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27 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Wright v. State , 961 So.2d 1036 , 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). 2019See Wright v. State , 961 So.2d 1036 , 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). | 2 | 2 |
Walker v. Edelgreen2 sentences2002See Walker v. Edel, 727 So.2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), where, in reversing the trial court the Fifth District held as follows: The trial court's refusal to hear Walker's defense was clearly error, which affected the issue before the court. 2002See Walker v. Edel, 727 So.2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), where, in reversing the trial court the Fifth District held as follows: The trial court’s refusal to hear Walker’s defense was clearly error, which affected the issue before the court. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Spencergreen1 sentence2021We affirm without further discussion the lower court’s May 12, 2021 order denying Walker’s motion to correct his sentence but reverse the June 30, 2021 sanctions order to allow the lower court to rule on Walker’s response filed on September 1, 2021, and to determine whether sanctions 2 are appropriate in accordance with State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48-49 (Fla. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Ronald Pak Zern v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2019Zern v. State, 191 So. 3d 962, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Dylan Harris v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Harris v. State, 204 So.3d 973, 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Toney Deron Davis v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2014See Davis v. State, 136 So.3d 1169 (Fla.2014); Braddy v. State, 111 So.3d 810 (Fla.2012), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 275 , 187 L.Ed.2d 199 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Raleigh v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Raleigh v. State, 932 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Fla.2006) (“[D]efense counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to make a meritless objection.”). | 1 | 1 |
Woody v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Woody v. State, 993 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See Young v. State, 4 So.3d 1265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (affirming revocation of probation and remanding for entry of written order). | 1 | 1 |
Stephens v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999). | 1 | 1 |
LaMarca v. Stategreen1 sentence2007"On appeal of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal where the State submitted direct evidence, the trial court's determination will be affirmed if the record contains competent and substantial evidence in support of the ruling." Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 943 (Fla.2003) (citing LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1215 (Fla.2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Conde v. Stategreen1 sentence2007"On appeal of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal where the State submitted direct evidence, the trial court's determination will be affirmed if the record contains competent and substantial evidence in support of the ruling." Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 943 (Fla.2003) (citing LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1215 (Fla.2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Stategreen1 sentence2007And, as we explain below, because we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to support Walker's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Walker's motion for judgment for acquittal. "[C]ourts should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law." Woods v. State 733 So.2d 980, 985 (Fla.1999) (quoting Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974)). | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Stategreen1 sentence2007And, as we explain below, because we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to support Walker's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Walker's motion for judgment for acquittal. "[C]ourts should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law." Woods v. State 733 So.2d 980, 985 (Fla.1999) (quoting Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974)). | 1 | 1 |
Jakeway v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See Jakeway, 884 So.2d at 291 . | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Carroll v. State, 914 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Chatmon v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Chatmon v. State, 738 So.2d 970, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Farmer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foster v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Turner v. Duggergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Preston v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walls v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gamble v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Duggergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yates v. Godwingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barno v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zankich v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Florida Bar Re: Rules of Criminal Proceduregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2012On direct appeal, Walker argued that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement because his statement was involuntary; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare Florida’s capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional because a judge rather than a unanimous jury determines death penalty aggravators; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) the trial court erred in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors; (5) the trial court erred by admitting photographic evidence which was either irrel 2012On direct appeal, Walker argued that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement because his statement was involuntary; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare Florida’s capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional because a judge rather than a unanimous jury determines death penalty aggravators; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) the trial court erred in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors; (5) the trial court erred by admitting photographic evidence which was either irrel | 2 | 2007–2012 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2012On direct appeal, Walker argued that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement because his statement was involuntary; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare Florida’s capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional because a judge rather than a unanimous jury determines death penalty aggravators; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) the trial court erred in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors; (5) the trial court erred by admitting photographic evidence which was either irrel 2012On direct appeal, Walker argued that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement because his statement was involuntary; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare Florida’s capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional because a judge rather than a unanimous jury determines death penalty aggravators; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) the trial court erred in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors; (5) the trial court erred by admitting photographic evidence which was either irrel | 2 | 2007–2012 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2026Instead, the court addressed the deficiency element of an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
green
2 sentences2025As the Supreme Court noted, “issuers of ID ‘typically do not permit’ the placement on their IDs of ‘message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated,’” and, therefore, “‘persons who observe’ designs on IDs ‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.’” 576 U.S. at 212 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 ). 2025As the Supreme Court noted, “issuers of ID ‘typically do not permit’ the placement on their IDs of ‘message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated,’” and, therefore, “‘persons who observe’ designs on IDs ‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.’” 576 U.S. at 212 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025As the Supreme Court noted, “issuers of ID ‘typically do not permit’ the placement on their IDs of ‘message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated,’” and, therefore, “‘persons who observe’ designs on IDs ‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.’” 576 U.S. at 212 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 ). 2025As the Supreme Court noted, “issuers of ID ‘typically do not permit’ the placement on their IDs of ‘message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated,’” and, therefore, “‘persons who observe’ designs on IDs ‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.’” 576 U.S. at 212 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Braddy v. State
green
1 sentence2014See Davis v. State, 136 So.3d 1169 (Fla.2014); Braddy v. State, 111 So.3d 810 (Fla.2012), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 275 , 187 L.Ed.2d 199 (2013). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Braddy v. Florida
green
2 sentences2014See Davis v. State, 136 So.3d 1169 (Fla.2014); Braddy v. State, 111 So.3d 810 (Fla.2012), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 275 , 187 L.Ed.2d 199 (2013). 2014See Davis v. State, 136 So.3d 1169 (Fla.2014); Braddy v. State, 111 So.3d 810 (Fla.2012), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 275 , 187 L.Ed.2d 199 (2013). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Walker v. State
green
2 sentences2012On direct appeal, this Court concluded that there was “competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Walker made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to waive his Miranda rights and give his statement to police.” Walker, 957 So.2d at 576 . 2012Walker, 957 So.2d at 569 . . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Alston v. State
green
1 sentence2007As explained below, we deny Walker's claim. (1) Aggravating Factors In reviewing aggravating factors on appeal, as this Court stated in Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 148 (Fla.1998), [I]t is not this Court's function to reweigh the evidence to determine whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is the trial court's job. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Hearns
green
2 sentences2007In support of its ruling, the postconviction court cited Jenkins v. State [1] and Brown v. State. [2] The Impact of State v. Hearns When the postconviction court summarily denied Walker's rule 3.800(a) motion, it did not have the benefit of State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla.2007). 2007In support of its ruling, the postconviction court cited Jenkins v. State [1] and Brown v. State. [2] The Impact of State v. Hearns When the postconviction court summarily denied Walker's rule 3.800(a) motion, it did not have the benefit of State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla.2007). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Walker v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2007The court concluded that the requested information should have been made available and that it had a significant impact on the case: “We believe that the lack of disclosure of the plea agreements known to exist by the prosecution and the prior inconsistent statements made by Hunnell had an effect on Walker’s defense; the information should have been disclosed since it was specifically requested and undeniably material to the case.” Id., at 300 . 2007The court went on to state that “the fact remains that the defendant specifically requested the disclosure of exculpatory material in the Commonwealth’s possession and was entitled to the information.” Id., at 300 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lomont v. State
green
1 sentence2006In the order on appeal, the trial court summarily denied all of the claims, reasoning that Lomont v. State, 506 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), precludes a defendant from raising scoresheet error claims in a rule 3.800(a) motion. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Wendel v. Hauser
neutral
1 sentence2003The circuit court based its ruling on the decision in Wendel v. Hauser, 726 So.2d 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Walker v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| McFadden v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Armstrong v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Wuornos v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Martin v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Gonzalez v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Grubbs v. State neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Ivey v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Daniels v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.