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39 Ohio opinions name it 6 courts 1920–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Geiger v. Geigergreen2 sentences2026The severability question tries to answer what the law is—what is the law, in light of what the law is not?”). {¶37} Ohio courts have long assessed severability by asking three questions: “(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the c 2026Consistent with this law, a court must apply a three-part test to determine whether it can sever an invalid portion of a statute, or it must strike down the entire law: “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause Nos. 25AP-10 to 25AP-64; 25AP-66 to 25AP-72; 25AP-76 to 25AP-81; 19 25AP-101 to 25AP-105; 25AP-107 to 25AP-126 or par | 6 | 32 |
State v. Bickfordgreen2 sentences2026The severability question tries to answer what the law is—what is the law, in light of what the law is not?”). {¶37} Ohio courts have long assessed severability by asking three questions: “(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the c 2026Consistent with this law, a court must apply a three-part test to determine whether it can sever an invalid portion of a statute, or it must strike down the entire law: “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause Nos. 25AP-10 to 25AP-64; 25AP-66 to 25AP-72; 25AP-76 to 25AP-81; 19 25AP-101 to 25AP-105; 25AP-107 to 25AP-126 or par | 2 | 20 |
State v. Noling (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2026The severability question tries to answer what the law is—what is the law, in light of what the law is not?”). {¶37} Ohio courts have long assessed severability by asking three questions: “(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the c 2026Consistent with this law, a court must apply a three-part test to determine whether it can sever an invalid portion of a statute, or it must strike down the entire law: “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause Nos. 25AP-10 to 25AP-64; 25AP-66 to 25AP-72; 25AP-76 to 25AP-81; 19 25AP-101 to 25AP-105; 25AP-107 to 25AP-126 or par | 1 | 4 |
State v. Hochhauslergreen2 sentences2001Fourth Assignment of Error “It was error for the court not to sever from the 2000 SOB ordinance those provisions which it deemed unconstitutional.” Ohio employs a three-part test to assess whether the unconstitutional portions of an ordinance may be severed from the remainder of the ordinance: “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if th 2001Fourth Assignment of Error “It was error for the court not to sever from the 2000 SOB ordinance those provisions which it deemed unconstitutional.” Ohio employs a three-part test to assess whether the unconstitutional portions of an ordinance may be severed from the remainder of the ordinance: “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if th | 1 | 4 |
State v. Romagegreen2 sentences2016State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390 , 2014-Ohio-783 , 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 16 (severance was not appropriate because the severance of the requested word would still make the statute overbroad and unconstitutional). 2016State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390 , 2014-Ohio-783 , 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 16 (severance was not appropriate because the severance of the requested word would still make the statute overbroad and unconstitutional). | 1 | 2 |
City of Norwood v. Horneygreen2 sentences2007See, also, Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 126 ; State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 94-95 . {¶ 45} After severing the unconstitutional provisions of R.C. 503.09, that is, the word “freehold” and the phrase “owning land,” the statute reads: {¶ 46} “Where a township contains a municipal corporation, either in whole or in part, if a majority of the electors in the portion of such a township outside the municipal corporation’s corporate limits, petitions, with a map accurately setting forth such territory, praying to hav 2007See, also, Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 126 ; State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 94-95 . {¶ 45} After severing the unconstitutional provisions of R.C. 503.09, that is, the word “freehold” and the phrase “owning land,” the statute reads: {¶ 46} “Where a township contains a municipal corporation, either in whole or in part, if a majority of the electors in the portion of such a township outside the municipal corporation’s corporate limits, petitions, with a map accurately setting forth such territory, praying to hav | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences2023We have previously explained how we determine whether severing a provision is appropriate: Three questions are to be answered before severance is appropriate. “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the 2023We have previously explained how we determine whether severing a provision is appropriate: Three questions are to be answered before severance is appropriate. “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the | 3 | 2007–2023 |
Geauga County Bar Ass'n v. Taber
green
2 sentences1993State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 1993State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Smorgala
green
2 sentences1993State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 1993State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Oregon v. Ice
green
2 sentences2023We have previously explained how we determine whether severing a provision is appropriate: Three questions are to be answered before severance is appropriate. “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the 2023We have previously explained how we determine whether severing a provision is appropriate: Three questions are to be answered before severance is appropriate. “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the | 1 | 2023–2023 |
City of Cleveland v. State
green
2 sentences2020The test for severance asks three questions: “(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?” Cleveland, 138 Ohio St.3d 232 , 2014-Ohio-86 , 5 N.E 2020The test for severance asks three questions: “(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?” Cleveland, 138 Ohio St.3d 232 , 2014-Ohio-86 , 5 N.E | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. Pope
green
2 sentences2006We hold that Geiger is satisfied in this case and therefore severance is appropriate. {¶ 127} Severing the unconstitutional portion of R.C. 163.19 leaves only the first sentence, which reads as follows: “Subject to sections 163.07 and 163.09 of the Revised Code, any party may prosecute appeals as in other civil actions from the judgment of the court.” Although it appears that part of the legislature’s intent in the statute was to prevent the issuance of stays or injunctions pending appellate review, Pope, 54 Ohio St.2d at 18-19 , 8 O.O.3d 7 , 374 N.E.2d 406 , even if doing so could lead to the 2006We hold that Geiger is satisfied in this case and therefore severance is appropriate. {¶ 127} Severing the unconstitutional portion of R.C. 163.19 leaves only the first sentence, which reads as follows: “Subject to sections 163.07 and 163.09 of the Revised Code, any party may prosecute appeals as in other civil actions from the judgment of the court.” Although it appears that part of the legislature’s intent in the statute was to prevent the issuance of stays or injunctions pending appellate review, Pope, 54 Ohio St.2d at 18-19 , 8 O.O.3d 7 , 374 N.E.2d 406 , even if doing so could lead to the | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Simmons-Harris v. Goff
green
1 sentence2001Simmons-Harris v. Goff (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1 , 8 , quoting Geiger v. Geiger (1927), 117 Ohio St. 451 , 466 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Passov v. Paris Development Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1996Corp. (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 202 , 563 N.E.2d 327 (completion of a system is a discretionary act of the legislature to which immunity applies). 1996Corp. (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 202 , 563 N.E.2d 327 (completion of a system is a discretionary act of the legislature to which immunity applies). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Agnew v. Porter
green
2 sentences1986Understandably, the appellant in this case would look askance at a statute which permits the sacrifice of human life to protect bank property, and increasing traffic counts would seem to bring into serious question whether all risk attending “emergency calls” should be borne by innocent victims, but such observations were brushed aside in the Agnew case as follows: “ ‘If it is unwise or unfair to load the economic burden of the damage done by this policy upon the innocent users of the highway, the governmental power to change the policy remains in the hands of the Legislature where the immunit 1986Understandably, the appellant in this case would look askance at a statute which permits the sacrifice of human life to protect bank property, and increasing traffic counts would seem to bring into serious question whether all risk attending “emergency calls” should be borne by innocent victims, but such observations were brushed aside in the Agnew case as follows: “ ‘If it is unwise or unfair to load the economic burden of the damage done by this policy upon the innocent users of the highway, the governmental power to change the policy remains in the hands of the Legislature where the immunit | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ferry v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1936Co., 258 U. S. 314 , the Supreme Court of the United States held there was no vested right in dower, and that the legislature could bar those it saw fit without violating the due process clause. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Dorchy v. Kansas
green
2 sentences1927Cas., 1916D, 140: *466 “(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?” Other authorities upon the same proposition are : Dorchy v. State of Kansa 1927Cas., 1916D, 140: *466 “(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?” Other authorities upon the same proposition are : Dorchy v. State of Kansa | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Mathues
green
1 sentence1920According to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Section 13 of Article III, provides: “No law shall extend the term of any public officer or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments after his election or appointment.” In the case of Commissioners v. Mathues, 210 Pa., 372 already quoted, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania says that this provision of their Constitution has no application to the judiciary and can not be read into the judiciary article which refers to a separate and co-ordinate branch of the government. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.