Walker claim in Alabama

2015This was trial counsel’s reasonable professional decision; furthermore, [Walker] is not entitled ‘[to] errorless counsel, and not [to] counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but [to] counsel reasonable likely to render ... effective assistance.’ Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041, 1059 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129, 134 [(1992)]).

2015This was trial counsel’s reasonable professional decision; furthermore, [Walker] is not entitled ‘[to] errorless counsel, and not [to] counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but [to] counsel reasonable likely to render ... effective assistance.’ Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041, 1059 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129, 134 [(1992)]).

2010"This Court has stated the following regarding a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a false light: "`"`One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if "`"`(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and "`"`(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. '"' " Butler v. Town of Argo, 8

2010“This Court has stated the following regarding a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a false light: “ ‘ “ ‘One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if “ ‘ “ ‘(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and “ ‘ “ ‘(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.’ ” ’ “Butler v. Town o

2010Regarding the tort of outrage, this Court has stated: "In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct `(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.' Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990)" Potts v. Hayes, 771 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000).

2010Regarding the tort of outrage, this Court has stated: “In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct ‘(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.’ Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.2d 38, 44 (Ala.1990)” Potts v. Hayes, 771 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala.2000).

2010"This Court has stated the following regarding a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a false light: "`"`One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if "`"`(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and "`"`(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. '"' " Butler v. Town of Argo, 8

2010“This Court has stated the following regarding a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a false light: “ ‘ “ ‘One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if “ ‘ “ ‘(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and “ ‘ “ ‘(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.’ ” ’ “Butler v. Town o

2010Regarding the tort of outrage, this Court has stated: "In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct `(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.' Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990)" Potts v. Hayes, 771 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000).

2010Regarding the tort of outrage, this Court has stated: “In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct ‘(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.’ Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.2d 38, 44 (Ala.1990)” Potts v. Hayes, 771 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala.2000).

2010"This Court has stated the following regarding a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a false light: "`"`One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if "`"`(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and "`"`(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. '"' " Butler v. Town of Argo, 8

2010“This Court has stated the following regarding a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a false light: “ ‘ “ ‘One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if “ ‘ “ ‘(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and “ ‘ “ ‘(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.’ ” ’ “Butler v. Town o

2009In the written order denying Walker’s motion for a new trial, the trial court noted that both statute and caselaw in Alabama provide that in order for a search warrant to be valid it must be accompanied by a written affidavit containing supporting evidence that is signed or subscribed to by the complainant or by the party making the statement. § 15-5-4, Ala.Code 1975; Anderson v. State, 445 So.2d 974, 976 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).

2009In the written order denying Walker's motion for a new trial, the trial court noted that both statute and caselaw in Alabama provide that in order for a search warrant to be valid it must be accompanied by a written affidavit containing supporting evidence that is signed or subscribed to by the complainant or by the party making the statement. § 15-5-4, Ala.Code 1975; Anderson v. State, 445 So.2d 974, 976 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983).

2007In Ex parte Bryant, 951 So.2d 724 (Ala. 2002), this Court addressed the application of the plain-error rule in capital cases, stating: "`"`Plain error' arises only if the error is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings."' Ex parte Womack, 435 So.2d 766, 769 (Ala.1983) (quoting United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir.1981)).

2007In Ex parte Bryant, 951 So.2d 724 (Ala. 2002), this Court addressed the application of the plain-error rule in capital cases, stating: "`"`Plain error' arises only if the error is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings."' Ex parte Womack, 435 So.2d 766, 769 (Ala.1983) (quoting United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir.1981)).

2005See supra Part III.C. 13 In Hoskins , the accused demanded a speedy trial immediately upon learning of a detainer warrant issued by Florida authorities. 485 F.2d at 1193 n. 10.

2005See supra Part III.C. [13] In Hoskins , the accused demanded a speedy trial immediately upon learning of a detainer warrant issued by Florida authorities. 485 F.2d at 1193 n. 10.

2005Especially is this so when the prosecution continues at all time to bear the responsibility for securing a prompt trial.'" 378 So.2d at 1178 (quoting Prince v. State , 354 So.2d 1186 , 1191 (Ala.Crim.App. 1977), quoting in turn Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 , 704 (5th Cir. 1975)). 12 In our discussion of the third Barker factor, we examined Walker's claim that she had no knowledge of the indictment during the time between her indictment and her arrest, and we concluded that the record neither proves nor disproves that claim.

2005Especially is this so when the prosecution continues at all time to bear the responsibility for securing a prompt trial.'" 378 So.2d at 1178 (quoting Prince v. State, 354 So.2d 1186, 1191 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), quoting in turn Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 704 (5th Cir.1975)). [12] In our discussion of the third Barker factor, we examined Walker's claim that she had no knowledge of the indictment during the time between her indictment and her arrest, and we concluded that the record neither proves nor disproves that claim.

2005Especially is this so when the prosecution continues at all time to bear the responsibility for securing a prompt trial.'" 378 So.2d at 1178 (quoting Prince v. State , 354 So.2d 1186 , 1191 (Ala.Crim.App. 1977), quoting in turn Prince v. Alabama , 507 F.2d 693 , 704 (5th Cir. 1975)). 12 In our discussion of the third Barker factor, we examined Walker's claim that she had no knowledge of the indictment during the time between her indictment and her arrest, and we concluded that the record neither proves nor disproves that claim.

2005Especially is this so when the prosecution continues at all time to bear the responsibility for securing a prompt trial.'" 378 So.2d at 1178 (quoting Prince v. State, 354 So.2d 1186, 1191 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), quoting in turn Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 704 (5th Cir.1975)). [12] In our discussion of the third Barker factor, we examined Walker's claim that she had no knowledge of the indictment during the time between her indictment and her arrest, and we concluded that the record neither proves nor disproves that claim.

2000The Court of Criminal Appeals *137 responded as follows in its memorandum decision: "On appeal, [Walker] argues that his third petition was improperly dismissed as successive because, he says, no previous petition was adjudicated on its merits. "`While it is true that our cases hold that a judge must conduct a hearing on a post-conviction petition that is meritorious on its face, a judge who presided over the trial or other proceeding and observed the conduct of the attorneys at the trial or other proceeding need not hold a hearing on the effectiveness of those attorneys based upon conduct tha

2000The Court of Criminal Appeals *Page 137 responded as follows in its memorandum decision: "On appeal, [Walker] argues that his third petition was improperly dismissed as successive because, he says, no previous petition was adjudicated on its merits. "`While it is true that our cases hold that a judge must conduct a hearing on a post-conviction petition that is meritorious on its face, a judge who presided over the trial or other proceeding and observed the conduct of the attorneys at the trial or other proceeding need not hold a hearing on the effectiveness of those attorneys based upon conduc