applicant claim in Texas

2023See Ex parte Florence, 319 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. Crim.

2013Applicant’s claim for pre-sentence jail time credit is dismissed pursuant to Ex parte Florence , 319 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. Crim.

2015As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim.

2010As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez , 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim.

2025When a trial judge “denies an applicant a hearing on the merits of his [] claims, there is no right to appeal.” Garcia, 683 S.W.3d at 471–72 (citing Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 394 ).

2025When a trial court refuses to issue a writ or denies an applicant a hearing on the merits of the habeas claims, “the applicant has two remedies: first, to present the application to another trial judge with jurisdiction; or second, to file an application for a writ of mandamus.” Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 394 ; see Garcia, 683 S.W.3d at 473; Hodge v. Kraft, 490 S.W.3d 510 , 516 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (noting that “in certain circumstances, we may treat an interlocutory appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus”) (citing CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 , 452–53 (Tex. 2011))

2013Applicant's claim for pre-sentence jail time credit is dismissed pursuant to Ex Parte Ybarra , 149 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim.

2013Applicant's claim for pre-sentence jail time credit is dismissed pursuant to the Texas Gov't Code §501.0081(b)-(c) and Ex Parte Ybarra , 149 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim.

2023Importantly, when a trial court refuses to issue a writ or denies an applicant a hearing on the merits of the habeas claims, “the applicant has two remedies: first, to present the application to another trial judge with jurisdiction; or second, to file an application for a writ of mandamus.” Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 394 (citing Hargett, 819 S.W.2d at 868 ).

2008VILLANUEVA—5 determine whether a writ should issue or whether the merits of claims should be addressed is not the same as one that is held to resolve the merits of an applicant’s allegations.13 Only when a hearing is held on the merits of an applicant’s claims and there is a ruling on the merits of the claims may a losing party appeal.14 However, when a trial judge refuses to issue a writ or denies an applicant a hearing on the merits of his or her claims, there is no right to appeal.15 In such cases, the applicant has two remedies: first, to present the application to another trial judge with

2018Ex parte Elizondo, supra; Ex parte Tuley, supra. The trial court may also make any other findings and conclusions it deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for habeas corpus relief.

2011In assessing Applicant's claim, we look to see whether there is "clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence." Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209 .

2025See Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 487−88 (suggesting that the prejudice that the State must show is in its ability to respond to the applicant’s habeas claims).

2011See Ex parte Carrio , 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim.

2025In Ex parte Broussard, 517 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. Crim.

2024Id. at 817 (“[A] guilty plea induced by the State’s misrepresentation . . . is involuntary and may be withdrawn.”).

2024As I wrote in Ex parte Ohlemacher: When undisputed new facts that were inaccessible to both parties at the time of a trial or plea irrefutably demonstrate that an Applicant is not guilty of the offense for which a judgment of conviction has been entered, the right to due that [her] plea counsel was ineffective[,]’ may retroactively render an applicant’s plea of guilty involuntary”) (quoting Saucedo, 576 S.W.3d at 721 (Keasler, J., concurring)). 4 Nor was Applicant’s plea with respect to his hydrocodone charge involuntary simply because he possessed a different Penalty Group 3 controlled substa

2024As I wrote in Ex parte Ohlemacher: When undisputed new facts that were inaccessible to both parties at the time of a trial or plea irrefutably demonstrate that an Applicant is not guilty of the offense for which a judgment of conviction has been entered, the right to due that [her] plea counsel was ineffective[,]’ may retroactively render an applicant’s plea of guilty involuntary”) (quoting Saucedo, 576 S.W.3d at 721 (Keasler, J., concurring)). 4 Nor was Applicant’s plea with respect to his hydrocodone charge involuntary simply because he possessed a different Penalty Group 3 controlled substa

2023See id. (holding the applicant’s claim not to be actionable as a post- conviction habeas corpus proceeding but granting him relief under the criteria for mandamus). 1 Even if the Court deems Applicant’s claim to somehow constitute 1 The Court has said that it has no capacity to directly reform a criminal judgment in post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings because an application for post-conviction habeas corpus constitutes a “collateral attack” on the judgment.

2017In re Daniel, 396 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Tex. Crim.

2022We have said that resolving a claim of actual innocence requires a court to examine the evidence of innocence “in light of the evidence presented at trial.” Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. Crim.

2011We evaluate "the probable impact of the newly available evidence upon the persuasiveness of the State's case as a whole, [so] we must necessarily weigh such exculpatory evidence against the evidence of guilt adduced at trial." Id. at 206 ; see Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d at 417 .

2015This Court concludes that Applicant's defense attorney, Curt- is Fortinberry also should have been aware of the applicable law 13 years after Owens trial, over 25 years after the Su- preme Court decided Waller and Press-Enterprise I/ and over 5 months after the Supreme Court reiterated that the applicable law was already very well established in Presley . 22. "access to counsels skill and knowledge is necessary to ac- cord“defendant's the ample opportunity.to meet the case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 . 23.

2009This court finds that the inadequate presentation of such evidence, crucial to Applicant's defense, was, under the standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), ineffective assistance of counsel.

2021Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. Crim.

2007See Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 547 (one issue "before us is the inherent persuasiveness of the evidence establishing innocence").

2018Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim.

2018Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668-69 (Tex. Crim.App.2001) (listing situations when criminal judgments are void: (1) the alleged charging instrument does not satisfy the requisites of a charging instrument, (2) the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged, (3) the record reflects no evidence to support the conviction, or (4) when an indigent defendant is required to face criminal trial proceedings without appointed counsel, when such has not been waived).

2012See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668-69 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (listing situations when criminal judgments are void: (1) the alleged charging instrument does not satisfy the requisites of a charging instrument, (2) the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged, (3) the record reflects no evidence to support the conviction, or (4) when an indigent defendant is required to face criminal trial proceedings without appointed counsel, when such has not been waived).

2011Martinez III, 147 S.W.3d at 417-20. 18 .

2011Martinez III , 147 S.W.3d at 417-20. 18.

2016We filed and set his application for submission and directed the parties to brief whether: “(1) the misconduct in Applicant’s case should be imputed to the prosecution for purposes of Applicant’s Brady v. Maryland claim; (2) this misconduct is exculpatory; ’ and (3) Applicant’s plea was involuntary because of ‘impermissible conduct by state agents.’ Bra *430 dy v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 [ 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 ] (1970).” Ex parte Pena, No. WR-84,073-01, 2015 WL 7353322 (Tex.Crim.App.

2016We filed and set his application for submission and directed the parties to brief whether: “(1) the misconduct in Applicant’s case should be imputed to the prosecution for purposes of Applicant’s Brady v. Maryland claim; (2) this misconduct is exculpatory; ’ and (3) Applicant’s plea was involuntary because of ‘impermissible conduct by state agents.’ Bra *430 dy v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 [ 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 ] (1970).” Ex parte Pena, No. WR-84,073-01, 2015 WL 7353322 (Tex.Crim.App.

2024Ex parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim.

2019I would hold that Applicant's claim is barred by estoppel. 17 For these reasons, I would deny relief. 1 See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(d). 2 See id. §§ 481.103(4), 481.116(d). 3 See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 483.001(2). 4 See id. § 483.041(d). 5 Ex parte Mable , 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim.

2024Two years later, in March of 2024, Applicant filed the instant application for writ of habeas corpus with the assistance of the Harris County Public Defender’s Office. 1 Applicant raises two grounds for relief “[i]n light of the laboratory report showing that the evidence contained a different controlled 1 Applicant long ago completed his sentence, but he has alleged in his pleading the existence of collateral consequences “sufficient to establish ‘confinement’ so as to trigger application of art. 11.07.” Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. Crim.

2022See Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 456 (Tex. Crim.

2015The Trial court correctly notes (#10, pq. 16) that a Schlup- type claim is a procedural claim in which the Applicant's claim of innocence " 'does not by itself provide a basis for relief', but is INTERTWINED with OONSTITUTIONAL ERROR that renders .a persons conviction Constitutionally invalid." SCHLUP, 513 U.S. at 315, 115 S.Ct. 851 .

2015In the present case, Applicant submits his claim of actual innocence is constitutional in nature based upon - the deprivation and abridgement of his constitutional rights lby the State used to convict him. `The constitutional nature of Applicant’s claim is that while it’s true the CW testified he sexually assaulted her; there was absolutely no physical or other direct evidence to substantiate her claims We as a society are repulsed by the prospect of being called and chosen as a juror, who is then subject to having to listen to- a young woman describe deviate sexual behavior visited upon her y

2023The practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”); State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d) (“The rig

2022Unlike common occupations that are not regulated, the practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”);State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. A

2012In our letter, we noted the following: Also included in the file in this case is a copy of appellant’s “Out of Time Motion for a New Trial.” In that motion, appellant, relying on a case that has since been overruled, states that “[p]ost-conviction habeas corpus relief is not an appropriate remedy for an applicant whose claim for relief is based on newly discovered evidence.” Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim.

1994We denied relief concluding that "post-conviction habeas corpus has not been and is not now the appropriate remedy for an applicant whose claim for relief is based on newly discovered evidence." Id., 660 S.W.2d at 106 .

2016Ex parte Huerta, 692 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim.

2012Based on the testimony from that hearing, the trial court determined that Applicant’s plea was involuntary and that Applicant is entitled to relief. 2 Ex parte Huerta, 692 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim.