companion principle in California

2023(People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 13 , 22–23.) Similarly, in a case where the defendant shot a companion at a bar and the evidence suggested that the defendant obtained the gun during a struggle at the bar moments before the shooting, section 654 barred punishment for possession of a firearm by an ex-felon in addition to punishment for assault with a deadly weapon because “the possession [was] physically simultaneous” and “was incidental to only one objective, namely to shoot [the victim].” (People v. Venegas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814 , 818–821.) Morgan argues that there is no evidence to

2002(People v. Bradford, supra, at pp. 22-23.) Likewise, in People v. Venegas, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d at page 821 , the defendant shot a companion in a bar.

2023(People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 13 , 22–23.) Similarly, in a case where the defendant shot a companion at a bar and the evidence suggested that the defendant obtained the gun during a struggle at the bar moments before the shooting, section 654 barred punishment for possession of a firearm by an ex-felon in addition to punishment for assault with a deadly weapon because “the possession [was] physically simultaneous” and “was incidental to only one objective, namely to shoot [the victim].” (People v. Venegas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814 , 818–821.) Morgan argues that there is no evidence to

2002The defendant's possession of the officer's revolver was not antecedent and separate from the *323 use of the revolver in assaulting the officer. ( Id. at pp. 22-23, 130 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 549 P.2d 1225 .) Likewise, in People v. Venegas, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d at p. 821 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 103 , the defendant shot a companion in a bar.

2023As we explained in People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082 (Simon): ‘ “ ‘ “The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver [or forfeiture] is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” . . .’ [Citat

2022As we explained in People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082 (Simon): ‘ “ ‘ “The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver [or forfeiture] is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine 14 it.” . . .’ [Ci

2014(A.W. v Jersey City Public School (2007) 486 F.3d 791 , 804.) However, the settlement agreement in the underlying action provided that the parties would treat and report the settlement allocation for tax purposes under federal and state law.

2013(A.W. v Jersey City Public School (2007) 486 F.3d 791 , 804.) However, the settlement agreement in the underlying action provided that the parties would treat and report the settlement allocation for tax purposes under federal and state law.

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

1979He overlooks the companion principle that the tax burden should fall equally upon members of the same class. ( Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ].) Again, the cases cited are factually *893 distinguishable from the situation involved in the instant case: e.g., uniform treatment between spouses ( Estate of Legatos (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 657 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]); a special tax on retired persons who occupy nonprofit retirement homes ( John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 372 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 ]); a city tax on lodg

2013(See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 , 352–353.) The trial court properly sustained defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

2013(Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 798, 804 .) A claim for breach of the covenant that merely repeats and realleges the same allegations set forth in a companion claim for breach of contract is properly dismissed as superfluous.

2000(Giannuzzi, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 467 .) 5 The court relied upon a comment to section 831.2, a companion immunity statute to section 831.4.

1998(United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682 [ 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 ]; People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 586 .) In this case, however, Officer Bolinger requested permission to search the fanny pack while awaiting the results of the warrant check, which arrived in a minute. *500 Thus, the request to search did not unduly prolong the detention or extend the period justified by the valid traffic stop.

1997(In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 ].) [¶] 2) The companion rule, ... is that, where a reunification plan is proving to be ineffective, it must be amended promptly [under section 342], to ensure that it becomes a true reunification plan.” The latter would comply with the requirement that the reunification plan “ ‘must be specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of each family [citation], and must be designed to eliminate those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.’ ” (In re Precious J. *1143 (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463 , 1474

1997(In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 ].) [¶] 2) The companion rule, ... is that, where a reunification plan is proving to be ineffective, it must be amended promptly [under section 342], to ensure that it becomes a true reunification plan.” The latter would comply with the requirement that the reunification plan “ ‘must be specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of each family [citation], and must be designed to eliminate those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.’ ” (In re Precious J. *1143 (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463 , 1474

1991Maier now claims the evidence is insufficient to support a true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance, and under People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 ], a special circumstance may not stand after acquittal of the underlying offense.

1991Maier now claims the evidence is insufficient to support a true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance, and under People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 ], a special circumstance may not stand after acquittal of the underlying offense.