8 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bush v. Parmenter
green
2 sentences2020In Camburn, 459 Mich at 479 , our Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff in that case was not on a special mission by traveling to an education seminar because the “defendant was not directly benefited by [the] plaintiff’s attendance at the seminar and that the attendance was neither compulsory nor definitely expected.” The Court cited Bush in quoting a treatise discussing the special mission exception: When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the 1999In Bush, supra at 452 , the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following from Professor Larson’s treatise: “When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself | 4 | 1985–2020 |
Cherewick v. Morris G. Laramie & Son, Inc.
green
2 sentences1980Failure to relax the going-and-coming "rule" in the face of the principle that "lunchtime injuries wherever they occur are compensable so long as the employee is doing that which he might reasonably do" could create the anomalous situation of allowing recovery for injuries at a restaurant because eating at a restaurant is a reasonable thing for an employee to do but denying recovery for injuries during travel to the restaurant because travel injuries fall within the going-and-coming rule. [19] Furino v Lansing, 293 Mich 211 ; 291 NW 637 (1940), and Cherewick v Morris G Laramie & Son, Inc, 1980Failure to relax the going-and-coming "rule" in the face of the principle that "lunchtime injuries wherever they occur are compensable so long as the employee is doing that which he might reasonably do" could create the anomalous situation of allowing recovery for injuries at a restaurant because eating at a restaurant is a reasonable thing for an employee to do but denying recovery for injuries during travel to the restaurant because travel injuries fall within the going-and-coming rule. [19] Furino v Lansing, 293 Mich 211 ; 291 NW 637 (1940), and Cherewick v Morris G Laramie & Son, Inc, | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Furino v. City of Lansing
green
2 sentences1980Failure to relax the going-and-coming "rule" in the face of the principle that "lunchtime injuries wherever they occur are compensable so long as the employee is doing that which he might reasonably do" could create the anomalous situation of allowing recovery for injuries at a restaurant because eating at a restaurant is a reasonable thing for an employee to do but denying recovery for injuries during travel to the restaurant because travel injuries fall within the going-and-coming rule. [19] Furino v Lansing, 293 Mich 211 ; 291 NW 637 (1940), and Cherewick v Morris G Laramie & Son, Inc, 1980Failure to relax the going-and-coming "rule" in the face of the principle that "lunchtime injuries wherever they occur are compensable so long as the employee is doing that which he might reasonably do" could create the anomalous situation of allowing recovery for injuries at a restaurant because eating at a restaurant is a reasonable thing for an employee to do but denying recovery for injuries during travel to the restaurant because travel injuries fall within the going-and-coming rule. [19] Furino v Lansing, 293 Mich 211 ; 291 NW 637 (1940), and Cherewick v Morris G Laramie & Son, Inc, | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Camburn v. Northwest School District
green
2 sentences2020In Camburn, 459 Mich at 479 , our Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff in that case was not on a special mission by traveling to an education seminar because the “defendant was not directly benefited by [the] plaintiff’s attendance at the seminar and that the attendance was neither compulsory nor definitely expected.” The Court cited Bush in quoting a treatise discussing the special mission exception: When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the 2020In Camburn, 459 Mich at 479 , our Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff in that case was not on a special mission by traveling to an education seminar because the “defendant was not directly benefited by [the] plaintiff’s attendance at the seminar and that the attendance was neither compulsory nor definitely expected.” The Court cited Bush in quoting a treatise discussing the special mission exception: When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Abela v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences2018In Bush, the Court observed: “When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the 9 “Although lower federal court decisions may be persuasive, they are not binding on state courts.” Abela v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 607 ; 677 NW2d 325 (2004). -9- particular circumstances, i 2018In Bush, the Court observed: “When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the 9 “Although lower federal court decisions may be persuasive, they are not binding on state courts.” Abela v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 607 ; 677 NW2d 325 (2004). -9- particular circumstances, i | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Haller v. City of Lansing
green
2 sentences1996Professor Larson categorizes this case as a special-errand exception to the going and coming rule: When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. [1 Larson, 1996This Court held that Haller's wife could collect worker's compensation: From an examination of cases cited by defendant, and others we have examined in which it has been held that an employee injured on the premises of his employer during the noon hour or other temporary suspension of work was not under the act, we think it manifest that the controlling reason for denying an award in those cases rests upon the proven facts that the employee broke the so-called nexus between workman and employer by some manifestly reckless and unreasonable hazard, amounting to intentional and wilful misconduct, | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ricciardi v. Aniero Concrete Co.
green
1 sentence1988As was so aptly stated in Ricciardi v Aniero Concrete Co, Inc, 64 NJ 60; 312 A2d 139 (1973), where the sum paid in travel expense was only forty percent of the total travel involved: We conclude, after study of all the cases, that the rationale of the exception to the going and coming rule under discussion can be sustained only in those situations where, if the employee travels by car, the employer reimburses him for all or substantially all of the total expense involved. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Ream v. L. E. Myers Co.
green
2 sentences1985In Bush v Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413 Mich 444, 452 ; 320 NW2d 858 (1982), the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the s 1985In Bush v Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413 Mich 444, 452 ; 320 NW2d 858 (1982), the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the s | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co.
green
2 sentences1980Justice Talbot Smith elaborated the nexus principle in his influential dissent in Salmon v Bagley Laundry Co, 344 Mich 471, 490 ; 74 NW2d 1 (1955), again without reference to or reliance on the concept embodied in the on-premises amendment. 26 Although Dyer, the case in which Haller was reinstated, 27 and Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 28 the only post-Dyer lunchtime injury case decided by this Court, were based on the "on-premises” presumption, the Court did not thereby reject the independently developing principle enunciated in Haller. 1980Justice Talbot Smith elaborated the nexus principle in his influential dissent in Salmon v Bagley Laundry Co, 344 Mich 471, 490 ; 74 NW2d 1 (1955), again without reference to or reliance on the concept embodied in the on-premises amendment. 26 Although Dyer, the case in which Haller was reinstated, 27 and Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 28 the only post-Dyer lunchtime injury case decided by this Court, were based on the "on-premises” presumption, the Court did not thereby reject the independently developing principle enunciated in Haller. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
McClure v. General Motors Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1980The passages in Haller to which Justice BLACK refers are quoted in part in fns 9, 12 and 13, supra. [18] While a necessary side effect of extending principles developed in on-premises injury cases to off-premises injuries sustained during travel would be to hold the going-and-coming rule inapplicable to the lunch period, the rule would have continued application to pre- and post-workday travel. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.