applicant bar in California

2022(Wollmer, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347 .) “If the project were not built, it goes without saying that housing units for lower-income households would not be built and the purpose of the [D]ensity [B]onus [L]aw to encourage such development would not be achieved.” (Ibid.) Thus, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies, so long as a proposed housing development project meets the criteria of the Density Bonus Law by including the necessary affordable units, a city may not apply any development standard that would physically preclude construction of that project as designed, even if the

2021(Stats. 2008, ch. 454, § 1; Wollmer v. City of Berkeley (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1346 .) “[I]t is clear that one of the effects of the 2008 amendments is to delete the requirement that an applicant for a waiver of development standards must show that the waiver was necessary to render the project economically feasible.” (Wollmer, at p. 1346.) A local ordinance is preempted if it conflicts with the density bonus law by increasing the requirements to obtain its benefits.

2024(Marriage of James, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1276–1277.) None of the parties has brought to our attention any precedent addressing whether an applicant under rule 1.100 may seek an accommodation “on behalf of” someone else, as FSFG did here.

2014(See Kraebel v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (2d Cir. 1992) 959 F.2d 395 , 405.12).) We cannot see why the same rule would not also apply to a business permit as to which an applicant may claim first amendment protection.

1999(See Stats. 1983, ch. 882, § 1, pp. 3203-3204.) 9 Here is the relevant text of the court’s discussion: “In instances in this state where courts have sustained requirements that those seeking to obtain or seeking to retain public employment or other public benefits are required to subscribe to a so-called loyalty oath they have uniformly done so on the rationale that the state or municipality has a right to inquire into the applicant’s qualifications, and that loyalty has a direct bearing on the qualification necessary for the employment or other benefit under consideration. [Citations.] But wh

1998With regard to an employee, an employer searching for the telltale *32 signs of drug abuse “can observe the employee at work, evaluate his or her work product and safety record, and check employment records to determine whether the employee has been excessively absent or late.” ( 14 Cal.4th at p. 883 .) Thus, “an employer generally need not resort to suspicionless drug testing to determine whether a current employee is likely to be absent from work or less productive or effective as a result of current drug . . . abuse . . . .” (Ibid.) By contrast, “When deciding whether to hire a job applican

1972(Potts v. The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Hawaii (D.Hawaii 1971) 332 F.Supp. 1392 ; Lipman v. Van Zant (N.D.

1966Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. [Citation.]” (See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra, 353 U.S. 252, 273 .) In addition to an arrest for suspicion of driving a stolen car, the petitioner in Schware had also been arrested at least' twice on “suspicion of criminal syndicalism” in connection with a bitter labor dispute in which he participated, and once for violation of the Neutrality Act of 1917, which makes it

1966(In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 248 [272P.2d 768].) As the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, 353 U.S. 232, 239 , “A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law. [Citations.] Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church.

1966(In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 248 [272P.2d 768].) As the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, 353 U.S. 232, 239 , “A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law. [Citations.] Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church.

1960(See Board of Education v. Mass, supra, 47 Cal.2d 494; Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [ 285 P.2d 617 ]; Pockman v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 276 ; Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ] ; see also Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Pullic Works, 341 U.S. 716 [ 71 S.Ct. 909 , 95 L.Ed. 1317 ] ; Gerende v. Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [ 71 S.Ct. 565 , 95 L.Ed. 745 ].) But where there is no rational and substantial connection between the nature of the investigation into loyalty and the qualification of the app

1960(See Board of Education v. Mass, supra, 47 Cal.2d 494; Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [ 285 P.2d 617 ]; Pockman v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 276 ; Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ] ; see also Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Pullic Works, 341 U.S. 716 [ 71 S.Ct. 909 , 95 L.Ed. 1317 ] ; Gerende v. Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [ 71 S.Ct. 565 , 95 L.Ed. 745 ].) But where there is no rational and substantial connection between the nature of the investigation into loyalty and the qualification of the app

1960(See Board of Education v. Mass, supra, 47 Cal.2d 494; Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [ 285 P.2d 617 ]; Pockman v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 276 ; Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ] ; see also Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Pullic Works, 341 U.S. 716 [ 71 S.Ct. 909 , 95 L.Ed. 1317 ] ; Gerende v. Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [ 71 S.Ct. 565 , 95 L.Ed. 745 ].) But where there is no rational and substantial connection between the nature of the investigation into loyalty and the qualification of the app

1960(See Board of Education v. Mass, supra, 47 Cal.2d 494; Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [ 285 P.2d 617 ]; Pockman v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 276 ; Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ] ; see also Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Pullic Works, 341 U.S. 716 [ 71 S.Ct. 909 , 95 L.Ed. 1317 ] ; Gerende v. Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [ 71 S.Ct. 565 , 95 L.Ed. 745 ].) But where there is no rational and substantial connection between the nature of the investigation into loyalty and the qualification of the app

1960(See Board of Education v. Mass, supra, 47 Cal.2d 494; Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [ 285 P.2d 617 ]; Pockman v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 276 ; Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ] ; see also Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Pullic Works, 341 U.S. 716 [ 71 S.Ct. 909 , 95 L.Ed. 1317 ] ; Gerende v. Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [ 71 S.Ct. 565 , 95 L.Ed. 745 ].) But where there is no rational and substantial connection between the nature of the investigation into loyalty and the qualification of the app

1960(See Board of Education v. Mass, supra, 47 Cal.2d 494; Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [ 285 P.2d 617 ]; Pockman v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 276 ; Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ] ; see also Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Pullic Works, 341 U.S. 716 [ 71 S.Ct. 909 , 95 L.Ed. 1317 ] ; Gerende v. Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [ 71 S.Ct. 565 , 95 L.Ed. 745 ].) But where there is no rational and substantial connection between the nature of the investigation into loyalty and the qualification of the app

1960(See Board of Education v. Mass, supra, 47 Cal.2d 494; Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [ 285 P.2d 617 ]; Pockman v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 276 ; Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ] ; see also Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Pullic Works, 341 U.S. 716 [ 71 S.Ct. 909 , 95 L.Ed. 1317 ] ; Gerende v. Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [ 71 S.Ct. 565 , 95 L.Ed. 745 ].) But where there is no rational and substantial connection between the nature of the investigation into loyalty and the qualification of the app

1958Church v. Walsh, supra [ 244 N.Y. 280 ( 155 N.E. 575 )].) “ The application for a variance necessarily admits the constitutionality of the ordinance under which the city officials charged with the duty of administering a zoning ordinance are asked to exercise a discretion; therefore, an applicant may not challenge its constitutionality before the administrative body.

1958Church v. Walsh, supra [ 244 N.Y. 280 ( 155 N.E. 575 )].) “ The application for a variance necessarily admits the constitutionality of the ordinance under which the city officials charged with the duty of administering a zoning ordinance are asked to exercise a discretion; therefore, an applicant may not challenge its constitutionality before the administrative body.

1925It has been repeatedly decided that the right of a common carrier to use the public highways for the conduct of his business as such is not a vested or natural right, but is a mere privilege or license which the legislature may grant or withhold in its discretion, or which it may grant upon such conditions as it may see fit to impose (Ex parte Lee, 28 Cal. App. 719 [ 153 Pac. 922 ]; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657 [Ann.

1925It has been repeatedly decided that the right of a common carrier to use the public highways for the conduct of his business as such is not a vested or natural right, but is a mere privilege or license which the legislature may grant or withhold in its discretion, or which it may grant upon such conditions as it may see fit to impose (Ex parte Lee, 28 Cal. App. 719 [ 153 Pac. 922 ]; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657 [Ann.