going and coming rule in New Jersey

2023“To facilitate the task of distinguishing compensable from noncompensable incidents, the courts developed the going and coming rule, which ordinarily precluded an award of compensation benefits for ‘injuries sustained during routine travel to and from an employee’s regular place of work.’” Livingstone, 111 N.J. at 96 (quoting Watson, 74 N.J. at 158 ).

1988One of these principles, the going and coming rule, “ordinarily precluded an award of compensation benefits for ‘injuries sustained during routine travel to and from an employee’s regular place of work.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Watson v. Nassau Inn, 74 N.J. 155, 158 (1977)).

2023The rule, which was created in Gullo v. American 9 Lead Pencil Co., 119 N.J.L. 484, 486 (E. & A. 1938), and affirmed in Hammond v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 56 N.J. 7, 11 (1970), separated “work risks from ordinary risks unrelated to employment” and “was premised on the assumption that the normal journey to and from work is of no particular benefit to the employer and exposes the worker to no unusual risks.” Hersh, 217 N.J. at 243 .

1977The rationale for the going and coming rule is the suspension of the employment relationship after the employee's departure from work at the end of the day, see Gullo v. American Lead Pencil Co., 119 N.J.L. 484, 486 (E. & A. 1937); Gilroy v. Standard Oil Co., 107 N.J.L. 170, 172 (E. & A. 1930).

1988In sum, these and other cases led the Court in Briggs v. American Biltrite, supra , to conclude that while the going and coming rule had not been overruled, it *99 had been narrowed to have "a rather limited applicability, extending only to those routine daily trips to and from an employee's fixed place of business at specified hours at the beginning or end of the day." 74 N.J. at 190.

1988See also Pearce v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 122 N.J.Super. 342 (App.Div.1973) (compensation for employee injured while driving to work on Parkway not barred by going and coming rule because employer provided employee with coupons for the tolls; “intrusion” of employer into travel habits “necessarily implies some benefit to or for the employer * * * ”). in sum, these and other cases led the Court in Briggs v. American Biltrite, supra, to conclude that while the going and coming rule had not been overruled, it had been narrowed to have “a rather limited applicability, extending only to those ro

2023“To facilitate the task of distinguishing compensable from noncompensable incidents, the courts developed the going and coming rule, which ordinarily precluded an award of compensation benefits for ‘injuries sustained during routine travel to and from an employee’s regular place of work.’” Livingstone, 111 N.J. at 96 (quoting Watson, 74 N.J. at 158 ).

2006In addition, " 'the going and coming rule ... precluded an award of compensation benefits for injuries sustained during routine travel to and from an employee’s regular place of work.' ” Id. at 578 , 754 A.2d 525 (quoting Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 111 N.J. 89, 96 , 543 A.2d 45 (1988)).

1988To facilitate the task of distinguishing compensable from noncompensable incidents, the courts developed the going and coming rule, which ordinarily precluded an award of compensation benefits for "injuries sustained during routine travel to and from an employee's regular place of work." Watson v. Nassau Inn, 74 N.J. 155, 158 (1977); accord Hammond, supra, 56 N.J. at 11 ; Ricciardi v. Damar Prods.

1988To facilitate the task of distinguishing compensable from noncompensable incidents, the courts developed the going and coming rule, which ordinarily precluded an award of compensation benefits for “injuries sustained during routine travel to and from an employee’s regular place of work.” Watson v. Nassau Inn, 74 N.J. 155, 158 (1977); accord Hammond, supra, 56 N.J. at 11 ; Ricciardi v. Damar Prods.

1974NOTES [1] "The going and coming rule has proven unfair to workers, to be judicial fiat and not legislative command, and should be given judicial burial." [Horovitz, supra, 14 NACCA L.J. at 46]. [2] 45 N.J. at 60 .

1974Curiously, the opinion does note that the going and coming rule is "not free from dispute since travel to and from the place of work quite obviously is essential to the work itself." [ 45 N.J. at 61 ; emphasis supplied].

2003Although acknowledging that prior decisions of this Court had considered midday lunch breaks part of the workday, and thus an exception to the going and coming rule, id. at 522-23 , 468 A.2d at 252-53 (contrasting Hornyak, supra, and Wyatt v. Metro.

2003Although acknowledging that prior decisions of this Court had considered midday lunch breaks part of the workday, and thus an exception to the going and coming rule, id. at 522-23 , 468 A.2d at 252-53 (contrasting Hornyak, supra, and Wyatt v. Metro.

1988Compare Wyatt v. Metropolitan Maintenance Co., supra, 74 N.J. at 176 (Schreiber, Clifford, JJ., dissenting) (expressing disagreement with Hornyak ) with Watson v. Nassau Inn, supra, 74 N.J. at 166-67 (Schreiber, Clifford, JJ., dissenting) (discussing, but not criticizing, Hammond).

1977Rather than acknowledging that the going and coming rule no longer has any vitality in view of its decisions today, Wyatt v. Metropolitan Maintenance Co., 74 N.J. 167 (1977), Watson v. Nassau Inn, 74 N.J. 155 (1977), and Briggs v. American Biltrite, 74 N.J. 185 (1977), and its previous decision in Hornyak v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 63 N.J. 99 (1973), the Court has extended compensability to the situation where the employee suffers an injury after completion of his regular *183 work and arrival at home at a time when he is subject to call, but not being compensated.

2003Tea Co., 56 N.J. 7, 11 , 264 A.2d 204, 206 (1970); accord Livingstone, supra, 111 N.J. at 96 , 543 A.2d at 49 ; O’Brien v. First Camden Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 37 N.J. 158, 163 , 179 A.2d 740, 742-43 (1962).

2003Tea Co., 56 N.J. 7, 11 , 264 A.2d 204, 206 (1970); accord Livingstone, supra, 111 N.J. at 96 , 543 A.2d at 49 ; O’Brien v. First Camden Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 37 N.J. 158, 163 , 179 A.2d 740, 742-43 (1962).

1981We accept the proposition that the mere carrying home of “some of the paraphernalia of his employment” does not in and of itself render a commuting accident compensable, Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 18 N.J. 195, 200 (1955), although we observe that that decision was 4-3 and has not escaped doubtful reference in a statement questioning the basis for the going and coming rule.

1978While conceding that Sabat often did work at and from his home and was frequently called back to his office, the compensation judge relied upon Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 18 N.J. 195 (1955) for the requirement that the trip home of an employee who performs work at home must be " for the purpose of doing work for the employer * * *" in order to establish compensability under an exception to the going and coming rule. 18 N.J. at 200 (emphasis in original).

2021Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298, 316 (1997).

1998“The ‘going and coming rule’ that existed in workers’ compensation jurisprudence since the inception of the Act was abrogated by the 1979 amendments to the Act.” Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298, 316 , 708 A.2d 1173, 1182 (1998); see also Serrano v. Apple Container, 236 N.J.Super. 216, 221 , 565 A.2d 417 (App.Div.1989) (“[T]he ‘going and coming rule’ has come and gone.”).

1977Ricciardi v. Damar Products Co., 45 N.J. 54, 61 (1965); O'Brien v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 37 N.J. 158, 162-163 (1963); Moosebrugger v. Prospect Presbyterian Church, 12 N.J. 212, 214 (1953); Gullo v. American Lead Pencil Co., 119 N.J.L. 484, 486 (E. & A. 1938); 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation (1972 ed.), §§ 14-19.63.

1973See Gullo v. American Lead Pencil Co., 119 N.J.L. 484, 486 ( E. & A. 1938). *105 However, in their dissent to Moosebrugger v. Prospect Presbyterian Church, supra, 12 N.J. 212 , three Justices joined in the suggestion that the remedial purposes of the Act might better be furthered by drawing the line antecedently so as to afford compensation coverage on the way to and from work. 12 N.J. at 217 .

2018Relying on Kasper v. Board of Trs. of the Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564 (2000), the ALJ found Cargill ineligible for accidental disability because of the going and coming rule.

2018In reaching its decision, the Court noted the amendments to the accidental disability statutes, requiring the traumatic event occur "during and as a result of the performance of [the employee's] regularly assigned duties," was "intended to reestablish the integrity of the premises rule and eliminate the judicially created exceptions to the going and coming rule." Id. at 580 .

2023The rule, which was created in Gullo v. American 9 Lead Pencil Co., 119 N.J.L. 484, 486 (E. & A. 1938), and affirmed in Hammond v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 56 N.J. 7, 11 (1970), separated “work risks from ordinary risks unrelated to employment” and “was premised on the assumption that the normal journey to and from work is of no particular benefit to the employer and exposes the worker to no unusual risks.” Hersh, 217 N.J. at 243 .

2021Prior to the amendments, courts applied the going and coming rule, "a doctrine that prevented awarding workers' compensation benefits for accidental injuries that occurred during routine travel to or from the employee's place of work." Hersh v. Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 243 (2014).

2000Similarly, Justice Handler noted that the Legislature “rejected many of the exceptions that had come to qualify and limit the effect of the rule.” Zelasko, supra, 128 N.J. at 342 , 608 A.2d 231 (Handler, J., dissenting).

2000Similarly, Justice Handler noted that the Legislature “rejected many of the exceptions that had come to qualify and limit the effect of the rule.” Zelasko, supra, 128 N.J. at 342 , 608 A.2d 231 (Handler, J., dissenting).

2000More recently, we observed that the legislative adoption of the premises rule was “designed to overcome the expansive exceptions to its application that occurred under the going-and-coming rule.” Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 591 , 713 A.2d 486 (1998).

2000More recently, we observed that the legislative adoption of the premises rule was “designed to overcome the expansive exceptions to its application that occurred under the going-and-coming rule.” Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 591 , 713 A.2d 486 (1998).

2017As the Court explained in Carter, [w]hen an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the 8 A-1541-15T4 special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. [Ibid. (quoting Carberry v. State, Div. of State Police, 279 N.J

2003When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. [Carberry v. State, Div. of State Police, 279 N.J.Super. 114, 120 , 652 A.2d 232 (App.Div.) (quoting 1 Arthur

1989In Mangigian v. Franz Warner Assoc., Inc. 205 N.J.

1988See Ehrgott v. Jones, 208 N.J.Super. 393 (App.Div.1986) (applying “special mission” provision of N.J.S.A. 34:15-36); Mangigian v. Franz Warner Assocs., Inc., 205 N.J.Super. 422 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting applicability of "special mission” exception); Mahon v. Reilly's Radio Cabs, Inc., 212 N.J.Super. 28 (App.Div.1986) (rejecting applicability of "employee-paid travel time” exception), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 79 (1987); Nebesne v. Crocetti, 194 N.J.Super. 278 (App.Div.1984) (same); Ohio Casualty Group v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.

1988E.g., Briggs v. American Biltrite, supra, 74 N.J. at 193-95 (Schreiber, Clifford, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that majority’s contention that employer was benefited by employee’s voluntary off-premises lunch trip “is a thin thread indeed”); Hornyak, supra, 63 N.J. at 99 (Hall, J., dissenting); Ricciardi v. Damar Prods.

1977Rather than acknowledging that the going and coming rule no longer has any vitality in view of its decisions today, Wyatt v. Metropolitan Maintenance Co., 74 N.J. 167 (1977), Watson v. Nassau Inn, 74 N.J. 155 (1977), and Briggs v. American Biltrite, 74 N.J. 185 (1977), and its previous decision in Hornyak v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 63 N.J. 99 (1973), the Court has extended compensability to the situation where the employee suffers an injury after completion of his regular *183 work and arrival at home at a time when he is subject to call, but not being compensated.

1988E.g., Watson v. Nassau Inn, supra, 74 N.J. at 159 (exceptions have "proliferated" and "overshadowed" basic rule); White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 N.J. 128, 134 (1973) (exceptions so numerous "that they have almost swallowed the rule").

1988E.g., Watson v. Nassau Inn, supra, 74 N.J. at 159 (exceptions have “proliferated” and “overshadowed” basic rule); White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 N.J. 128, 134 (1973) (exceptions so numerous “that they have almost swallowed the rule”).

1974E.g., Bergman v. Parnes Bros., Inc., 58 N.J. 559 (1971); Pearce v. N.J.

1972Accord, Bergman v. Parnes Brothers, Inc., 58 N.J. 559, 566-567 (1961).

2003Carter, supra, 345 N.J.Super, at 74, 783 A.2d 724 .

2003Carter, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 74 , 783 A. 2d 724 .

2003Appeals Bd., 69 Cal.2d 814 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365, 373 (1968) (in bank) (“[I]n this day of a highly motorized society we cannot cast the going and coming rule as a protective cloak over the shoulders of the employer, who, for his own advantage, demands that the employee furnish the car on the job.”)).

2003Appeals Bd., 69 Cal.2d 814 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365, 373 (1968) (in bank) (“[I]n this day of a highly motorized society we cannot cast the going and coming rule as a protective cloak over the shoulders of the employer, who, for his own advantage, demands that the employee furnish the car on the job.”)).

2001See Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J.Super. 138 , 550 A.2d 1278 (App.Div.1988) (“In brief, the Supreme Court in Livingstone concluded that the 1979 amendment of N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which imposed a more stringent definition of employment than had evolved from judicial construction of the going and coming rule, was not intended to overrule the body of case law which fixed the commencement of the day’s employment at the time of arrival in the parking lot made available to employees by the employer.

2001See Manole v. Carvellas, 229 N.J.Super. 138 , 550 A.2d 1278 (App.Div.1988) (“In brief, the Supreme Court in Livingstone concluded that the 1979 amendment of N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which imposed a more stringent definition of employment than had evolved from judicial construction of the going and coming rule, was not intended to overrule the body of case law which fixed the commencement of the day’s employment at the time of arrival in the parking lot made available to employees by the employer.