14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2011Comm’n, 72 Ariz. 197, 198 , 232 P.2d 846, 847 (1951) (stating that a "widely accepted and well-known exception” to the going and coming rule exists when "the work is of such a nature that it creates the necessity of travel on the part of the employee, or where the employer compensates the employee for travel to and from work”); Martin v. Indus. 2011Comm’n, 72 Ariz. 197, 198 , 232 P.2d 846, 847 (1951) (stating that a "widely accepted and well-known exception” to the going and coming rule exists when "the work is of such a nature that it creates the necessity of travel on the part of the employee, or where the employer compensates the employee for travel to and from work”); Martin v. Indus. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Superior Court, in & for County of Maricopagreen2 sentences2011In general, under the going and coming rule, "an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of his employee while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment." Id. at 35 , V 11, 251 P.3d at 414 (quoting State v. Superior Court (Schraft), 111 Ariz. 130, 132 , 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) (recognizing that reimbursement of a National Guardsman’s travel expenses in the form of a mileage allowance did not bestow in the state a right of control)). 2011In general, under the going and coming rule, "an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of his employee while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment." Id. at 35 , V 11, 251 P.3d at 414 (quoting State v. Superior Court (Schraft), 111 Ariz. 130, 132 , 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) (recognizing that reimbursement of a National Guardsman’s travel expenses in the form of a mileage allowance did not bestow in the state a right of control)). | 2 | 2 |
Robarge v. Bechtel Power Corp.green2 sentences2011See Ortiz v. Clinton, 187 Ariz. 294, 298 , 928 P.2d 718, 722 (App.1996); Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz.App. 277, 280-83 , 501 P.2d 453, 456-59 (1972) (applying the “dual-purpose” exception to the going and coming rule and recognizing that “there are instances when [workers’ compensation] principles are particularly apropos and can be invoked” in tort cases). 9 ¶ 20 “Nevertheless, the rules adopted for workers’] compensation cases should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases.” *493 Robarge, 131 Ariz. at 282 , 640 P.2d at 213 . 2011Similarly, in Robarge , this court declined to apply a workers’ compensation principle as an exception to the going and coming rule in a tort case. 131 Ariz. at 282-83, 640 P.2d at 213-14 . 8 . | 1 | 2 |
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elksgreen2 sentences1984Pauley, supra; Knoop v. Industrial Commission, supra. See McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 11 Ariz. 244, 248-49, 226 P.2d 147, 149-50 (1950) (refused to adopt the “premises” exception to the “going-and-coming” limitation, overruled in Pauley, supra.) Pauley adopted an “on-premises” exception to the going-and-coming rule: We hold that when an employee is going to or coming from his place of work and is on the employer’s premises he is within the protective ambit of the Workmens’ Compensation Act, at least when using the customary means of ingress and egress or route of emplo 1973Petitioner, however, urges that the case should not be controlled by the going and coming rule but rather by what has generally become known as the “on premise rule.” The on premise rule is a limitation on the going and coming rule which, although accepted nearly everywhere in the United States, has been rejected in Arizona commencing with McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950). | 1 | 2 |
Knoop v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1984Knoop v. Industrial Commission, 121 Ariz. 293 , 589 P.2d 1325 (App.1978) followed Pauley and Royall adopting a further exception to the going-and-coming rule. 1984Knoop v. Industrial Commission, 121 Ariz. 293 , 589 P.2d 1325 (App.1978) followed Pauley and Royall adopting a further exception to the going-and-coming rule. | 1 | 2 |
Pauley v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1984Pauley, supra; Knoop v. Industrial Commission, supra. See McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 11 Ariz. 244, 248-49, 226 P.2d 147, 149-50 (1950) (refused to adopt the “premises” exception to the “going-and-coming” limitation, overruled in Pauley, supra.) Pauley adopted an “on-premises” exception to the going-and-coming rule: We hold that when an employee is going to or coming from his place of work and is on the employer’s premises he is within the protective ambit of the Workmens’ Compensation Act, at least when using the customary means of ingress and egress or route of emplo 1984Pauley, supra; Knoop v. Industrial Commission, supra. See McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 11 Ariz. 244, 248-49, 226 P.2d 147, 149-50 (1950) (refused to adopt the “premises” exception to the “going-and-coming” limitation, overruled in Pauley, supra.) Pauley adopted an “on-premises” exception to the going-and-coming rule: We hold that when an employee is going to or coming from his place of work and is on the employer’s premises he is within the protective ambit of the Workmens’ Compensation Act, at least when using the customary means of ingress and egress or route of emplo | 1 | 2 |
Kerr v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1978See Kerr v. Industrial Commission, 23 Ariz.App. 106 , 530 P.2d 1139 (1975), where we considered other off-premises exceptions to the going and coming rule after the Pauley decision. 1978See Kerr v. Industrial Commission, 23 Ariz.App. 106 , 530 P.2d 1139 (1975), where we considered other off-premises exceptions to the going and coming rule after the Pauley decision. | 1 | 2 |
Butler v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1975The going and coming rule was first enunciated in Arizona in Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937): “It is of course the general rule in compensation cases, subject to a few exceptions, that a man does not enter an em *108 ployment until he reaches the place where the work of his employer is to be carried on, and similarly, when he has finished all the work required by his duties and leaves the place of business of his employer to go to his own home, he has left the employment, and that an accident which may occur to him on his way to or from his work is not in the 1975The going and coming rule was first enunciated in Arizona in Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937): “It is of course the general rule in compensation cases, subject to a few exceptions, that a man does not enter an em *108 ployment until he reaches the place where the work of his employer is to be carried on, and similarly, when he has finished all the work required by his duties and leaves the place of business of his employer to go to his own home, he has left the employment, and that an accident which may occur to him on his way to or from his work is not in the | 1 | 2 |
Strauss v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2015See id. (noting that “[a]nother exception [to the going and coming rule] is whether transportation is furnished at the expense of the employer”). ¶ 16 Additionally, we do not read Connors as broadening the dual purpose doctrine. 2015See Delk, 74 Ariz. at 381 , 249 P.2d 943 (holding that employee’s death from car accident while traveling on an old road parallel to a new highway arose in the course of his employment as a livestock inspector because the nature of his duties “called for the decedent to travel on side roads and trails”); Strauss, 73 Ariz. at 290 , 240 P.2d 550 (finding employee was within course of employment when fatal accident occurred following a personal errand where employer provided transportation and required employee to “work both on and off the premises at any and all hours”). | 1 | 1 |
Delk v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2015See Delk, 74 Ariz. at 381 , 249 P.2d 943 (holding that employee’s death from car accident while traveling on an old road parallel to a new highway arose in the course of his employment as a livestock inspector because the nature of his duties “called for the decedent to travel on side roads and trails”); Strauss, 73 Ariz. at 290 , 240 P.2d 550 (finding employee was within course of employment when fatal accident occurred following a personal errand where employer provided transportation and required employee to “work both on and off the premises at any and all hours”). 2015See Delk, 74 Ariz. at 381 , 249 P.2d 943 (holding that employee’s death from car accident while traveling on an old road parallel to a new highway arose in the course of his employment as a livestock inspector because the nature of his duties “called for the decedent to travel on side roads and trails”); Strauss, 73 Ariz. at 290 , 240 P.2d 550 (finding employee was within course of employment when fatal accident occurred following a personal errand where employer provided transportation and required employee to “work both on and off the premises at any and all hours”). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Gobeagreen2 sentences2011See Ortiz v. Clinton, 187 Ariz. 294, 298 , 928 P.2d 718, 722 (App.1996); Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz.App. 277, 280-83 , 501 P.2d 453, 456-59 (1972) (applying the “dual-purpose” exception to the going and coming rule and recognizing that “there are instances when [workers’ compensation] principles are particularly apropos and can be invoked” in tort cases). 9 ¶ 20 “Nevertheless, the rules adopted for workers’] compensation cases should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases.” *493 Robarge, 131 Ariz. at 282 , 640 P.2d at 213 . 2011See Ortiz v. Clinton, 187 Ariz. 294, 298 , 928 P.2d 718, 722 (App.1996); Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz.App. 277, 280-83 , 501 P.2d 453, 456-59 (1972) (applying the “dual-purpose” exception to the going and coming rule and recognizing that “there are instances when [workers’ compensation] principles are particularly apropos and can be invoked” in tort cases). 9 ¶ 20 “Nevertheless, the rules adopted for workers’] compensation cases should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases.” *493 Robarge, 131 Ariz. at 282 , 640 P.2d at 213 . | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2011Comm’n, 73 Ariz. 401, 405 , 242 P.2d 286, 289 (1952) (explaining that because "Martin’s employment created the necessity for travel, he comes within the rule stated in Harris ”). 2011Comm’n, 73 Ariz. 401, 405 , 242 P.2d 286, 289 (1952) (explaining that because "Martin’s employment created the necessity for travel, he comes within the rule stated in Harris ”). | 1 | 1 |
Ortiz v. Clintongreen2 sentences2011See Ortiz v. Clinton, 187 Ariz. 294, 298 , 928 P.2d 718, 722 (App.1996); Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz.App. 277, 280-83 , 501 P.2d 453, 456-59 (1972) (applying the “dual-purpose” exception to the going and coming rule and recognizing that “there are instances when [workers’ compensation] principles are particularly apropos and can be invoked” in tort cases). 9 ¶ 20 “Nevertheless, the rules adopted for workers’] compensation cases should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases.” *493 Robarge, 131 Ariz. at 282 , 640 P.2d at 213 . 2011See Ortiz v. Clinton, 187 Ariz. 294, 298 , 928 P.2d 718, 722 (App.1996); Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz.App. 277, 280-83 , 501 P.2d 453, 456-59 (1972) (applying the “dual-purpose” exception to the going and coming rule and recognizing that “there are instances when [workers’ compensation] principles are particularly apropos and can be invoked” in tort cases). 9 ¶ 20 “Nevertheless, the rules adopted for workers’] compensation cases should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases.” *493 Robarge, 131 Ariz. at 282 , 640 P.2d at 213 . | 1 | 1 |
Senor T's Restaurant v. Industrial Commissiongreen1 sentence2011Similarly, in Robarge , this court declined to apply a workers’ compensation principle as an exception to the going and coming rule in a tort case. 131 Ariz. at 282-83, 640 P.2d at 213-14 . 8 . | 1 | 1 |
Hansen v. Oakleygreen2 sentences2011State v. Superior Court (Schrafi), 111 Ariz. 130, 132 , 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) (citing Hansen v. Oakley, 76 Ariz. 307, 312 , 263 P.2d 807, 810 (1953)). 2011State v. Superior Court (Schrafi), 111 Ariz. 130, 132 , 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) (citing Hansen v. Oakley, 76 Ariz. 307, 312 , 263 P.2d 807, 810 (1953)). | 1 | 1 |
Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adamsgreen1 sentence1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers, 777 P.2d at 1149; Fenton, 741 P.2d at 519 . | 1 | 1 |
Circle K Store 1131 v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1993The positional risk doctrine “provides that an injury ‘arises out of’ the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact the employment placed plaintiff at that location at that particular time.” Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Industrial Comm’n, 165 Ariz. 91, 94 , 796 P.2d 893, 896 (1990) (emphasis original); see 1 Larson, supra § 6.50 at 3-6 to 3-7. 1993The positional risk doctrine “provides that an injury ‘arises out of’ the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact the employment placed plaintiff at that location at that particular time.” Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Industrial Comm’n, 165 Ariz. 91, 94 , 796 P.2d 893, 896 (1990) (emphasis original); see 1 Larson, supra § 6.50 at 3-6 to 3-7. | 1 | 1 |
Rencehausen v. Western Greyhound Linesgreen2 sentences1983Second, we determined that "the hazards, if any, which he [the employee] would encounter in traveling from his home to the work site are not distinguishable from those `risks [which] are shared with members of the general public.'" Id. at 108 , 530 P.2d at 1141 , citing, Rencehausen v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Ariz. App. 184, 186 , 444 P.2d 741, 743 (1968). 1983Second, we determined that "the hazards, if any, which he [the employee] would encounter in traveling from his home to the work site are not distinguishable from those `risks [which] are shared with members of the general public.'" Id. at 108 , 530 P.2d at 1141 , citing, Rencehausen v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Ariz. App. 184, 186 , 444 P.2d 741, 743 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
| North American Rockwell Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Bajbek
green
2 sentences2015Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Bajbek, 79 Ariz. 89, 93 , 284 P.2d 459 (1955) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 2015Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Bajbek, 79 Ariz. 89, 93 , 284 P.2d 459 (1955) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). | 3 | 1984–2015 |
Robins Silk Manufacturing Co. v. Consolidated Piece Dye Works
green
1 sentence2015The dual purpose doctrine is based on a test enunciated in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929), which our supreme court later adopted: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, [the employee] is in the course of [ ] employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own----If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undo | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Claim of Dependents of Marks v. Gray
green
1 sentence2015The dual purpose doctrine is based on a test enunciated in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929), which our supreme court later adopted: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, [the employee] is in the course of [ ] employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own----If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undo | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Connors v. Parsons
green
2 sentences2015In that case, the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by her co-employee. 169 Ariz. at 248 , 818 P.2d 232 . 2015In that case, the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by her co-employee. 169 Ariz. at 248 , 818 P.2d 232 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Davis v. VUMORE CABLE COMPANY
neutral
2 sentences2011Although the court in McCloud II "found no case directly on point” in extending an employer's tort liability for the conduct of an off-duty employee assigned to out-of-town work, it did find a few cases "instructive,” including Davis v. Vumore Cable Co., 14 Ariz.App. 411 , 484 P.2d 23 (1971), in which this court addressed an employer’s potential vicarious tort liability for an out-of-town employee’s unauthorized use of a company truck. 2011Although the court in McCloud II "found no case directly on point” in extending an employer's tort liability for the conduct of an off-duty employee assigned to out-of-town work, it did find a few cases "instructive,” including Davis v. Vumore Cable Co., 14 Ariz.App. 411 , 484 P.2d 23 (1971), in which this court addressed an employer’s potential vicarious tort liability for an out-of-town employee’s unauthorized use of a company truck. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Carnes v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011In general, under the going and coming rule, "an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of his employee while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment." Id. at 35 , V 11, 251 P.3d at 414 (quoting State v. Superior Court (Schraft), 111 Ariz. 130, 132 , 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) (recognizing that reimbursement of a National Guardsman’s travel expenses in the form of a mileage allowance did not bestow in the state a right of control)). 2011In general, under the going and coming rule, "an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of his employee while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment." Id. at 35 , V 11, 251 P.3d at 414 (quoting State v. Superior Court (Schraft), 111 Ariz. 130, 132 , 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) (recognizing that reimbursement of a National Guardsman’s travel expenses in the form of a mileage allowance did not bestow in the state a right of control)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Torres v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1996According to the Torres court, the employer’s conveyance exception to the going and coming rule should apply in Arizona. 137 Ariz. at 321 , 670 P.2d at 426 . 1 We *108 agree and find that the situation before us falls squarely within this exception. 1996According to the Torres court, the employer’s conveyance exception to the going and coming rule should apply in Arizona. 137 Ariz. at 321 , 670 P.2d at 426 . 1 We *108 agree and find that the situation before us falls squarely within this exception. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Fenton v. SAIF Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1993See Kodiak Oilfield Haulers, 777 P.2d at 1149; Fenton, 741 P.2d at 519 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Serrano v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1983The court noted that the employer had contracted "[t]o pay to each employee, as an allowance for travel and subsistence expense, and in lieu of any other provision for travel or subsistence, ... an amount equal to one hour's pay at such employees' straight time rate for each day worked by such employee, ..." 75 Ariz. at 328 , 256 P.2d at 710 ; that the reason for this extra pay was that "[t]he job was not set up with housing, board or lodging"; and that Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal.2d 33 , 215 P.2d 736 (1950) stated *150 the "well established exception" to the going and comin 1983The court noted that the employer had contracted "[t]o pay to each employee, as an allowance for travel and subsistence expense, and in lieu of any other provision for travel or subsistence, ... an amount equal to one hour's pay at such employees' straight time rate for each day worked by such employee, ..." 75 Ariz. at 328 , 256 P.2d at 710 ; that the reason for this extra pay was that "[t]he job was not set up with housing, board or lodging"; and that Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal.2d 33 , 215 P.2d 736 (1950) stated *150 the "well established exception" to the going and comin | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences1983The court noted that the employer had contracted "[t]o pay to each employee, as an allowance for travel and subsistence expense, and in lieu of any other provision for travel or subsistence, ... an amount equal to one hour's pay at such employees' straight time rate for each day worked by such employee, ..." 75 Ariz. at 328 , 256 P.2d at 710 ; that the reason for this extra pay was that "[t]he job was not set up with housing, board or lodging"; and that Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal.2d 33 , 215 P.2d 736 (1950) stated *150 the "well established exception" to the going and comin 1983The court noted that the employer had contracted "[t]o pay to each employee, as an allowance for travel and subsistence expense, and in lieu of any other provision for travel or subsistence, ... an amount equal to one hour's pay at such employees' straight time rate for each day worked by such employee, ..." 75 Ariz. at 328 , 256 P.2d at 710 ; that the reason for this extra pay was that "[t]he job was not set up with housing, board or lodging"; and that Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal.2d 33 , 215 P.2d 736 (1950) stated *150 the "well established exception" to the going and comin | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Proctor-Silex Corp. v. DeBrick green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Osborn v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Dependents of Pacheco v. Orchids of Hawaii neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Willis v. State Accident Insurance Fund green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Dependents of Pacheco v. Orchids of Hawaii green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Campbell v. Gates Rubber Company neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Lewis v. Walter Scott & Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1978Each of the following cases applied the exception to a similar fact situation: Campbell v. Gates Rubber Company, 526 P.2d 679 (Colo.App.1974) (the employee was injured going from the workplace to the parking lot after work; because the exception applied, and the employee’s injury occurred in the scope of her employment, her negligence action was dismissed); Willis v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 3 Or.App. 565 , 475 P.2d 986 (1970) (the employee was injured while crossing a public park from a parking lot to the workplace); Proctor-Silex Corporation v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477 , 252 A.2d 800 (App. 1978Each of the following cases applied the exception to a similar fact situation: Campbell v. Gates Rubber Company, 526 P.2d 679 (Colo.App.1974) (the employee was injured going from the workplace to the parking lot after work; because the exception applied, and the employee’s injury occurred in the scope of her employment, her negligence action was dismissed); Willis v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 3 Or.App. 565 , 475 P.2d 986 (1970) (the employee was injured while crossing a public park from a parking lot to the workplace); Proctor-Silex Corporation v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477 , 252 A.2d 800 (App. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Claim of Gaik v. National Aniline Division green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Jean v. Chrysler Corporation green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Swanson v. General Paint Company
green
1 sentence1978Each of the following cases applied the exception to a similar fact situation: Campbell v. Gates Rubber Company, 526 P.2d 679 (Colo.App.1974) (the employee was injured going from the workplace to the parking lot after work; because the exception applied, and the employee’s injury occurred in the scope of her employment, her negligence action was dismissed); Willis v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 3 Or.App. 565 , 475 P.2d 986 (1970) (the employee was injured while crossing a public park from a parking lot to the workplace); Proctor-Silex Corporation v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477 , 252 A.2d 800 (App. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| McKay v. Industrial Commission neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.