federal contract clause in California

2003The court explained that "[c]ourts construe constitutional phrases liberally and practically; where possible they avoid a literalism that effects absurd, arbitrary, or unintended results." ( Carman, supra, at p. 327 , 182 Cal.Rptr. 506 , 644 P.2d 192 .) It then based its conclusion the pension plan was unobjectionable on two bases: "Subdivision (b)'s focus on voter approval implies a concern that irrevocable, long-term obligations, solemnly approved by local electorates and entered on faith in taxing powers then available, not be frustrated by a revolutionary tax limitation imposed from outsid

2003The court explained that “[c]ourts construe constitutional phrases liberally and practically; where possible they avoid a literalism that effects absurd, arbitrary, or unintended results.” (Carman, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 327 .) It then based its conclusion the pension plan was unobjectionable on two bases: “Subdivision (b)’s focus on voter approval implies a concern that irrevocable, long-term obligations, solemnly approved by local electorates and entered on faith in taxing powers then available, not be frustrated by a revolutionary tax limitation imposed from outside the community. [Citation

2002Article I, section 9 of the California Constitution contains a similar clause providing that a “law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.” Generally, a public employee’s right to compensation, once vested, “cannot be eliminated without unconstitutionally impairing the contract obligation,” and “[wjhen agreements of employment between the state and public employees have been adopted by governing bodies, such agreements *229 are binding and constitutionally protected.” (Olson v. Cory, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 538 .) In interpreting the state contract clause, California courts ha

2002Article I, section 9 of the California Constitution contains a similar clause providing that a "law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed." Generally, a public employee's right to compensation, once vested, "cannot be eliminated without unconstitutionally impairing the contract obligation," and that "[w]hen agreements of employment between the state and public employees have been adopted by governing bodies, such agreements are binding and constitutionally protected." ( Olson v. Cory, supra 27 Cal.3d at p. 538 , 178 Cal. Rptr. 568 , 636 P.2d 532 .) In interpreting the state c

1978I, § 10) applies only to a "substantial impairment of a contractual relationship." ( Id., at p. 244 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 736 ].) In the absence of a factual record disclosing any present, specific and substantial impairment of contract attributable to the adoption of article XIII A, we must reject petitioners' impairment of contract challenge because it is premature. *242 A second defect in the impairment argument relates to petitioners' standing to assert the claim.

1978I, § 10) applies only to a “substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” (Id., at p. 244 [ 57 L.Ed.2d at p. 736 ].) In the absence of a factual record disclosing any present, specific and substantial impairment of contract attributable to the adoption of article XIII A, we must reject petitioners’ impairment of contract challenge because it is premature.

2019(McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd. (1st Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 12, 17 ; see ibid. [characterizing this view as “fairly well settled” and “applied repeatedly to state and municipal pension plans”]; see also Moro v. State (Or. 2015) 351 P.3d 1, 20-21 ; Taylor v. City of Gadsden (11th Cir. 2014) 767 F.3d 1124, 1134 ; State ex rel.

2019(United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey (1977) 431 U.S. 1 (United States Trust).) In this context, the term “vested right” has come to refer to the terms and conditions of public employment that are protected from impairment by the constitutional contract clause.

2016In sum, defendant has failed to show the retroactive application of amended section 1203.4 to his motion violated the federal contract clause. 10 Although Doe examined only the law of contract interpretation (Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 66 ), defendant discusses the opinion with respect to his contract clause challenge to the court’s order. 11 Doe explained, however, that “despite the general rule, the facts and circumstances of a particular plea agreement might give rise to an implicit promise that the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the law” and that “[w]hether such an understan

2016In sum, defendant has failed to show the retroactive application of amended section 1203.4 to his motion violated the federal contract clause. 10 Although Doe examined only the law of contract interpretation (Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 66 ), defendant discusses the opinion with respect to his contract clause challenge to the court’s order. 11 Doe explained, however, that “despite the general rule, the facts and circumstances of a particular plea agreement might give rise to an implicit promise that the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the law” and that “[w]hether such an understan

2016In sum, defendant has failed to show the retroactive application of amended section 1203.4 to his motion violated the federal contract clause. 10 Although Doe examined only the law of contract interpretation (Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 66 ), defendant discusses the opinion with respect to his contract clause challenge to the court’s order. 11 Doe explained, however, that “despite the general rule, the facts and circumstances of a particular plea agreement might give rise to an implicit promise that the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the law” and that “[w]hether such an understan

2006He relies on Barrett v. Dawson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1048 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 899 ], in which the issue was whether a retroactive statute impaired the right to contract.

2006He relies on Barrett v. Dawson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1048 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 899 ], in which the issue was whether a retroactive statute impaired the right to contract.

1994Thus here, . . . there was a ‘severe, permanent, and immediate change’ in petitioners’ rights under the contract [citation] and it cannot be said that ‘[the] measure taken . . . was a mild one . . . hardly burdensome’ to petitioners. [Citation.]” (23 Cal.3d at pp. 308-309.) “Since the statute accomplishes a severe impairment of petitioners’ contractual rights, the ‘height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear’ is elevated and ‘a careful examination of . . . [its] nature and purpose’ is required. [Citations.] “[S]ection 16281 declares that the salary limitation was intended by the Legi

1994Thus here, ... there was a `severe, permanent, and immediate change' in petitioners' rights under the contract [citation] and it cannot be said that `[the] measure taken ... was a mild one... hardly burdensome' to petitioners. [Citation.]" (23 Cal.3d at pp. 308-309.) "Since the statute accomplishes a severe impairment of petitioners' contractual rights, the `height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear' is elevated and `a careful examination of ... [its] nature and purpose' is required. [Citations.] "[S]ection 16281 declares that the salary limitation was intended by the Legislature t

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848) “pl

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848) “pl

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal. App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal. Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal *534 acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 8

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848) “pl

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848) “pl

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848) “pl

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal. App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal. Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal *534 acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 8

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848) “pl

1991"Pension rights, unlike tenure of civil service employment, are deferred compensation earned immediately upon the performance of services for a public employer `[and] cannot be destroyed ... without impairing a contractual obligation....' [Citation.]" ( 18 Cal.3d at p. 814 .) Decisions of this court have assumed the federal contract clause protects the vested pension rights of public officers.

1991“Pension rights, unlike tenure of civil service employment, are deferred compensation earned immediately upon the performance of services for a public employer ‘[and] cannot be destroyed . . . without impairing a contractual obligation. . . .’ [Citation.]” ( 18 Cal.3d at p. 814 .) Decisions of this court have assumed the federal contract clause protects the vested pension rights of public officers.

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal. App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal. Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal *534 acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 8

1991(See also Allen v. Board of Administration, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 119 .) In Lyon v. Flournoy (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 774 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 274 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 465 , 90 S.Ct. 564 ], a case likewise involving the rights of a state public official, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the federal rule limiting federal contract clause protection for discharged state public officers (citing Dodge v. Board of Education, supra, 302 U.S. 74 ), and further observed that the public employee pension decisions of this court (e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, supra, 29 Cal.2d 848) “pl

1983In Carman , the city, as here, argued “that article XIII A, if construed to repeal City’s special pension tax, might so impair pension rights as to violate the federal contract clause,” and the court observed that “[substantial issues of that nature” were present, reasoning as follows; “Cases have held that when a municipality was authorized to contract and to levy a corresponding tax, the tax power could not be revoked until the contract was fulfilled. [Citations.] This court has said that ‘[t]he pension provisions of a city charter or ordinance form an integral part of the employment contrac

1982(See County of Shasta, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d 30 ; see also, discussion post, pp. 332-333.) As we have seen, “any Í indebtedness” can include all obligations to pay money, whether or not evidenced by bonds, notes, or security.

1982(Cf. Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) ante, pp. 197, 202-204 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 643 P.2d 941 ].) It also implies a recognition that failure to create a “prior debt” exception might lead to problems under the federal contract clause.

1982(Cf. Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) ante, pp. 197, 202-204 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 643 P.2d 941 ].) It also implies a recognition that failure to create a “prior debt” exception might lead to problems under the federal contract clause.