Legislature bar (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

Legislature bar in California

51 California opinions name it 4 courts 1905–2024 6 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (42)

CaseFollowedCited
Bailey v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1977 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003We must presume from this history that the Legislature had the principle of grand jury secrecy in mind when it produced, and as it has continuously changed, section 827 and thus that the Legislature intentionally omitted grand juries from the select list found in the present version of subparts (A)-(L). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) And even if the omission was the product of legislative oversight, we cannot correct the mistake. ( Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 , 828 P.2d 672 ["Where the

2003We must presume from this history that the Legislature had the principle of grand jury secrecy in mind when it produced, and as it has continuously changed, section 827 and thus that the Legislature intentionally omitted grand juries from the select list found in the present version of subparts (A)-(L). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) And even if the omission was the product of legislative oversight, we cannot correct the mistake. ( Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 , 828 P.2d 672 ["Where the

22
In Re Autumn H.green
calctapp · 1994 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–2014
2 sentences

2014(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The Legislature has provided an exception to this statutory preference when the record shows compelling reason to find termination would be detrimental to the child, the parent has maintained regular visitation and the child would benefit from continuing the parental relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) As we stated in In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 , this exception arises only when the parental relationship "promotes 10 the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with

2013(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 .) The Legislature has provided an exception to adoption as the permanent plan where the court finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to qualify for the exception, a parent must show that the beneficial relationship with the child "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would

15
Mendoza v. Ruesgagreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(See Mendoza v. Ruesga (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 270, 285 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 ]; e.g., Evid.

2015(See Mendoza v. Ruesga (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 270, 285 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 ]; e.g., Evid.

12
In Re Brian R.green
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999(In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) In In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ], we explained: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by

1999(In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) In In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ], we explained: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by

12
Melendrez v. Ameron International Corp.green
calctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

11
Shoemaker v. Myersgreen
cal · 1990 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

11
Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.green
cal · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

11
Hendy v. Lossegreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

11
People v. Farleygreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [in construing a statute, courts do not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted].) Moreover, 6 Indeed, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature provided an exception to the requirements set forth in subdivision (e): “Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189

11
Manufacturers Life Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [in construing a statute, courts do not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted].) Moreover, 6 Indeed, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature provided an exception to the requirements set forth in subdivision (e): “Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189

11
McQuiggin v. Perkinsgreen
scotus · 2013 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021To pass through that gateway (the Schlup gateway), the petitioner must “persuade[] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 329; accord, McQuiggin v. Perkins (2013) 569 U.S. 383, 386 (McQuiggin).) If the petitioner is successful, only then may the district court consider the merits of the constitutional claims raised in the habeas petition.

11
Schlup v. Delored
scotus · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Code,1 § 4900.) The Board must hold a hearing on the claim unless (as relevant here) a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus and “has found that the person is factually innocent,” in which case that finding is binding on the Board and the Board must, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that the claim be paid. (§ 1485.55, subd. (a), see also § 4902, subd. (a).) If a court has granted a writ of habeas corpus but did not make a finding of factual innocence, “the factual findings and credibility determinations establishing the court’s basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus” are

11
People v. Delsongreen
calctapp · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Moreover, any action to be taken upon receiving a recommendation is clearly permissive -- the statute uses the verb “may,” not “shall.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1); People v. Delson (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 56, 62 [no abuse of discretion in refusing to set a hearing on the Department’s recommendation for alternative sentencing].) 4 McCallum dealt with the same issue of “whether the trial court must hold a hearing prior to ruling on the Secretary’s recommendation for recall and resentencing.” (People v. McCallum, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) Observing that the statutory provision itself is silent o

11
In Re Eric H.green
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012(Eric H., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) “[G]ur office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 ].) We decline to read the Legislature’s instruction to the juvenile court out of section 350, subdivision (c).

11
Vasquez v. Californiagreen
cal · 2008 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012(Eric H., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) “[G]ur office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 ].) We decline to read the Legislature’s instruction to the juvenile court out of section 350, subdivision (c).

2012(Eric H., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) “[G]ur office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 , 195 P.3d 1049 ].) We decline to read the Legislature’s instruction to the juvenile court out of section 350, subdivision (c).

11
In Re Forsythe Applicationgreen
nj · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
11
In Re CTgreen
calctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11
Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brockgreen
cal · 1951 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc.green
ny · 1939 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11
Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc.green
nyappdiv · 1938 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.green
scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11
Ornelas v. Randolphgreen
cal · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
11
Bowen v. Kendrickgreen
scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
11
Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
11
DeVita v. County of Napagreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
11
People v. Sipegreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
People v. Riologreen
cal · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
People v. Karsaigreen
calctapp · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
People v. Jonesgreen
cal · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
People v. Navarrogreen
cal · 1972 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
California State Employees' Ass'n v. Flournoygreen
calctapp · 1973 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Mitchell v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Mills v. Municipal Courtgreen
cal · 1973 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1990 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
Nunn v. State of Californiagreen
cal · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
11
Merriman v. Board of Supervisorsgreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11
Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispogreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11
Friends of Mount Diablo v. County of Contra Costagreen
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpentersgreen
cal · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11
Hughes v. City of Lincolngreen
calctapp · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (38)

CaseCitedYears
In Re Casey D. green
calctapp · 1999
2 sentences

2016A court could have concluded that, although Mother appeared bonded to Baby and maintained regular visitation throughout the case, her relationship with Baby was minimal in comparison to the caregiver's primary relationship with Baby. 16 by the Legislature. [Citation.] The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because '[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from co

2014If a child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the plan preferred by the Legislature. [Citation.] The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because '[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from continuing the relationship.' " (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50 , quoting former § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) (now § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).) "In the context

22014–2016
In Re Estrada green
cal · 1965
1 sentence

2024This well-settled principle is codified at section 3 of the Penal Code and appears in other codes as well.” (Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 7-8.) However, under the doctrine of Estrada, supra, “an amendment to a statute that reduces the punishment for a particular criminal offense gives rise to an inference that the statute applies retroactively to all judgments not yet final on appeal.” (Burgos, at p. 12.) Defendants contend the Estrada doctrine makes Evidence Code section 352.2 retroactive, citing the Legislature’s statement of intent as follows: “It is the intent of this Legislature to pr

12024–2024
King v. CompPartners, Inc. green
cal · 2018
2 sentences

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

12023–2023
People v. Billa green
cal · 2003
1 sentence

2022Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [in construing a statute, courts do not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted].) Moreover, 6 Indeed, in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature provided an exception to the requirements set forth in subdivision (e): “Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189

12022–2022
Enmund v. Florida green
scotus · 1982
1 sentence

2022(See Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 ; Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 .) Because these cases are inapposite, we need not discuss them.

12022–2022
Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. green
cal · 2014
1 sentence

2022(See Salas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 424 .) BrightView argues to the contrary that the trial court did not err in ruling that Manuel’s immigration status was relevant, and therefore discoverable, because in enacting Labor Code section 1171.5 “the Legislature permitted inquiry into an individual’s immigration status when, in situations like this, there is a dispute whether an employer terminated an individual because the individual was not authorized to work in the United States.” In other words, BrightView contends that it had a legal obligation under federal immigration law to terminate Manuel

12022–2022
Tison v. Arizona green
scotus · 1987
1 sentence

2022(See Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 ; Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 .) Because these cases are inapposite, we need not discuss them.

12022–2022
Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Board of Supervisors green
calctapp · 2002
2 sentences

2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio

2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio

12018–2018
Truta v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. green
calctapp · 1987
2 sentences

2018A stronger inference, however, is that the language was taken from the statutory provision on which it was modeled-Article 16.6 of the Insurance Code, which authorizes rental car companies to sell insurance coverage for risks related to the use of a rental car, "incidental to rental agreements." (§ 1758.8, subd. (b).) By the time Article 16.6 was enacted in 1999, Truta, supra , 193 Cal.App.3d 802 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 , had applied the principal object and purpose test to car rental companies' use of CDWs, but Article 16.6 makes no mention of this doctrine or of precluding CDWs.

2018A stronger inference, however, is that the language was taken from the statutory provision on which it was modeled-Article 16.6 of the Insurance Code, which authorizes rental car companies to sell insurance coverage for risks related to the use of a rental car, "incidental to rental agreements." (§ 1758.8, subd. (b).) By the time Article 16.6 was enacted in 1999, Truta, supra , 193 Cal.App.3d 802 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 , had applied the principal object and purpose test to car rental companies' use of CDWs, but Article 16.6 makes no mention of this doctrine or of precluding CDWs.

12018–2018
In Re Lynch red
cal · 1972
2 sentences

2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro

2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro

12018–2018
People v. Dillon green
cal · 1983
2 sentences

2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro

2018A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it "shocks the conscience." ( In re Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .) Courts engage in a broad, fact-specific inquiry when assessing constitutional proportionality claims, considering the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 479, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 .) Calculating base terms, in contrast, is best understood as an exercise designed to pro

12018–2018
Zuckerman v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners green
cal · 2002
2 sentences

2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio

2018After stating generally that the law does not explain what less than 20 percent or five percent by volume means, the Institute posits a number of hypothetical scenarios: does the bow of a stringed instrument count as a separate object?; why would the Legislature bar an ivory figure attached to a small antique where it constitutes five percent or more of that object, but permit an exception if the same piece were affixed to a larger object?; how could the owner of an Old Master's painting, many of which used black ivory in the pigments, 8 know if the artwork fell within *617 the volume exceptio

12018–2018
In Re Dannenberg green
cal · 2005
2 sentences

2018The Board promulgated base term regulations in response to the Legislature's instruction to establish "criteria" that would promote sentence uniformity for inmates serving lifetime sentences. ( Dannenberg , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) The Board may not, however, release an inmate until the individual no longer poses a threat to "public safety," regardless of any base term calculation. ( Id. at pp. 1083-1084, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) In fact, we specifically instructed the Board to "eschew term uniformity" if public safety considerations

2018The Board promulgated base term regulations in response to the Legislature's instruction to establish "criteria" that would promote sentence uniformity for inmates serving lifetime sentences. ( Dannenberg , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) The Board may not, however, release an inmate until the individual no longer poses a threat to "public safety," regardless of any base term calculation. ( Id. at pp. 1083-1084, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 .) In fact, we specifically instructed the Board to "eschew term uniformity" if public safety considerations

12018–2018
Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles green
calctapp · 2008
1 sentence

2016(Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 864 .) We do not, of course, know whether the enactment of Business and Professions Code section 25666 was prompted by the Department’s complaint to the Legislature that hearing officers were improperly refusing to grant continuances on the grounds of the minor’s illness.

12016–2016
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Angela G. green
calctapp · 2012
1 sentence

2016A court could have concluded that, although Mother appeared bonded to Baby and maintained regular visitation throughout the case, her relationship with Baby was minimal in comparison to the caregiver's primary relationship with Baby. 16 by the Legislature. [Citation.] The Legislature has provided an exception to the general rule of adoption: the court should not order a permanent plan of adoption when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because '[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the [child] and the [child] would benefit from co

12016–2016
Watts v. Farmers Insurance Exchange green
calctapp · 2002
12006–2006
Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson green
cal · 2006
12006–2006
Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons green
ny · 1948
12004–2004
Burden v. Snowden green
cal · 1992
12003–2003
People v. Herrera green
calctapp · 1998
12001–2001
Johnson v. Unocal Corp. green
calctapp · 1993
12000–2000
Delta Farms Reclamation District v. Superior Court green
cal · 1983
12000–2000
Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors green
cal · 1994
11999–1999
Arcadia Unified School District v. State Department of Education green
cal · 1992
11999–1999
People v. Methey green
calctapp · 1991
11997–1997
Schlick v. Superior Court green
cal · 1992
11997–1997
Colvin v. City of Gardena green
calctapp · 1992
11995–1995
Haight v. Gay green
cal · 1857
11995–1995
Ex Parte Harker neutral
cal · 1875
11995–1995
Walker v. City of Salinas green
calctapp · 1976
11988–1988
In Re Marriage of Stephens green
calctapp · 1984
11988–1988
Yost v. Thomas green
cal · 1984
11988–1988
Mervynne v. Acker green
calctapp · 1961
11988–1988
Riedman v. Brison green
cal · 1933
11988–1988
Dimas v. López green
prsupreme · 1931
11986–1986
Garcia v. State of California green
calctapp · 1967
11982–1982
Hocharian v. Superior Court green
cal · 1981
11981–1981
Colberg, Inc. v. State of California Ex Rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. green
cal · 1967
11975–1975

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 58 (1912–2025) CA 51 (1905–2024) PA 41 (1904–2023) OH 39 (1920–2026) MI 34 (1924–2025) IL 29 (1916–2025) NY 26 (1880–2021) NM 20 (1960–2025) FL 19 (1978–2017) MA 16 (1912–2015) NJ 16 (1959–2026) VT 15 (2002–2025) WA 14 (1927–2019) HI 13 (1912–2013) AZ 13 (1938–2026) CT 13 (1942–2025) OR 13 (1899–2026) AL 11 (1844–2014) LA 10 (1989–2012) MT 10 (1897–2024) NC 9 (1893–2022) IA 8 (1900–2019) MO 8 (1873–2023) OK 7 (1915–2024) MN 7 (1979–2018) IN 7 (1867–2019) WY 7 (1978–2025) WI 6 (1983–2025) UT 6 (1913–2024) WV 6 (1919–2006) CO 6 (1927–2022) KY 6 (1924–2013) SD 6 (1941–2024) GA 6 (1921–2013) MD 6 (1940–2006) NE 6 (1903–2020) AR 5 (1918–2003) TN 5 (1944–2015) VI 5 (1996–2024) KS 3 (1929–1996) AK 2 (2021–2023) ME 2 (2009–2010) ND 2 (2002–2025) NH 2 (2014–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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