Walker motion in Georgia

2017The facts set forth at Walker’s plea hearing established that Walker fatally shot his estranged wife inside their home, then exited the home and shot the second victim as she stood in the driveway calling 911. “[M]order and aggravated assault upon different victims do not merge as a matter of law.” Biddy v. State, 253 Ga. 289, 292 (2) ( 319 SE2d 842 ) (1984).

2017The facts set forth at Walker’s plea hearing established that Walker fatally shot his estranged wife inside their home, then exited the home and shot the second victim as she stood in the driveway calling 911. “[M]order and aggravated assault upon different victims do not merge as a matter of law.” Biddy v. State, 253 Ga. 289, 292 (2) ( 319 SE2d 842 ) (1984).

2017See Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 753 (3) ( 804 SE2d 1 ) (2017).

2017See Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 753 (3) ( 804 SE2d 1 ) (2017).

2013See Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 248-249 (2) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (holding that trial court may reserve final ruling on an objection to certain evidence and parties remain free to renew the objection during trial).

2013See Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242, 248-249 (2) ( 695 SE2d 255 ) (2010) (holding that trial court may reserve final ruling on an objection to certain evidence and parties remain free to renew the objection during trial).

2013Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. at 660-661 (1); Brown v. State, 301 Ga. App. at 85; State v. Harris, 261 Ga. App. at 122 . (b) In its order denying Walker’s motion to suppress the contraband, the trial court found that, as argued by the State, by pulling the contraband from his pocket 9 Cf. Barber v. State, 317 Ga. App. 600, 602 (1) (b) ( 732 SE2d 125 ) (Where an officer observed the defendant violating OCGA § 40-6-96 by walking down the center of the roadway, the officer had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory detention, and no constitutional violation occurred bef

2013Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. at 660-661 (1); Brown v. State, 301 Ga. App. at 85 ; State v. Harris, 261 Ga. App. at 122 . (b) In its order denying Walker’s motion to suppress the contraband, the trial court found that, as argued by the State, by pulling the contraband from his pocket and discarding it as he ran away from the officer, Walker “lost any [Fjourth [A]mendment protection, as [the contraband was] not recovered pursuant to a search but [was] picked up off the ground.” “While it is true that a criminal defendant’s voluntary abandonment of evidence can remove the taint of an illegal stop

2014Id. at 783 . “ ‘We accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003). (a) Walker’s defense theory was that Roger killed Shuman.

1996Walker’s motion for new trial was denied by the trial court on the ground that he had not carried his burden of showing that any deficient performance by counsel prejudiced his defense by creating “a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s unprofessional deficiencies.” Waddell v. State, 190 Ga. App. 499 (1) ( 379 SE2d 592 ) (1989); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2025Nevertheless, the doctrine of res judicata applies in the context of a motion for summary judgment.9 “There are three prerequisites to the application of res judicata: (1) identity of the cause of action; (2) identity of the parties or their privies; and (3) a previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.”10 As noted above, Walker’s motion for summary judgment was on the same issue litigated by the 8 Smith v. Chandler, 256 Ga. App. 440, 440 ( 568 SE2d 592 ) (2002). 9 See Bennett v. Cotton, 244 Ga. App. 784, 785 (1) ( 536 SE2d 802 ) (2000) (“Under Georgia law, preclu

2025Nevertheless, the doctrine of res judicata applies in the context of a motion for summary judgment.9 “There are three prerequisites to the application of res judicata: (1) identity of the cause of action; (2) identity of the parties or their privies; and (3) a previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.”10 As noted above, Walker’s motion for summary judgment was on the same issue litigated by the 8 Smith v. Chandler, 256 Ga. App. 440, 440 ( 568 SE2d 592 ) (2002). 9 See Bennett v. Cotton, 244 Ga. App. 784, 785 (1) ( 536 SE2d 802 ) (2000) (“Under Georgia law, preclu

2025See Blocker v. State, 12 Ga. App. 81 (2) ( 76 SE 784 ) (1912).

2025See Blocker v. State, 12 Ga. App. 81 (2) ( 76 SE 784 ) (1912).

2025And preclusion doctrines apply to a cause of action even if some new factual allegations have been made, some new relief has been requested, or a new defendant has been added.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 Smith v. Lockridge, 288 Ga. 180, 185 (4) ( 702 SE2d 858 ) (2010). 10 arbitration panel.

2025And preclusion doctrines apply to a cause of action even if some new factual allegations have been made, some new relief has been requested, or a new defendant has been added.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 Smith v. Lockridge, 288 Ga. 180, 185 (4) ( 702 SE2d 858 ) (2010). 10 arbitration panel.

2025Nevertheless, the doctrine of res judicata applies in the context of a motion for summary judgment.9 “There are three prerequisites to the application of res judicata: (1) identity of the cause of action; (2) identity of the parties or their privies; and (3) a previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.”10 As noted above, Walker’s motion for summary judgment was on the same issue litigated by the 8 Smith v. Chandler, 256 Ga. App. 440, 440 ( 568 SE2d 592 ) (2002). 9 See Bennett v. Cotton, 244 Ga. App. 784, 785 (1) ( 536 SE2d 802 ) (2000) (“Under Georgia law, preclu

2025Nevertheless, the doctrine of res judicata applies in the context of a motion for summary judgment.9 “There are three prerequisites to the application of res judicata: (1) identity of the cause of action; (2) identity of the parties or their privies; and (3) a previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.”10 As noted above, Walker’s motion for summary judgment was on the same issue litigated by the 8 Smith v. Chandler, 256 Ga. App. 440, 440 ( 568 SE2d 592 ) (2002). 9 See Bennett v. Cotton, 244 Ga. App. 784, 785 (1) ( 536 SE2d 802 ) (2000) (“Under Georgia law, preclu

2025Clarke and Walker claim that under Cousins v. Macedonia Baptist Church of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 570, 573 ( 662 SE2d 533 ) (2008), because the information obtained in a pre-hearing conversation with Wilson was not sworn testimony, the probate court’s actions are “clearly improper” and warrant reversal.

2025Clarke and Walker claim that under Cousins v. Macedonia Baptist Church of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 570, 573 ( 662 SE2d 533 ) (2008), because the information obtained in a pre-hearing conversation with Wilson was not sworn testimony, the probate court’s actions are “clearly improper” and warrant reversal.

2025See also Malice v. Coloplast Corp., 278 Ga. App. 395, 397-398 ( 629 SE2d 95 ) (2006) (“Georgia law is clear that the authority of courts to review an arbitration award is very limited; courts cannot inquire into the 11 correctly denied Walker’s motion for summary judgment on this previously adjudicated matter.

2025See also Malice v. Coloplast Corp., 278 Ga. App. 395, 397-398 ( 629 SE2d 95 ) (2006) (“Georgia law is clear that the authority of courts to review an arbitration award is very limited; courts cannot inquire into the 11 correctly denied Walker’s motion for summary judgment on this previously adjudicated matter.

2022“On appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), this Court is limited to a consideration of only whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment under the limited statutory criteria.” Fred Jones Enterprises v. Williams, 331 Ga. App. 481, 485 (2) ( 771 SE2d 163 ) (2015).

2022“On appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), this Court is limited to a consideration of only whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment under the limited statutory criteria.” Fred Jones Enterprises v. Williams, 331 Ga. App. 481, 485 (2) ( 771 SE2d 163 ) (2015).

2021See Mangrum, 244 Ga. App. at 559 (holding that the trial court’s error in denying the defendant’s motion to sever the offenses was harmless where the State presented strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt). 4.

2021“A cause of action has been defined as being the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 116 (3) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).

2021“A cause of action has been defined as being the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 116 (3) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).

2020Instead, “reversal is not required if, when viewing the charge as a whole, the State’s burden of proof is adequately defined.” White v. State, 302 Ga. 806, 807 (2) ( 809 SE2d 749 ) (2018). 10 Here, the trial court properly instructed on Walker’s presumption of innocence, correctly charged that Walker had no burden of proof, and properly advised that the State had the burden of proof to establish the allegations and elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

2020Instead, “reversal is not required if, when viewing the charge as a whole, the State’s burden of proof is adequately defined.” White v. State, 302 Ga. 806, 807 (2) ( 809 SE2d 749 ) (2018). 10 Here, the trial court properly instructed on Walker’s presumption of innocence, correctly charged that Walker had no burden of proof, and properly advised that the State had the burden of proof to establish the allegations and elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

2020Further, given the indirect nature of the remark in the letter, it would have been reasonable for trial counsel to decide against having the jury instructed that the statement could be deemed an admission or confession. “[A]s counsel articulated a valid strategic decision regarding [this] instruction, failure to request [this] charge is not ineffective assistance.” Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108 ) (2003). (f) Finally, the cumulative prejudice from any assumed deficiencies discussed in Division 3 (b), (c), and (d) is insufficient to show a reasonable probability that the

2020Further, given the indirect nature of the remark in the letter, it would have been reasonable for trial counsel to decide against having the jury instructed that the statement could be deemed an admission or confession. “[A]s counsel articulated a valid strategic decision regarding [this] instruction, failure to request [this] charge is not ineffective assistance.” Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108 ) (2003). (f) Finally, the cumulative prejudice from any assumed deficiencies discussed in Division 3 (b), (c), and (d) is insufficient to show a reasonable probability that the

2018In Walker v. State , 341 Ga. App. 742 , 745-47 (2), 801 S.E.2d 621 (2017), this Court affirmed Walker's convictions but vacated the trial court's ruling on Walker's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

2018In Walker v. State , 341 Ga. App. 742 , 745-47 (2), 801 S.E.2d 621 (2017), this Court affirmed Walker's convictions but vacated the trial court's ruling on Walker's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

2017See Airport Book Store, Inc. v. Jackson, 242 Ga. 214, 217-219, n. 3 ( 248 SE2d 623 ) (1978).

2017See Airport Book Store, Inc. v. Jackson, 242 Ga. 214, 217-219, n. 3 ( 248 SE2d 623 ) (1978).

2016Counsel described the situation as one “I had to deal with . . . whether or not I got [Walker’s] approval [for the justification instruction, and] if he says I didn’t discuss it with him, then I have no reason to disagree with that and I should have [discussed it with him].” 3 Contrary to Walker’s assertion, the trial court did not inform the jury that an affirmative defense is one which “admits the doing of the act.” Compare Williams v. State, 297 Ga. 460, 463-464 (2), fn. 2 ( 773 SE2d 213 ) (2015).

2016Counsel described the situation as one “I had to deal with . . . whether or not I got [Walker’s] approval [for the justification instruction, and] if he says I didn’t discuss it with him, then I have no reason to disagree with that and I should have [discussed it with him].” 3 Contrary to Walker’s assertion, the trial court did not inform the jury that an affirmative defense is one which “admits the doing of the act.” Compare Williams v. State, 297 Ga. 460, 463-464 (2), fn. 2 ( 773 SE2d 213 ) (2015).

2014See United States v. Salazar, 609 F3d 1059, 1067 (II) (C) (10th Cir. 2010) (“Mr. Salazar did not submit to [the show of] authority until he complied with Trooper Berner’s command to get out of the pickup.”) 7 As Walker did not submit to Officer Adriance’s show of authority before abandoning the items at issue, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Walker’s motion to suppress.

2014See United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1066 (II) (C) (10th Cir., 2010) (“Mr. Salazar did not submit to [the show of] authority until he complied with Trooper Berner’s command to get out of the pickup.”)7 As Walker did not submit to Officer Adriance’s show of authority before abandoning the items at issue, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Walker’s motion to suppress.

2014According to the facts as found by the trial court after the hearing on Walker’s motion to suppress,1 Officer David Adriance, of the Warner Robbins Police Department, was patrolling an area near an elementary school at 12:12 a.m. on February 23, 2011; he had been advised to be on the lookout for a black 1 “On appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court's findings on disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and its application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.” Registe v. State, 292 Ga. 154, 155-156 ( 734 SE2d 19 ) (2012) (Cita

2014According to the facts as found by the trial court after the hearing on Walker’s motion to suppress,1 Officer David Adriance, of the Warner Robbins Police Department, was patrolling an area near an elementary school at 12:12 a.m. on February 23, 2011; he had been advised to be on the lookout for a black 1 “On appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court's findings on disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and its application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.” Registe v. State, 292 Ga. 154, 155-156 ( 734 SE2d 19 ) (2012) (Cita

2014See Walker v. State, 323 Ga. App. 558 ( 747 SE2d 51 ) (2013).

2014See Walker v. State, 323 Ga. App. 558 ( 747 SE2d 51 ) (2013).

2014Id. at 783 . “ ‘We accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003). (a) Walker’s defense theory was that Roger killed Shuman.

2014Id. at 783 . “ ‘We accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003). (a) Walker’s defense theory was that Roger killed Shuman.

2013Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. at 660-661 (1); Brown v. State, 301 Ga. App. at 85; State v. Harris, 261 Ga. App. at 122 . (b) In its order denying Walker’s motion to suppress the contraband, the trial court found that, as argued by the State, by pulling the contraband from his pocket 9 Cf. Barber v. State, 317 Ga. App. 600, 602 (1) (b) ( 732 SE2d 125 ) (Where an officer observed the defendant violating OCGA § 40-6-96 by walking down the center of the roadway, the officer had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory detention, and no constitutional violation occurred bef

2013Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. at 660-661 (1); Brown v. State, 301 Ga. App. at 85; State v. Harris, 261 Ga. App. at 122 . (b) In its order denying Walker’s motion to suppress the contraband, the trial court found that, as argued by the State, by pulling the contraband from his pocket 9 Cf. Barber v. State, 317 Ga. App. 600, 602 (1) (b) ( 732 SE2d 125 ) (Where an officer observed the defendant violating OCGA § 40-6-96 by walking down the center of the roadway, the officer had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory detention, and no constitutional violation occurred bef