going and coming rule in California

2024(Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 157 .) It excludes from coverage “the ordinary, local commute that marks the daily transit of the mass of workers to and from their jobs; the employment, there, plays no special role in the requisites of portage except the normal need of the presence of the person for the performance of the work.” (Ibid.) Nanez’s traveling does not comport with the type of travel subject to the going and coming rule.

2024(Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 157 .) It excludes from coverage “the ordinary, local commute that marks the daily transit of the mass of workers to and from their jobs; the employment, there, plays no special role in the requisites of portage except the normal need of the presence of the person for the performance of the work.” (Ibid.) Nanez’s traveling does not comport with the type of travel subject to the going and coming rule.

2025(Hinman v. Westinghouse Electric Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 961 (Hinman).) On appeal, Morales argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because he raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether certain exceptions to the going and coming rule apply here.

2025(Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 961 .) The rule is “grounded in the notion that ‘ “the employment relationship is ‘suspended’ from the time the employee leaves until he returns [citation], or that in commuting he is not rendering service to his employer.” ’ ” (Jorge, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 397 .) In this appeal, Morales does not challenge the sufficiency of CMI’s initial showing that the going and coming rule should apply because Maldonado was commuting to work.

2024Going-and-coming exception Under the so-called “going-and-coming” exception, an agent or employee “is not regarded as acting within the scope of [their agency or] employment while going to or coming from [their] place of work.” (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722 ; Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec.

2024The special errand exception to the going-and- coming exception Under this exception-to-an-exception, a principal or employer remains liable for its agent’s or employee’s negligence while commuting to or from the place of work if that commute occurred while the agent or employee “was engaged in a special errand” “either as part of [their] regular duties or at a specific order or request of [the principal or] employer.” (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722 ; Felix v. Asai (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 926, 931 ; Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 169 .) The special errand exception does not apply, however,

2015Appeals Bd., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 348 .) “The going and coming rule precludes compensation for injury suffered during the course of a local commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

2015Appeals Bd., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 348 .) “The going and coming rule precludes compensation for injury suffered during the course of a local commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

2016This is insufficient to take Da Fonseca’s negligent conduct outside the scope of the going and coming rule, because the required vehicle exception applies only where the employer requires the employee to use his or her vehicle to perform his or her work duties during the workday, as Smith, supra, 69 Cal.2d 814 , and Huntsinger, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 803 , confirm.

2014Thus, the key inquiry is whether there is an incidental benefit derived by the employer. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This exception to the going and coming rule, carved out by this court in Huntsinger [v. Glass Containers Corp. (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 803, 807 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 666 ]], has been referred to as the ‘required-vehicle’ exception. [Citation.] The exception can apply if the use of a personally owned vehicle is either an express or implied condition of employment [citation], or if the employee has agreed, expressly or implicitly, to make the vehicle available as an accommodation to the employ

2024(Accord, Pierson, at p. 627 [decision by employees to carpool does not negate the going-and-coming exception]; Anderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 254, 262 [same]; Caldwell v. A.R.B., Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1037 [same].) Plaintiffs resist this conclusion.

2016(Fields v. State of California, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398 .) For example, the court in Caldwell, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 1028 stated: “While in certain circumstances payment of travel expenses may be an exception [to the going and coming rule] under workers’ compensation laws [citation], the same conclusion has not been reached under respondeat superior doctrine. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1040.) Workers’ compensation cases take a more expansive view of the test for course of employment than tort cases because the policies underlying the workers’ compensation statute favor granting employee

2021Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 155 .) “Generally, whether an employee is within the scope of employment is a question of fact; however, when the facts of a case are undisputed and conflicting inferences may not be drawn from those facts, whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment is a question of law.” (Blackman v. Great American First Savings Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 598, 602 .) We begin with the special errand exception because we find it dispositive.3 “An exception to the going and coming rule occurs when an employee commits a negligent 3 While the trial court found th

2017(Ibid.; Blackman v. Great American First Savings Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 598, 602 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 491 ] (Blackman).) Normally the going and coming rule applies in cases where an employee ordinarily works at a particular location and the job duties do not ordinarily include driving on the job.

2024(Accord, Pierson, at p. 627 [decision by employees to carpool does not negate the going-and-coming exception]; Anderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 254, 262 [same]; Caldwell v. A.R.B., Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1037 [same].) Plaintiffs resist this conclusion.

2017Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608 , 618-619, 124 Cal.Rptr. 143 .) Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the respondeat superior doctrine. ( Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 960 , 88 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 471 P.2d 988 .) Under the going and coming rule, for example, an employee commuting to or from work is typically outside the scope of employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's torts. ( Id . at p. 961, 88 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 471 P.2d 988 , citing 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed. 1960) pp. 448-449.) "The 'going and coming' rule is sometimes ascribed to the theory that the employment rela

2015App. Bd. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 944, 946-947 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 428 P.2d 606 ].) This rule, known as the going and coming rule, bars workers’ compensation for injuries that occur “during a local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of special or extraordinary circumstances.” (Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp.

2015App. Bd. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 944, 946-947 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 428 P.2d 606 ].) This rule, known as the going and coming rule, bars workers’ compensation for injuries that occur “during a local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of special or extraordinary circumstances.” (Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp.

2024(Lobo v. Tamco (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 297, 301 (Lobo).) This subvariant is not at issue here. 8 the incidental benefit exception would negate the going-and- coming exception entirely. 2.

2020(Visser Ranch, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p.577.) “[T]his principle holds that an employee going to or from work ordinarily is considered outside the scope of employment and, therefore, the employer is not liable for torts committed during the commute.” (Ibid.) “ ‘A well-known exception to the going-and- coming rule arises where the use of the car gives some incidental benefit to the employer.’ ” (Lobo v. Tamco (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 297, 301 , italics omitted (Lobo).) 3.

1991IV Workers’ compensation law takes a different approach to exceptions to the going-and-coming rule as demonstrated in Dimmig v. Workmen’s Comp. *375 Appeals Bd. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 860 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 105 , 495 P.2d 433 ], In Dimmig , the Workers’ Compensation Board denied benefits to a widow whose husband was killed while returning from a night college class.

1991IV Workers’ compensation law takes a different approach to exceptions to the going-and-coming rule as demonstrated in Dimmig v. Workmen’s Comp. *375 Appeals Bd. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 860 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 105 , 495 P.2d 433 ], In Dimmig , the Workers’ Compensation Board denied benefits to a widow whose husband was killed while returning from a night college class.

2018Accordingly, even though [the employee's] employment contract said nothing about the manner of his transit to the job, he nevertheless acted within the course of his employment in thus furnishing *384 his own car." ( Id. at p. 821, 73 Cal.Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365 .) Similarly in Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d 150 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 , the Supreme Court found the going and coming rule did not bar recovery, because the employer required employees to provide vehicles for transportation at work every day.

2018Accordingly, even though [the employee's] employment contract said nothing about the manner of his transit to the job, he nevertheless acted within the course of his employment in thus furnishing *384 his own car." ( Id. at p. 821, 73 Cal.Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365 .) Similarly in Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d 150 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 , the Supreme Court found the going and coming rule did not bar recovery, because the employer required employees to provide vehicles for transportation at work every day.

2024The special errand exception to the going-and- coming exception Under this exception-to-an-exception, a principal or employer remains liable for its agent’s or employee’s negligence while commuting to or from the place of work if that commute occurred while the agent or employee “was engaged in a special errand” “either as part of [their] regular duties or at a specific order or request of [the principal or] employer.” (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722 ; Felix v. Asai (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 926, 931 ; Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 169 .) The special errand exception does not apply, however,

2023The employer’s liability extends to risks inherent in or incidental to the employer’s enterprise. [Citation.]” (Morales-Simental v. Genentech, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 445, 452 (Morales).) An exception to the respondeat superior doctrine is the “going-and-coming rule.” “Generally, an employee is outside the scope of his employment while engaged in his ordinary commute to and from his place of work.” (Felix v. Asai (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 926, 931 (Felix).) The going-and-coming rule is “based on the theory that the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves his job u

2026Appeals Bd. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 151 , a secretary argued the going and coming rule 6Indeed, in his opposition below Chang argued workers’ compensation cases had “no applicability in tort cases.” 17 did not bar compensation for injuries she sustained in an accident during her evening commute because she was bringing deposition transcripts home to translate them from Spanish to English for her employer.

2026Appeals Bd. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 151 , a secretary argued the going and coming rule 6Indeed, in his opposition below Chang argued workers’ compensation cases had “no applicability in tort cases.” 17 did not bar compensation for injuries she sustained in an accident during her evening commute because she was bringing deposition transcripts home to translate them from Spanish to English for her employer.

2026Entertainment Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 427 , 435–436.) For example, the rule does not apply if “ ‘use of a personally owned vehicle is either an express or implied condition of employment,’ ” or the employee “ ‘make[s] the vehicle available as an accommodation to the employer and the employer has “reasonably come to rely upon its use . . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Moradi v. Marsh USA, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 886, 895 .) It does not apply if the employee “is engaged in a ‘special errand’ or a ‘special mission’ for the employer.” (Jeewarat, at p. 436.) To the extent an employee combines persona

1991(See Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 969 [employer need not be benefitting employer if tort was committed while acting within scope of employment].) Here, however, if there was no significant benefit, the going- and-coming rule precludes liability, since the commute was not at the employer’s specific order or request under the special errand exception and there is no other applicable exception.

2025Appeals Bd., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 566, italics added; see also 1 Hanna, Cal. Law of Employee Injuries and Workers’ Compensation (rev. 2d ed. 2024) ch. 4, Special Risk Exception § 4.156[1], p. 4-201 [“If a condition on or off the employer’s premises creates a special risk of harm to an employee about to enter or who has just left the premises, the injury is within the course of employment” (fns. omitted)].) For instance, in two cases cited by the Board, “the employees were injured in accidents while making left turns on a public street to the employers’ premises in the face of oncoming traffi

2015Appeals Bd., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 566 [recovery not barred where injury was suffered after employee arrived at work but before doors to workplace were unlocked].) In several cases, our Supreme Court has rejected application of the going and coming rule when an employee is injured while driving a vehicle into the employer’s premises.

2022We begin with the rule itself. “ ‘Under the “going and coming” rule, an employee going to or coming from work is ordinarily considered outside the scope of employment so that the employer is not liable for his torts.’ ” ( Halliburton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 95-96.) “One exception to the going and coming rule has been recognized when the commute involves ‘ “an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to commute trips by ordinary members of the work force.” ’ ” (Halliburton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 96 .) “Where the incidental benefit exception applies, the employee’s commute di

2022We begin with the rule itself. “ ‘Under the “going and coming” rule, an employee going to or coming from work is ordinarily considered outside the scope of employment so that the employer is not liable for his torts.’ ” ( Halliburton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 95-96.) “One exception to the going and coming rule has been recognized when the commute involves ‘ “an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to commute trips by ordinary members of the work force.” ’ ” (Halliburton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 96 .) “Where the incidental benefit exception applies, the employee’s commute di

2023The employer’s liability extends to risks inherent in or incidental to the employer’s enterprise. [Citation.]” (Morales-Simental v. Genentech, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 445, 452 (Morales).) An exception to the respondeat superior doctrine is the “going-and-coming rule.” “Generally, an employee is outside the scope of his employment while engaged in his ordinary commute to and from his place of work.” (Felix v. Asai (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 926, 931 (Felix).) The going-and-coming rule is “based on the theory that the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves his job u

2017Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608 , 618-619, 124 Cal.Rptr. 143 .) Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the respondeat superior doctrine. ( Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 960 , 88 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 471 P.2d 988 .) Under the going and coming rule, for example, an employee commuting to or from work is typically outside the scope of employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's torts. ( Id . at p. 961, 88 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 471 P.2d 988 , citing 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed. 1960) pp. 448-449.) "The 'going and coming' rule is sometimes ascribed to the theory that the employment rela

1984(See, e.g., Parks, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 593 ; Greydanus v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 490, 492-493 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 407 P.2d 296 ]; Freire v. Matson Navigation Co., supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 11.) Although the special risk exception need not be invoked here because the going and coming rule does not apply, the exception supports by analogy the conclusion that Price’s injury occurred within the course of his employment.

1984(See, e.g., Parks, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 593 ; Greydanus v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 490, 492-493 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 407 P.2d 296 ]; Freire v. Matson Navigation Co., supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 11.) Although the special risk exception need not be invoked here because the going and coming rule does not apply, the exception supports by analogy the conclusion that Price’s injury occurred within the course of his employment.

1985Ind. Exch. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 751, 760 [ 135 P.2d 158 ].) In part, courts developed exceptions to the going and coming rule to ameliorate its harsh and arbitrary effect.

1985Ind. Exch. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 751, 760 [ 135 P.2d 158 ].) In part, courts developed exceptions to the going and coming rule to ameliorate its harsh and arbitrary effect.

2022(Halliburton, at p. 103; cf. Moradi v. Marsh USA, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 886, 891-892, 895, 904-905 [The incidental benefit or “ ‘required vehicle’ ” exception to the going and coming rule applies when the employee’s use of his or her own vehicle gives some “ ‘incidental benefit’ ” to the employer.].) The “dual or combined purpose exception” to the going and coming rule is substantially identical to the incident benefit exception, and likewise does not apply.

2017In a number of cases we have established exceptions to this rule, such as those in which the employer defrayed the travel expenses . . . and those in which the employee engaged in a special errand for his employer.’ ” (Moradi, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 895 , quoting Smith , at pp. 815-816, 818, 820.) For instance, where an “ ‘accident occurred when the employee drove his car to the employer’s premises pursuant to the employer’s requirement that the employee furnish his own car, we hold that the so-called going and coming rule does not bar coverage.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he employer clearly benef

1984Appeals Bd., supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 166.) A study of cases has shown that the rationale for the going and coming rule has in effect been abandoned in the special mission cases. ( Schreifer v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 291, fn. 1 .) An injury sustained by an employee attending a regularly scheduled union business meeting was held noncompensable on the grounds that the business conducted in no way benefited the employer. ( Pacific Ind. Co. v. Industrial A. Com.

1981Appeals Bd. ( McGrew ) (1973) 29 Cal. App.3d 902, 906 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 39 ].) Further, the fact that applicant's hours were on frequent occasions irregular also does not necessarily justify departure from the going and coming rule. ( Schreifer v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 289 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 352 , 391 P.2d 832 ]; Arboleda v. Workmen's Comp.

2026If the home becomes a second business situs, the familiar rule applies that injury sustained while traveling between jobsites is compensable.” (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 184 .) Wilson continued, “However, if work is performed at home for the employee's convenience, the commute does not constitute a business trip, since serving the employee’s own convenience in selecting an off-premise place to work is a personal and not a business purpose.” (Ibid.) Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held a teacher was not exempt from the going and coming rule simply because she brought work home

2026Fund), cited in Wilson for the proposition that the going and coming rule does not apply “[i]f the home becomes a second 18 business situs.” (See Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 184 .) The question in State Ins.

2026“The reason for this ‘going and coming’ rule is that ‘the employment relationship is “suspended” from the time the employee leaves until he returns [citation], or that in commuting he is not rendering service to his employer [citation].’ ” (Tryer v. Ojai Valley School (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1481 .) Although the jury’s questions implicated the going-and-coming rule, the trial court expressly directed it to only consider CACI No. 3720.

2015Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 961 (Hinman).) “The reason for this ‘going and coming’ rule is that ‘the employment relationship is “suspended” from the time the employee leaves until he returns [citation], or that in commuting he is not rendering service to his employer [Citation].’ [Citation.]” (Tryer, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481 [citing and quoting Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 961 .) There are, however, several “exceptions to the rule.” (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 962 .) One exception “‘arises where the use of the [employee’s] car gives some incidental benefit to the employer. . . . [T]he

2026Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 619 , italics omitted.) “Workers’ compensation cases take a more expansive view of the test for course of employment than tort cases because the policies underlying the workers’ compensation statute favor granting employee’s coverage.” (Ibid.) In the context of workers’ compensation coverage, “ ‘any reasonable doubt as to the applicability of the going and coming doctrine must be resolved in the employee’s favor.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Thus, “the analysis 16 used in workers’ compensation cases should not be applied in tort cases as though it was controlli

2026Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 619 , italics omitted.) “Workers’ compensation cases take a more expansive view of the test for course of employment than tort cases because the policies underlying the workers’ compensation statute favor granting employee’s coverage.” (Ibid.) In the context of workers’ compensation coverage, “ ‘any reasonable doubt as to the applicability of the going and coming doctrine must be resolved in the employee’s favor.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Thus, “the analysis 16 used in workers’ compensation cases should not be applied in tort cases as though it was controlli

2015Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 595, 598 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 546 P.2d 1361 ].) The going and coming rule is a judicially created doctrine first recognized in California jurisprudence in Ocean Acc. etc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1916) 173 Cal. 313 [ 159 P. 1041 ] {Ocean Accident), where the California Supreme Court held that the death of a shipworlcer who fell into the water and drowned on the way to the vessel on which he worked was not covered by workers’ compensation.

2015Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 595, 598 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 546 P.2d 1361 ].) The going and coming rule is a judicially created doctrine first recognized in California jurisprudence in Ocean Acc. etc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1916) 173 Cal. 313 [ 159 P. 1041 ] {Ocean Accident), where the California Supreme Court held that the death of a shipworlcer who fell into the water and drowned on the way to the vessel on which he worked was not covered by workers’ compensation.

2025The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business.” ’ ” (Jorge, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 396 .) Under the going and coming rule, however, an employee’s commute to and from work is considered outside the scope of employment, so that the employer is not vicariously liable for the employee’s torts committed while commuting.

2025(Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 961 .) The rule is “grounded in the notion that ‘ “the employment relationship is ‘suspended’ from the time the employee leaves until he returns [citation], or that in commuting he is not rendering service to his employer.” ’ ” (Jorge, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 397 .) In this appeal, Morales does not challenge the sufficiency of CMI’s initial showing that the going and coming rule should apply because Maldonado was commuting to work.