship with the child "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would | 1 | 5 |
Mendoza v. Ruesgagreen2 sentences2015(See Mendoza v. Ruesga (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 270, 285 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 ]; e.g., Evid. 2015(See Mendoza v. Ruesga (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 270, 285 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 ]; e.g., Evid. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Brian R.green2 sentences1999(In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) In In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ], we explained: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by 1999(In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) In In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ], we explained: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by | 1 | 2 |
Melendrez v. Ameron International Corp.green1 sentence2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f | 1 | 1 |
Shoemaker v. Myersgreen1 sentence2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f | 1 | 1 |
Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.green1 sentence2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f | 1 | 1 |
Hendy v. Lossegreen1 sentence2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f | 1 | 1 |
People v. Farleygreen1 sentence2022Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [in construing a statute, courts do not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted].) Moreover, 6 Indeed, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature provided an exception to the requirements set forth in subdivision (e): “Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189 | 1 | 1 |
Manufacturers Life Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2022Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [in construing a statute, courts do not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted].) Moreover, 6 Indeed, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature provided an exception to the requirements set forth in subdivision (e): “Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189 | 1 | 1 |
McQuiggin v. Perkinsgreen1 sentence2021To pass through that gateway (the Schlup gateway), the petitioner must “persuade[] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 329; accord, McQuiggin v. Perkins (2013) 569 U.S. 383, 386 (McQuiggin).) If the petitioner is successful, only then may the district court consider the merits of the constitutional claims raised in the habeas petition. | 1 | 1 |
Schlup v. Delored1 sentence2021Code,1 § 4900.) The Board must hold a hearing on the claim unless (as relevant here) a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus and “has found that the person is factually innocent,” in which case that finding is binding on the Board and the Board must, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that the claim be paid. (§ 1485.55, subd. (a), see also § 4902, subd. (a).) If a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus but did not make a finding of factual innocence, “the factual findings and credibility determinations establishing the court’s basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus” are | 1 | 1 |
People v. Delsongreen1 sentence2021Moreover, any action to be taken upon receiving a recommendation is clearly permissive -- the statute uses the verb “may,” not “shall.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1); People v. Delson (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 56, 62 [no abuse of discretion in refusing to set a hearing on the Department’s recommendation for alternative sentencing].) 4 McCallum dealt with the same issue of “whether the trial court must hold a hearing prior to ruling on the Secretary’s recommendation for recall and resentencing.” (People v. McCallum, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) Observing that the statutory provision itself is silent o | 1 | 1 |
In Re Eric H.green1 sentence2012(Eric H., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) “[G]ur office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 ].) We decline to read the Legislature’s instruction to the juvenile court out of section 350, subdivision (c). | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Californiagreen2 sentences2012(Eric H., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) “[G]ur office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 ].) We decline to read the Legislature’s instruction to the juvenile court out of section 350, subdivision (c). 2012(Eric H., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) “[G]ur office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 ].) We decline to read the Legislature’s instruction to the juvenile court out of section 350, subdivision (c). | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Forsythe Applicationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re CTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ornelas v. Randolphgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bowen v. Kendrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeVita v. County of Napagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sipegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Riologreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Karsaigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Navarrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| California State Employees' Ass'n v. Flournoygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mills v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nunn v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Merriman v. Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Friends of Mount Diablo v. County of Contra Costagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpentersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hughes v. City of Lincolngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Casey D.
green
2 sentences2016A court could have concluded that, although Mother appeared bonded to Baby and maintained regular visitation throughout the case, her relationship with Baby was minimal in comparison to the caregiver's primary relationship with Baby. 16 by the Legislature. [Citation.] The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because '[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from co 2014If a child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the plan preferred by the Legislature. [Citation.] The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because '[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from continuing the relationship.' " (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50 , quoting former § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) (now § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).) "In the context | 2 | 2014–2016 |
In Re Estrada
green
1 sentence2024This well-settled principle is codified at section 3 of the Penal Code and appears in other codes as well.” (Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 7-8.) However, under the doctrine of Estrada, supra, “an amendment to a statute that reduces the punishment for a particular criminal offense gives rise to an inference that the statute applies retroactively to all judgments not yet final on appeal.” (Burgos, at p. 12.) Defendants contend the Estrada doctrine makes Evidence Code section 352.2 retroactive, citing the Legislature’s statement of intent as follows: “It is the intent of this Legislature to pr | 1 | 2024–2024 |
King v. CompPartners, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f 2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Billa
green
1 sentence2022Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [in construing a statute, courts do not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted].) Moreover, 6 Indeed, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature provided an exception to the requirements set forth in subdivision (e): “Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Enmund v. Florida
green
1 sentence2022(See Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 ; Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 .) Because these cases are inapposite, we need not discuss them. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co.
green
1 sentence2022(See Salas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 424 .) BrightView argues to the contrary that the trial court did not err in ruling that Manuel’s immigration status was relevant, and therefore discoverable, because in enacting Labor Code section 1171.5 “the Legislature permitted inquiry into an individual’s immigration status when, in situations like this, there is a dispute whether an employer terminated an individual because the individual was not authorized to work in the United States.” In other words, BrightView contends that it had a legal obligation under federal immigration law to terminate Manuel | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tison v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2022(See Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 ; Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 .) Because these cases are inapposite, we need not discuss them. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Board of Supervisors
green
2 sentences2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio 2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Truta v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018A stronger inference, however, is that the language was taken from the statutory provision on which it was modeled-Article 16.6 of the Insurance Code, which authorizes rental car companies to sell insurance coverage for risks related to the use of a rental car, "incidental to rental agreements." (§ 1758.8, subd. (b).) By the time Article 16.6 was enacted in 1999, Truta, supra , 193 Cal.App.3d 802 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 , had applied the principal object and purpose test to car rental companies' use of CDWs, but Article 16.6 makes no mention of this doctrine or of precluding CDWs. 2018A stronger inference, however, is that the language was taken from the statutory provision on which it was modeled-Article 16.6 of the Insurance Code, which authorizes rental car companies to sell insurance coverage for risks related to the use of a rental car, "incidental to rental agreements." (§ 1758.8, subd. (b).) By the time Article 16.6 was enacted in 1999, Truta, supra , 193 Cal.App.3d 802 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 , had applied the principal object and purpose test to car rental companies' use of CDWs, but Article 16.6 makes no mention of this doctrine or of precluding CDWs. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Lynch
red
2 sentences2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro 2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Dillon
green
2 sentences2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro 2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Zuckerman v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners
green
2 sentences2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio 2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Dannenberg
green
2 sentences2018The Board promulgated base term regulations in response to the Legislature's instruction to establish "criteria" that would promote sentence uniformity for inmates serving lifetime sentences. ( Dannenberg , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) The Board may not, however, release an inmate until the individual no longer poses a threat to "public safety," regardless of any base term calculation. ( Id. at pp. 1083-1084, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) In fact, we specifically instructed the Board to "eschew term uniformity" if public safety considerations 2018The Board promulgated base term regulations in response to the Legislature's instruction to establish "criteria" that would promote sentence uniformity for inmates serving lifetime sentences. ( Dannenberg , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) The Board may not, however, release an inmate until the individual no longer poses a threat to "public safety," regardless of any base term calculation. ( Id. at pp. 1083-1084, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) In fact, we specifically instructed the Board to "eschew term uniformity" if public safety considerations | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2016(Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 864 .) We do not, of course, know whether the enactment of Business and Professions Code section 25666 was prompted by the Department’s complaint to the Legislature that hearing officers were improperly refusing to grant continuances on the grounds of the minor’s illness. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Angela G.
green
1 sentence2016A court could have concluded that, although Mother appeared bonded to Baby and maintained regular visitation throughout the case, her relationship with Baby was minimal in comparison to the caregiver's primary relationship with Baby. 16 by the Legislature. [Citation.] The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because '[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from co | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Watts v. Farmers Insurance Exchange green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Burden v. Snowden green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Herrera green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Johnson v. Unocal Corp. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Delta Farms Reclamation District v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Arcadia Unified School District v. State Department of Education green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Methey green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Schlick v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Colvin v. City of Gardena green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Haight v. Gay green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ex Parte Harker neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Walker v. City of Salinas green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In Re Marriage of Stephens green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Yost v. Thomas green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Mervynne v. Acker green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Riedman v. Brison green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Dimas v. López green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Garcia v. State of California green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Hocharian v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Colberg, Inc. v. State of California Ex Rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.