absence of a limiting instruction in California

2022(See Sisneros, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 152-153.) But he did not and now complains that the absence of a limiting instruction caused him to be prejudiced by the witnesses’ refusals. “[A]lthough a court should give a limiting instruction on request, it has no sua sponte duty to give one.” (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051 .) However, one of defense counsel’s express bases for his objection was his concern that the jury would infer that the witnesses were unwilling to testify because they could be labeled a snitch and killed for it, a permissible inference.

2021(See Sisneros, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 152-153.) But he did not and now complains that the absence of a limiting instruction caused him to be prejudiced by the witnesses’ refusals. “[A]lthough a court should give a limiting instruction on request, it has no sua sponte duty to give one.” (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051 .) However, one of defense counsel’s express bases for his objection was his concern that the jury would infer that the witnesses were unwilling to testify because they could be labeled a snitch and killed for it, a permissible inference.

2022(Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074 .) Thus, the court concluded no prejudice was shown by the failure to instruct pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1193, reasoning that “[w]here, as here, the expert testifies regarding the behavior of abused children as a class, there is little, if any, chance the jury will misunderstand or misapply the evidence.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in this case, even absent a limiting instruction, the jury would not have misunderstood or misapplied Urquiza’s testimony as proof that Jane was in fact sexually abused.

2022(Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074 .) Thus, the court concluded no prejudice was shown by the failure to instruct pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1193, reasoning that “[w]here, as here, the expert testifies regarding the behavior of abused children as a class, there is little, if any, chance the jury will misunderstand or misapply the evidence.” (Mateo, at p. 1074.) Similarly, in this case, even absent a limiting instruction, the jury would not have misunderstood or misapplied Urquiza’s testimony as proof that Jane was in fact sexually abused.

2009Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 , 190 P.3d 586 ] ( Cable Connection ) gives us some answers, but unfortunately not the answer to the question here.

2009Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 , 190 P.3d 586 ] ( Cable Connection ) gives us some answers, but unfortunately not the answer to the question here.

2021A limiting instruction can ameliorate [Evidence Code] section 352 prejudice by eliminating the danger the jury could consider 23 the evidence for an improper purpose.” (Hendrix, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 247 .) The trial court did not give a limiting instruction addressing this evidence.10 Notwithstanding the absence of a limiting instruction, we conclude that the probative value of A.R.’s testimony was not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or

2015Analysis Salazar contends that he was denied the right to due process and a fair trial as a result of the fact that his brother's plea deal, including the factual basis supporting his brother's guilty plea, was "read into the record multiple times, verbatim, along with superfluous hyperbole from the district attorney," such that the jury was permitted to use it as "substantive evidence of Salazar's guilt in the absence of a limiting instruction. " 23 Salazar argues that a codefendant's guilty plea may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt, citing People v. Leonard (1983) 3

2014(See People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056 , 1094 and People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 61 [a limiting instruction concerning the use of other crimes evidence is required only in the rare case where the evidence is dominantly featured, highly prejudicial and minimally relevant].) All things considered, we do not believe the trial court erred in admitting evidence that appellant had previously been adjudicated of involuntary manslaughter.

2014As the court stated in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 139 , “Defendant’s reliance on Collie fails because the 14 evidence of the witnesses’ fear was more than minimally relevant to a legitimate purpose—supporting the witnesses’ credibility—and was not ‘a dominant part of the evidence against’ defendant. [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on the evidence’s limited admissibility.” Even if defendant had requested a limiting instruction, we would conclude that the absence of a limiting instruction was not prejudicial for the same reasons that

2014As the court stated in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 139 , “Defendant’s reliance on Collie fails because the 14 evidence of the witnesses’ fear was more than minimally relevant to a legitimate purpose—supporting the witnesses’ credibility—and was not ‘a dominant part of the evidence against’ defendant. [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on the evidence’s limited admissibility.” Even if defendant had requested a limiting instruction, we would conclude that the absence of a limiting instruction was not prejudicial for the same reasons that