15 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Walker v. Horinegreen2 sentences2010Walker, 695 S.W.2d at 576 (emphasis added). ¶39 Adopting the foregoing Walker analysis, we hold that Ledaura failed to demonstrate that the parties intended the Lease and Option to operate as a single contract. 2010Walker, 695 S.W.2d at 576 (emphasis added). ¶39 Adopting the foregoing Walker analysis, we hold that Ledaura failed to demonstrate that the parties intended the Lease and Option to operate as a single contract. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Beckergreen1 sentence2014We may review Walker's challenge under RAP 2.5(a)(3).19 See State v. Becker. 132 Wn.2d 54, 64 , 935 P.2d 1321 (1997) ("'Since a comment on the evidence violates a constitutional prohibition, [a] failure to object or move for a mistrial does not foreclose [him or] her from raising this issue on appeal.") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lampshire. 74 Wn.2d 888, 893 , 447 P.2d 727 (1968)); see also State v. Jackman. 156 Wn.2d 736, 743 , 132 P.3d 136 (2006) (claim that a jury instruction contains a judicial comment may be raised for the first time on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jackmangreen1 sentence2014We may review Walker's challenge under RAP 2.5(a)(3).19 See State v. Becker. 132 Wn.2d 54, 64 , 935 P.2d 1321 (1997) ("'Since a comment on the evidence violates a constitutional prohibition, [a] failure to object or move for a mistrial does not foreclose [him or] her from raising this issue on appeal.") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lampshire. 74 Wn.2d 888, 893 , 447 P.2d 727 (1968)); see also State v. Jackman. 156 Wn.2d 736, 743 , 132 P.3d 136 (2006) (claim that a jury instruction contains a judicial comment may be raised for the first time on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beckergreen1 sentence2014We may review Walker's challenge under RAP 2.5(a)(3).19 See State v. Becker. 132 Wn.2d 54, 64 , 935 P.2d 1321 (1997) ("'Since a comment on the evidence violates a constitutional prohibition, [a] failure to object or move for a mistrial does not foreclose [him or] her from raising this issue on appeal.") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lampshire. 74 Wn.2d 888, 893 , 447 P.2d 727 (1968)); see also State v. Jackman. 156 Wn.2d 736, 743 , 132 P.3d 136 (2006) (claim that a jury instruction contains a judicial comment may be raised for the first time on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jackmangreen1 sentence2014We may review Walker's challenge under RAP 2.5(a)(3).19 See State v. Becker. 132 Wn.2d 54, 64 , 935 P.2d 1321 (1997) ("'Since a comment on the evidence violates a constitutional prohibition, [a] failure to object or move for a mistrial does not foreclose [him or] her from raising this issue on appeal.") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lampshire. 74 Wn.2d 888, 893 , 447 P.2d 727 (1968)); see also State v. Jackman. 156 Wn.2d 736, 743 , 132 P.3d 136 (2006) (claim that a jury instruction contains a judicial comment may be raised for the first time on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Finch
green
2 sentences2015The question before us is whether, in light of the "lesser showing" required under Fierro, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Walker's motion.6 Finch, 137 Wn.2d at 846 . 2015The question before us is whether, in light of the “lesser showing” required under Fierro , the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Walker’s motion. 6 Finch, 137 Wn.2d at 846 . | 3 | 2014–2015 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Glasmann
green
2 sentences2015Prosecutorial misconduct violated Walker's right to a fair trial Walker argues that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct primarily in the PowerPoint presentation used during closing argument. 3 We recently addressed this very same issue in Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696 , and it is regrettable that some prosecutors continue to defend these practices and the 1 Because we reverse Walker's convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct, we do not reach Walker's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 In its supplemental brief, the State reasserts the cross assignment of error 2015Prosecutorial misconduct violated Walker's right to a fair trial Walker argues that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct primarily in the PowerPoint presentation used during closing argument. 3 We recently addressed this very same issue in Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696 , and it is regrettable that some prosecutors continue to defend these practices and the 1 Because we reverse Walker's convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct, we do not reach Walker's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 In its supplemental brief, the State reasserts the cross assignment of error | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Walker
green
2 sentences2011Walker, 136 Wn.2d at 770 . ¶22 Applying the Walker test here, we examine whether a reasonably prudent person would have acted as George did in his situation. 2011Walker, 136 Wn.2d at 770 . ¶22 Applying the Walker test here, we examine whether a reasonably prudent person would have acted as George did in his situation. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham
green
2 sentences2008Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, 30 Wash. 484, 487 , 71 P. 43 (1902) (holding that the transfer of stolen property conveys no title and the purchaser has no right to retain it). ¶29 Because we hold that Walker’s offenses were not the same criminal conduct, Walker’s defense counsel had no need to argue that his convictions for first degree theft and first degree trafficking in stolen property were the same criminal conduct for purposes of calculating his offender score. 2008Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, 30 Wash. 484, 487 , 71 P. 43 (1902) (holding that the transfer of stolen property conveys no title and the purchaser has no right to retain it). ¶29 Because we hold that Walker’s offenses were not the same criminal conduct, Walker’s defense counsel had no need to argue that his convictions for first degree theft and first degree trafficking in stolen property were the same criminal conduct for purposes of calculating his offender score. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Austin
green
2 sentences2021First, it argues that the 10-day rule to object to a time for trial violation does not apply when there are fewer than 10 days left before the expiration of the time for trial period, citing State v. Austin, 59 Wn. 2021A. Timeliness of Objection under State v. Austin Relying on State v. Austin, 59 Wn. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Powell
green
1 sentence2016The denial of Walker's motion is thus not "manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds . . . ." Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 258 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Fierro
green
2 sentences2015Because no case expressly finds such a right in the Washington Constitution, Walker relies primarily on California cases as persuasive authority in support of his claim. 4 But even if we were to follow the cited cases and find such a right under our state constitution, we conclude that Walker would not be entitled to the relief he seeks. 114 In People v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173 , 821 P.2d 1302 , 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (1991), the defendant was sentenced to death after being convicted by a jury of first degree murder and two counts of robbery. 2015Because no case expressly finds such a right in the Washington Constitution, Walker relies primarily on California cases as persuasive authority in support of his claim. 4 But even if we were to follow the cited cases and find such a right under our state constitution, we conclude that Walker would not be entitled to the relief he seeks. 114 In People v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173 , 821 P.2d 1302 , 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (1991), the defendant was sentenced to death after being convicted by a jury of first degree murder and two counts of robbery. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Lampshire
green
2 sentences2014We may review Walker's challenge under RAP 2.5(a)(3).19 See State v. Becker. 132 Wn.2d 54, 64 , 935 P.2d 1321 (1997) ("'Since a comment on the evidence violates a constitutional prohibition, [a] failure to object or move for a mistrial does not foreclose [him or] her from raising this issue on appeal.") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lampshire. 74 Wn.2d 888, 893 , 447 P.2d 727 (1968)); see also State v. Jackman. 156 Wn.2d 736, 743 , 132 P.3d 136 (2006) (claim that a jury instruction contains a judicial comment may be raised for the first time on appeal). 2014We may review Walker's challenge under RAP 2.5(a)(3).19 See State v. Becker. 132 Wn.2d 54, 64 , 935 P.2d 1321 (1997) ("'Since a comment on the evidence violates a constitutional prohibition, [a] failure to object or move for a mistrial does not foreclose [him or] her from raising this issue on appeal.") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lampshire. 74 Wn.2d 888, 893 , 447 P.2d 727 (1968)); see also State v. Jackman. 156 Wn.2d 736, 743 , 132 P.3d 136 (2006) (claim that a jury instruction contains a judicial comment may be raised for the first time on appeal). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Walker
green
2 sentences2011Walker, 136 Wash.2d at 770 , 966 P.2d 883 . ¶ 22 Applying the Walker test here, we examine whether a reasonably prudent person would have acted as George did in his situation. 2011Walker, 136 Wash.2d at 770 , 966 P.2d 883 . ¶ 22 Applying the Walker test here, we examine whether a reasonably prudent person would have acted as George did in his situation. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1961The statutory requirement of notice by mail was added in 1953 to satisfy the test in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 , 94 L. 1961The statutory requirement of notice by mail was added in 1953 to satisfy the test in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 , 94 L. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.