Walker motion in Utah

2015As a consequence, because Walker has not carried its burden to show the court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under the Act, we are not convinced the district court erred. ¶17 In summary, we conclude that because a member’s demand to inspect a nonprofit corporation’s records of its members is satisfied by the statutorily required production of a list of its members’ names and addresses, the district court properly denied Walker’s request to inspect and copy a list of 20140085-CA 7 2015 UT App 216 Walker I Investments, LLC v. Sunpeak Association, Inc. the Association’s members’ e

2015Additionally, at least one of Walker's evidentiary arguments-that the prior acts evidence is admissible under the doctrine of chances, see State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶¶47-62 , 296 P.3d 678 -does not appear to have been presented to the district court in support of Walker's motion to admit the evidence.

2015"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 24 , 325 P.3d 855 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2015"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 24 , 325 P.3d 855 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2014The result, according to Walker, is that the property description in the Condemnation Resolution encompasses more acreage than UDOT acknowledges. 115 UDOT responds that the taking of property not described in the Condemnation Resolution or the pleadings "is simply not relevant to the issues before the Court." UDOT argues that if it took additional property, that taking constituted "a separate and unrelated wrongful act." Thus, while Walker's claim that UDOT took more property than it condemned might be the substance of a trespass or inverse condemnation claim, Walker failed to bring those clai

2014The result, according to Walker, is that the property description in the Condemnation Resolution encompasses more acreage than UDOT acknowledges. 115 UDOT responds that the taking of property not described in the Condemnation Resolution or the pleadings "is simply not relevant to the issues before the Court." UDOT argues that if it took additional property, that taking constituted "a separate and unrelated wrongful act." Thus, while Walker's claim that UDOT took more property than it condemned might be the substance of a trespass or inverse condemnation claim, Walker failed to bring those clai

2011We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Ms. Walker's motion to suppress on the alternative ground that the Warrant used to draw her blood was supported by probable cause. 119 Chief Justice DURHAM and Justice PARRISH concur in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion. . 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). .

2011We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Ms. Walker's motion to suppress on the alternative ground that the Warrant used to draw her blood was supported by probable cause. 119 Chief Justice DURHAM and Justice PARRISH concur in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion. . 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). .

2011State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104 , ¶ 14 n. 2, 48 P.3d 872 . .

2011State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104 , ¶ 14 n. 2, 48 P.3d 872 . .

2006The Walker standard requires reversal under rule 52(a) when a result is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Walker, 748 P.2d at 193 .

2006The Walker standard requires reversal under rule 52(a) when a result is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Walker, 748 P.2d at 193 .

2006The Walker standard requires reversal under rule 52(a) when a result is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193 .

2006The Walker standard requires reversal under rule 52(a) when a result is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193 .

2003"To the extent this issue requires us to interpret rules of civil procedure, it 'presents a question of law which we review for correctness? " Harris v. IES Assocs., Inc., 2003 UT App 112, ¶ 25 , 69 P.3d 297 (quoting Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ¶ 42 , 989 P.2d 1077 ). *638 11 Walker next argues that the trial court erred in not granting Walker's motion for a new trial because there was evidence of Jury misconduct.

2003"To the extent this issue requires us to interpret rules of civil procedure, it 'presents a question of law which we review for correctness? " Harris v. IES Assocs., Inc., 2003 UT App 112, ¶ 25 , 69 P.3d 297 (quoting Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ¶ 42 , 989 P.2d 1077 ). *638 11 Walker next argues that the trial court erred in not granting Walker's motion for a new trial because there was evidence of Jury misconduct.

2003"To the extent this issue requires us to interpret rules of civil procedure, it 'presents a question of law which we review for correctness? " Harris v. IES Assocs., Inc., 2003 UT App 112, ¶ 25 , 69 P.3d 297 (quoting Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ¶ 42 , 989 P.2d 1077 ). *638 11 Walker next argues that the trial court erred in not granting Walker's motion for a new trial because there was evidence of Jury misconduct.

2003"To the extent this issue requires us to interpret rules of civil procedure, it 'presents a question of law which we review for correctness? " Harris v. IES Assocs., Inc., 2003 UT App 112, ¶ 25 , 69 P.3d 297 (quoting Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ¶ 42 , 989 P.2d 1077 ). *638 11 Walker next argues that the trial court erred in not granting Walker's motion for a new trial because there was evidence of Jury misconduct.

2003"A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial." Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 13 , 29 P.3d 638 (citations omitted). 112 Walker also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Marble to exeeed the scope of a pretrial ruling in limine and further that the trial court erroneously prevented Dr. Sawchuck from fully testifying.

2003"A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial." Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 13 , 29 P.3d 638 (citations omitted). 112 Walker also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Marble to exeeed the scope of a pretrial ruling in limine and further that the trial court erroneously prevented Dr. Sawchuck from fully testifying.

1953As quoted in Walker’s brief from City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576 , 110 P. 2d 983, 985 , 133 A. L.

1953As quoted in Walker’s brief from City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576 , 110 P. 2d 983, 985 , 133 A. L.