Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 California opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Davidgreen2 sentences2018Penal Code section 22210 prohibits possession of "any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slungshot." In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ( Grubb ), our Supreme Court rejected a constitutional vagueness challenge to the term "billy" under former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). 3 The defendant in Grubb , convicted of possessing an altered baseball bat, argued that the term "billy" was unconstitutionally vague because it encompassed objects such as baseball bats, table legs, or pieces of lumber 2018Penal Code section 22210 prohibits possession of "any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slungshot." In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ( Grubb ), our Supreme Court rejected a constitutional vagueness challenge to the term "billy" under former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). 3 The defendant in Grubb , convicted of possessing an altered baseball bat, argued that the term "billy" was unconstitutionally vague because it encompassed objects such as baseball bats, table legs, or pieces of lumber | 2 | 2 |
People v. Grubbgreen2 sentences2018Penal Code section 22210 prohibits possession of "any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slungshot." In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ( Grubb ), our Supreme Court rejected a constitutional vagueness challenge to the term "billy" under former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). 3 The defendant in Grubb , convicted of possessing an altered baseball bat, argued that the term "billy" was unconstitutionally vague because it encompassed objects such as baseball bats, table legs, or pieces of lumber 2018Penal Code section 22210 prohibits possession of "any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slungshot." In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ( Grubb ), our Supreme Court rejected a constitutional vagueness challenge to the term "billy" under former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). 3 The defendant in Grubb , convicted of possessing an altered baseball bat, argued that the term "billy" was unconstitutionally vague because it encompassed objects such as baseball bats, table legs, or pieces of lumber | 1 | 2 |
People v. Freemangreen2 sentences2018Penal Code section 22210 prohibits possession of "any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slungshot." In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ( Grubb ), our Supreme Court rejected a constitutional vagueness challenge to the term "billy" under former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). 3 The defendant in Grubb , convicted of possessing an altered baseball bat, argued that the term "billy" was unconstitutionally vague because it encompassed objects such as baseball bats, table legs, or pieces of lumber 2018Penal Code section 22210 prohibits possession of "any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a billy, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub, sap, or slungshot." In People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ( Grubb ), our Supreme Court rejected a constitutional vagueness challenge to the term "billy" under former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). 3 The defendant in Grubb , convicted of possessing an altered baseball bat, argued that the term "billy" was unconstitutionally vague because it encompassed objects such as baseball bats, table legs, or pieces of lumber | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ledesmagreen1 sentence2022Under both Constitutions, due process of law in this context requires two elements: a criminal statute must "'be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt.""" (People v. Mclnnis (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 853 , 858 (Mclnnis).) In People v. Ledesma (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 830, 839-840 (Ledesma), a panel of this court rejected a similar constitutional vagueness challenge to a conviction for aggravated kidnapping in violation of section 209, subdivision (b). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gardeleygreen2 sentences2004As we observed in Lopez , the California Supreme Court in People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 622-623 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 , 927 P.2d 713 ] upheld section 186.22, subdivisions (e) and (f), against a constitutional vagueness challenge, concluding that the statute sufficiently informs the public of what is a criminal street gang. 2004As we observed in Lopez , the California Supreme Court in People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 622-623 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 , 927 P.2d 713 ] upheld section 186.22, subdivisions (e) and (f), against a constitutional vagueness challenge, concluding that the statute sufficiently informs the public of what is a criminal street gang. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castenadagreen2 sentences2004(Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) Under both the federal and the state Constitutions, vagueness invalidates a criminal statute if the statute “ ‘fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits . . .’ ” or if it “ ‘may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 , 3 P.3d 278 ]; see also Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) *939 We faced a constitutional vag 2004(Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) Under both the federal and the state Constitutions, vagueness invalidates a criminal statute if the statute “ ‘fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits . . .’ ” or if it “ ‘may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 , 3 P.3d 278 ]; see also Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) *939 We faced a constitutional vag | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2004(Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) Under both the federal and the state Constitutions, vagueness invalidates a criminal statute if the statute “ ‘fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits . . .’ ” or if it “ ‘may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 , 3 P.3d 278 ]; see also Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) *939 We faced a constitutional vag 2004(Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) Under both the federal and the state Constitutions, vagueness invalidates a criminal statute if the statute “ ‘fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits . . .’ ” or if it “ ‘may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 , 3 P.3d 278 ]; see also Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) *939 We faced a constitutional vag | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Garcettigreen2 sentences2004(Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) Under both the federal and the state Constitutions, vagueness invalidates a criminal statute if the statute “ ‘fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits . . .’ ” or if it “ ‘may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 , 3 P.3d 278 ]; see also Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) *939 We faced a constitutional vag 2004(Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 , 853 P.2d 507 ].) Under both the federal and the state Constitutions, vagueness invalidates a criminal statute if the statute “ ‘fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits . . .’ ” or if it “ ‘may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 , 3 P.3d 278 ]; see also Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) *939 We faced a constitutional vag | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Sheena K.
green
2 sentences2023(In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 887–888 (Sheena K.).) “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are 8 ‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 890, citing the U.S. Const., 5th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. 2021(People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723 .) To withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness, “[a] probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated . . . .’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 .) In this case, we conclude that condition No. 4 is vague because it is subject to two equally plausible interpretations, leaving defendant to guess at its meaning. | 2 | 2021–2023 |
People v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2019(See, e.g., People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593 , 606, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 , 170 P.3d 129 .) Before Johnson , the apparent need to prove across-the-board vagueness might have been an impediment to raising or applying a constitutional vagueness challenge to the second degree felony-murder law. 2019(See, e.g., People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593 , 606, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 , 170 P.3d 129 .) Before Johnson , the apparent need to prove across-the-board vagueness might have been an impediment to raising or applying a constitutional vagueness challenge to the second degree felony-murder law. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2019(See, e.g., People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606 .) Before Johnson, the apparent need to prove across-the-board vagueness might have been an impediment to raising or applying a constitutional vagueness challenge to the second degree felony-murder law. 2 Johnson considered whether the residual clause was void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Johnson, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2556 ), but the same analysis applies under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, both of which are 5 First degree 2019Johnson considered whether the residual clause was void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ( Johnson , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2556 ), but the same analysis applies under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, both of which are implicated here. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Appleton
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723 .) To withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness, “[a] probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated . . . .’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 .) In this case, we conclude that condition No. 4 is vague because it is subject to two equally plausible interpretations, leaving defendant to guess at its meaning. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Deane
green
2 sentences2018In People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617 , 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 ( King ), our Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's argument that instruments coming within that section never could be possessed lawfully. ( Id . at p. 626, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Citing Grubb , the King court noted that a baseball bat or table leg, each of which has a utilitarian purpose, may qualify as a billy. ( Id . at p. 624, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Thus, "where the object [which qualifies as an unlawful weapon under section 22210 ] may have a legitimate and lawful use," Grubb r 2018In People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617 , 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 ( King ), our Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's argument that instruments coming within that section never could be possessed lawfully. ( Id . at p. 626, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Citing Grubb , the King court noted that a baseball bat or table leg, each of which has a utilitarian purpose, may qualify as a billy. ( Id . at p. 624, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Thus, "where the object [which qualifies as an unlawful weapon under section 22210 ] may have a legitimate and lawful use," Grubb r | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. King
green
2 sentences2018In People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617 , 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 ( King ), our Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's argument that instruments coming within that section never could be possessed lawfully. ( Id . at p. 626, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Citing Grubb , the King court noted that a baseball bat or table leg, each of which has a utilitarian purpose, may qualify as a billy. ( Id . at p. 624, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Thus, "where the object [which qualifies as an unlawful weapon under section 22210 ] may have a legitimate and lawful use," Grubb r 2018In People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617 , 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 ( King ), our Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's argument that instruments coming within that section never could be possessed lawfully. ( Id . at p. 626, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Citing Grubb , the King court noted that a baseball bat or table leg, each of which has a utilitarian purpose, may qualify as a billy. ( Id . at p. 624, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 133 P.3d 636 .) Thus, "where the object [which qualifies as an unlawful weapon under section 22210 ] may have a legitimate and lawful use," Grubb r | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Antonio C.
green
1 sentence2016(Antonio C., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036 .) The court therefore modified the challenged probation condition to read in pertinent part: “[T]he minor shall not . . . obtain any piercings with gang significance or not in compliance with Penal Code section 652, subdivision (a).” (Ibid., italics added.) However, the Antonio C. court never considered whether an express statement of knowledge was necessary to protect this probation condition from a constitutional vagueness challenge. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2016The statute at issue in Caswell, section 647, subdivision (d), makes it a crime for any person to “loiter[] in or about any toilet open to the public for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any unlawful act.” (§ 647, subd. (d); Caswell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 388 .) The Supreme Court recognized that prior cases, including Cregler, had made clear a statute is not impermissibly indefinite because it uses the word “loiter” (Caswell, supra, at p. 390), and the court found that subdivision (d) was sufficiently definite to withstand a constitutional vagueness challenge | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Andreasen
green
1 sentence2015Felony Murder Special Circumstance Defendant argues the felony murder special circumstance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to distinguish between the offense of first degree murder based on a murder committed during the commission or attempted commission of a statutorily- enumerated felony (§ 189), and the special circumstance providing for a sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole when the murder is committed during the commission or attempted commission of a statutorily-enumerated felony. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Defendant recognizes that we have rejected a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Jorge M.
green
2 sentences2001IV Furthermore, contrary to the majority's assertion, this court's decision in In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866 , 98 Cal. Rptr.2d 466 , 4 P.3d 297 lends no support to the majority's reading of the statute. 2001IV Furthermore, contrary to the majority's assertion, this court's decision in In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866 , 98 Cal. Rptr.2d 466 , 4 P.3d 297 lends no support to the majority's reading of the statute. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Falck
green
2 sentences1999In People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ], the court upheld the statute in the face of a constitutional vagueness challenge concerning the term “safety.” In People v. Halgren (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 ], this court found the defintion of the term “credible threat” contained in section 646.9, subdivision (g) is not unconstitutionally vague. 3 Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(a) A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order, and an injunction 1999In People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ], the court upheld the statute in the face of a constitutional vagueness challenge concerning the term “safety.” In People v. Halgren (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 ], this court found the defintion of the term “credible threat” contained in section 646.9, subdivision (g) is not unconstitutionally vague. 3 Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(a) A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order, and an injunction | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Halgren
green
2 sentences1999In People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ], the court upheld the statute in the face of a constitutional vagueness challenge concerning the term “safety.” In People v. Halgren (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 ], this court found the defintion of the term “credible threat” contained in section 646.9, subdivision (g) is not unconstitutionally vague. 3 Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(a) A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order, and an injunction 1999In People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ], the court upheld the statute in the face of a constitutional vagueness challenge concerning the term “safety.” In People v. Halgren (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 ], this court found the defintion of the term “credible threat” contained in section 646.9, subdivision (g) is not unconstitutionally vague. 3 Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(a) A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order, and an injunction | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Pringle v. City of Covina
green
2 sentences1989Under the somewhat indefinite "regular and substantial course of conduct" standard proposed by the majority, an ordinary theater (see, e.g., Pringle, supra, 115 Cal. App.3d at p. 153 & fn. 1), which in good faith wishes to comply with the law, may have difficulty in determining whether it may show a popular, nonobscene — but sexually explicit — film once a week, once a month, or even once every two months without facing criminal charges of having turned its theater into a prohibited "adult motion picture theater." Even if the majority's proposed standard is sufficiently definite to survive a c 1989Under the somewhat indefinite “regular and substantial course of conduct” standard proposed by the majority, an ordinary theater (see, e.g., Pringle, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 153 & fn. 1), which in good faith wishes to comply with the law, may have difficulty in determining whether it may show a popular, nonobscene—but sexually explicit—film once a week, once a month, or even once every two months without facing criminal charges of having turned its theater into a prohibited “adult motion picture theater.” Even if the majority’s proposed standard is sufficiently definite to survive a consti | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.