Legislature waiver in Texas

2012Those statutory provisions, however, do not waive a municipality’s immunity from an Aranda claim. [6] Even if an Aranda claim could be asserted against a governmental entity under Chapters 101 and 104, such a claim would be subject to limitations on damages recoverable under those statutory provisions. [7] Courts traditionally defer to the Legislature on the waiver of governmental immunity, assuming it to be “better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues associated with waving immunity.” Norman , 342 S.W.3d at 58 (quoting Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex.

2012Code Ann. § 416.002 (b) (West 2006).Those statutory provisions, however, do not waive a municipality’s immunity from an Aranda claim. 6 Even if an Aranda claim could be asserted against a governmental entity under Chapters 101 and 104, such a claim would be subject to limitations on damages recoverable under those statutory provisions. 7 Courts traditionally defer to the Legislature on the waiver of governmental immunity, assuming it to be “better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues associated with waving immunity.” Norman, 342 S.W.3d at 58 (quoting Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Tay

2006Consistent with the language of article V, section 8 of the constitution, that contrary showing may be that the Legislature has provided the claim must be heard elsewhere. (20) See In re Entergy Corp., 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 729, 731-32 (June 25, 2004); Dubai Petroleum , 12 S.W.3d at 75 .

2004Consistent with the language of article V, section 8 of the constitution, that contrary showing may be that the Legislature has provided the claim must be heard elsewhere. [20] See In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321-323 , 47 Tex. Sup.Ct.

2008See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 221 ("Due to the unusual confluence of standards erected by the Legislature for waiver of sovereign immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute, plaintiffs must plead gross negligence to establish subject matter jurisdiction.").

2008See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 221 (“Due to the unusual confluence of standards erected by the Legislature for waiver of sovereign immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute, plaintiffs must plead gross negligence to establish subject matter jurisdiction.”).

2010Lindsey v. State, 811 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. App.–Austin 1991, writ denied).2 IV.

2010Lindsey v. State , 811 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied). (2) IV.

2021Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 328-29, 333 (Tex. 2006); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003).

2018Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 , 328–29, 333 (Tex. 2006); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003). “[A] governmental unit is immune from suit unless the [Texas] Tort Claims Act [(“TTCA”)] expressly waives immunity, which it does in,” among other situations, suits involving premises defects.

2012Those statutory provisions, however, do not waive a municipality’s immunity from an Aranda claim. [6] Even if an Aranda claim could be asserted against a governmental entity under Chapters 101 and 104, such a claim would be subject to limitations on damages recoverable under those statutory provisions. [7] Courts traditionally defer to the Legislature on the waiver of governmental immunity, assuming it to be “better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues associated with waving immunity.” Norman , 342 S.W.3d at 58 (quoting Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex.

2012Code Ann. § 416.002 (b) (West 2006).Those statutory provisions, however, do not waive a municipality’s immunity from an Aranda claim. 6 Even if an Aranda claim could be asserted against a governmental entity under Chapters 101 and 104, such a claim would be subject to limitations on damages recoverable under those statutory provisions. 7 Courts traditionally defer to the Legislature on the waiver of governmental immunity, assuming it to be “better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues associated with waving immunity.” Norman, 342 S.W.3d at 58 (quoting Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Tay

2023McCabe Tr., 531 S.W.3d at 798–99 (“[W]e have no basis upon which to conclude that the requirement of execution ‘by each party to the recorded original instrument’ is not ‘essential’ to fulfilling the Legislature’s standard for permitting a material correction . . . .”) (quoting PROP. § 5.029(b)).

2021McCabe Trust, 531 S.W.3d at 798 (holding that requirement that each party to recorded original instrument execute correction deed is essential to fulfilling Legislature’s standard for permitting material correction).

2025Tex. Gov’t 25 Code §311.034; Hillman v. Nueces Cty., 579 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex.2019).

2020See Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004) (“If a plaintiff has been provided a reasonable opportunity to amend after a governmental entity files its plea to the 4 Further, to the extent that media access implicates issues of security and monitoring, certain restrictions may comply with the Legislature’s instruction to TCCO to “develop procedures for the security and monitoring of committed persons in each programming tier.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.0833; see Matzen v. McLane, 764 F. App’x 402 , 403 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Matzen failed to show that McLane’s alle

2020See Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004) (“If a plaintiff has been provided a reasonable opportunity to amend after a governmental entity files its plea to the 4 Further, to the extent that media access implicates issues of security and monitoring, certain restrictions may comply with the Legislature’s instruction to TCCO to “develop procedures for the security and monitoring of committed persons in each programming tier.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.0833; see Matzen v. McLane, 764 F. App’x 402 , 403 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Matzen failed to show that McLane’s alle

2016The primary issue is the effect of these purported correction instruments on the overriding royalty interests that previously had been assigned to the Trusts and recorded in Hardin County, “The general rule is that in a contest over rights or interests in property,-the party that is first in time is first in right.” Nat’l City Bank v. Tex. Capital Bank, N.A., 353 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.); accord World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).

2016Lime, Ltd., 291 S.W.3d 392, 403 (Tex. 2009), we have no basis Upon which to conclude that the requirement of execution “by each party to the recorded original instrument” is not “essential” to fulfilling the Legislature’s standard for permitting' a material correction as a modification of the Myrad Properties rule that allowing ' substantive changes through correction deeds would undermine the purpose of record notice, Cf. Myrad Props., 300 S.W.3d at 750-51 .

2016Lime, Ltd., 291 S.W.3d 392, 403 (Tex. 2009), we have no basis upon which to conclude that the requirement of execution “by each party to the recorded original instrument” is not “essential” to fulfilling the Legislature’s standard for permitting a material correction as a modification of the Myrad Properties rule that allowing substantive changes through correction deeds would undermine the purpose of record notice.

2016The primary issue is the effect of these purported correction instruments on the overriding royalty interests that previously had been assigned to the Trusts and recorded in Hardin County, “The general rule is that in a contest over rights or interests in property,-the party that is first in time is first in right.” Nat’l City Bank v. Tex. Capital Bank, N.A., 353 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.); accord World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).

2015See DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 638 (“Courts ‘do is an “incisive” procedure (again, the negative implication not lightly presume that the Legislature may have done a of the Legislature's exception of blood draws from “inci- useless act.’ ” (quoting *477Liberty Mut.

2014Co., “[a] person who violates section 451.001 is liable for 596 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] reasonable damages incurred by the employee as a result 1990, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“If ... this balance [established by the of the violation,” and that “[a]n employee discharged in Act] is tipped so that the employee's benefits under the statute are substantially reduced, the clear intent of the legislature is violation of section 451.001 is entitled to reinstatement thwarted.”).

2013Pham, 314 S.W.3d at 528–29 (Seymore, J., dissenting); see also Henry, 18 S.W.3d at 692 (Hardberger, C.J., dissenting).

2013Pham, 314 S.W.3d at'528-29 (Seymore, J., dissenting); see also Henry, 18 S.W.3d at 692 (Hardberger, C.J., dissenting).

2011See, e.g., id. at 59; Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex.1981). 11 .