listing factors in California

2016“We hold that a proper instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence. [¶] The instruction should not take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological factors listed.” (Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1141 .) Further, “the listing of factors to be considered by the jury will sufficiently bring to the jury’s attention the appropriate factors, and . . . an explanation o

2014Such an instruction would improperly invade the domain of the jury, and confuse the roles of expert witnesses and the judge.” (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1141 (Wright), original italics.) “We conclude that the listing of factors to be considered by the jury will sufficiently bring to the jury's attention the appropriate factors, and that an explanation of the effects of those factors is best left to argument by counsel, cross-examination of the eyewitnesses, and expert testimony where appropriate.

2016“We hold that a proper instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence. [¶] The instruction should not take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological factors listed.” (Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1141 .) Further, “the listing of factors to be considered by the jury will sufficiently bring to the jury’s attention the appropriate factors, and . . . an explanation o

2013In People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1230-1231 (Johnson), the California Supreme Court first noted that “CALJIC No. 2.92 normally provides sufficient guidance on the subject of eyewitness identification factors.” The Court then held that the jury was properly instructed on the “certainty” factor with CALJIC No. 2.92 notwithstanding the defense‟s uncontroverted expert testimony that a witness‟s certainty in an identification did not positively correlate with its accuracy.

2025(See Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 700, fn. 26 [“the California Constitution’s separation of powers clause precludes any branch from usurping or improperly interfering with the essential operations of either of the other two branches”].) 2 unenumerated aggravating factors was already contemplated by rule 4.408, which provides in relevant part: “The listing of factors in these rules for making discretionary sentencing decisions is not exhaustive and does not prohibit a trial judge from using additional criteria reasonably related to the decision being made.” (Rule 4.408(a);

2025(People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 552 [“Only one criterion or factor in aggravation is necessary to support a consecutive sentence”].) Therefore, rule 4.425 acts as a guideline for the trial court and not a requirement: “[f]actors affecting the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences include . . . .” (Rule 4.425; see People v. Calderon (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 82 , 86–87 [“[the factors in rule 4.425] are guidelines, not rigid rules courts are bound to apply in every case”].) Moreover, rule 4.408(a) provides: “The listing of factors in these rules for making discretio

2025(See Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 700, fn. 26 [“the California Constitution’s separation of powers clause precludes any branch from usurping or improperly interfering with the essential operations of either of the other two branches”].) 2 unenumerated aggravating factors was already contemplated by rule 4.408, which provides in relevant part: “The listing of factors in these rules for making discretionary sentencing decisions is not exhaustive and does not prohibit a trial judge from using additional criteria reasonably related to the decision being made.” (Rule 4.408(a);

2025(See People v. Camp, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 467 ; People v. Stuckey (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 898, 916 [“What the interests of justice require in a particular case constitutes a question uniquely addressed to the broad judicial discretion of the trial court”]; accord, People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 179 ; see also § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(A).) DISPOSITION The judgments are affirmed. /s/ EARL, P. J.

2025(See People v. Camp, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 467 ; People v. Stuckey (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 898, 916 [“What the interests of justice require in a particular case constitutes a question uniquely addressed to the broad judicial discretion of the trial court”]; accord, People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 179 ; see also § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(A).) DISPOSITION The judgments are affirmed. /s/ EARL, P. J.

2025(People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 552 [“Only one criterion or factor in aggravation is necessary to support a consecutive sentence”].) Therefore, rule 4.425 acts as a guideline for the trial court and not a requirement: “[f]actors affecting the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences include . . . .” (Rule 4.425; see People v. Calderon (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 82 , 86–87 [“[the factors in rule 4.425] are guidelines, not rigid rules courts are bound to apply in every case”].) Moreover, rule 4.408(a) provides: “The listing of factors in these rules for making discretio

2022(Garment Workers Center, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.) Listing factors a court should consider before granting discovery, the Court of Appeal stated, “if it appears from the SLAPP motion there are significant issues as to falsity or publication—issues which the plaintiff should be able to establish without discovery—the court should consider resolving those issues before permitting what may otherwise turn out to be unnecessary, expensive and burdensome discovery proceedings” on the issue of actual malice.

2020The Kaulick court concluded the statute’s inclusion of factors for the court to consider in making the finding of dangerousness required information that would be in the possession of the prosecutor and not otherwise available to the court, including the petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation, and therefore “[e]ven if the statutory language did not expressly contemplate a hearing, one is implied by the listing of factors which the court is to take into account in its determination of the dangerousness issue.” (Kaulick, at p. 1297, fn. omitted; see People v. Bradford (201

2020The Kaulick court concluded the statute’s inclusion of factors for the court to consider in making the finding of dangerousness required information that would be in the possession of the prosecutor and not otherwise available to the court, including the petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation, and therefore “[e]ven if the statutory language did not expressly contemplate a hearing, one is implied by the listing of factors which the court is to take into account in its determination of the dangerousness issue.” (Kaulick, at p. 1297, fn. omitted; see People v. Bradford (201

1988(People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s listing of the factors during closing argument misled the jury by causing it to consider as aggravating evidence the absence of mitigating factors that were inapplicable to this case.

1988(People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s listing of the factors during closing argument misled the jury by causing it to consider as aggravating evidence the absence of mitigating factors that were inapplicable to this case.

1987(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 408(a); People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 671 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 155 ].) In any event, the gist of the court’s comments focus on Charron’s planning and sophistication in carrying out the scam.

1987(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 408(a); People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 671 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 155 ].) In any event, the gist of the court’s comments focus on Charron’s planning and sophistication in carrying out the scam.

1976Early, Jr., Co. v. County Sanitation Dist. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 505, 507-508 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 633 ] [construing former § 4104, now § 4107].) By designating both itself and appellant on the same line in the designation of subcontractors, respondent frustrated the purpose of the listing requirement of the act.

1976Early, Jr., Co. v. County Sanitation Dist. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 505, 507-508 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 633 ] [construing former § 4104, now § 4107].) By designating both itself and appellant on the same line in the designation of subcontractors, respondent frustrated the purpose of the listing requirement of the act.