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14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jorgensen v. Jorgensengreen2 sentences1952The reason for this is stated by the Supreme Court in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13 , at page 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ], as follows: “The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata *236 that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment, even though a party has persuaded the court or the jury by false allegations supported by perjured testimony. 1952The reason for this is stated by the Supreme Court in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13 , at page 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ], as follows: “The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata *236 that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment, even though a party has persuaded the court or the jury by false allegations supported by perjured testimony. | 4 | 5 |
Bacon v. Bacongreen2 sentences1966(Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal.477, 491 [ 89 P. 317 ]; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321 [ 163 P.2d 439 ].) ‘The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment. . . . 1956(Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477, 491 [ 89 P. 317 ]; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321 [ 163 P.2d 439 ].) “The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment. . . . | 2 | 3 |
Howard v. Howardgreen2 sentences1966(Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal.477, 491 [ 89 P. 317 ]; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321 [ 163 P.2d 439 ].) ‘The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment. . . . 1966(Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal.477, 491 [ 89 P. 317 ]; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321 [ 163 P.2d 439 ].) ‘The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment. . . . | 2 | 3 |
Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.green2 sentences2015(Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260-1261 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 ].) Still others consider whether the practice is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers [,] . . . weigh[ing] the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” (Id. at p. 1260.) Here, defendants argue plaintiff’s attempt to enforce their guaranties after pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure was both unfair and unlawful under the so-called “one-action rule,” which provides that there can be but one form of action for 2015(Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260-1261 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 ].) Still others consider whether the practice is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers [,] . . . weigh[ing] the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” (Id. at p. 1260.) Here, defendants argue plaintiff’s attempt to enforce their guaranties after pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure was both unfair and unlawful under the so-called “one-action rule,” which provides that there can be but one form of action for | 1 | 1 |
Camacho v. AUTO. CLUB OF SO. CALIFORNIAgreen2 sentences2015(Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 ].) Others require the public policy underlying the claim be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions. 2015(Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 ].) Others require the public policy underlying the claim be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions. | 1 | 1 |
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalizationgreen2 sentences1999It relies for that proposition on Garg , the authorities on which the Court of Appeal relied there, and the public policy underlying the bar to pre-payment litigation—the need “to allow revenue collection to continue during litigation so that essential public services dependent on the funds are not unnecessarily interrupted.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 277, 283 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 611 P.2d 463 ].) *323 The difficulty with the Board’s argument is that article XIII, section 32 unambiguously states that an action may be maintained after payment of 1999It relies for that proposition on Garg , the authorities on which the Court of Appeal relied there, and the public policy underlying the bar to pre-payment litigation—the need “to allow revenue collection to continue during litigation so that essential public services dependent on the funds are not unnecessarily interrupted.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 277, 283 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 611 P.2d 463 ].) *323 The difficulty with the Board’s argument is that article XIII, section 32 unambiguously states that an action may be maintained after payment of | 1 | 1 |
Chun v. Chungreen2 sentences1995The duty to support children of any age is legislatively designed “to protect the public from the burden of supporting a person who has a parent . . . able to support him or her.” {Chun v. Chun (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 589, 594 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 553 ]; see also In re Marriage of Ayo, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 451 [“[T]he clear and strong policy of this state [is] that a parent must support his children.”].) We are aware that the stipulation between Lambe and Meehan was approved by their counsel and ratified by a superior court judge. 1995The duty to support children of any age is legislatively designed “to protect the public from the burden of supporting a person who has a parent . . . able to support him or her.” {Chun v. Chun (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 589, 594 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 553 ]; see also In re Marriage of Ayo, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 451 [“[T]he clear and strong policy of this state [is] that a parent must support his children.”].) We are aware that the stipulation between Lambe and Meehan was approved by their counsel and ratified by a superior court judge. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Ayogreen1 sentence1995The duty to support children of any age is legislatively designed “to protect the public from the burden of supporting a person who has a parent . . . able to support him or her.” {Chun v. Chun (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 589, 594 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 553 ]; see also In re Marriage of Ayo, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 451 [“[T]he clear and strong policy of this state [is] that a parent must support his children.”].) We are aware that the stipulation between Lambe and Meehan was approved by their counsel and ratified by a superior court judge. | 1 | 1 |
Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc.green2 sentences1988(Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375, 380 ; Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 576 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 592 ].) The complaint alleged that defendants had made no appearance at the court hearing they had requested. 1988(Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375, 380 ; Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 576 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 592 ].) The complaint alleged that defendants had made no appearance at the court hearing they had requested. | 1 | 1 |
Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1977The reason therefor is to avoid unseemly dispute between counsel over purported waiver of the statutory requirements. ( Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 333, 340 [ 219 P. 1006 ].) Plaintiff argues the Supreme Court's decision in Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 [ 96 Cal. Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 ] dictates the application of an estoppel doctrine to the conduct between plaintiff and defense counsel. 1977The reason therefor is to avoid unseemly dispute between counsel over purported waiver of the statutory requirements. ( Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 333, 340 [ 219 P. 1006 ].) Plaintiff argues the Supreme Court's decision in Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 [ 96 Cal. Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 ] dictates the application of an estoppel doctrine to the conduct between plaintiff and defense counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Cookgreen2 sentences1960The rule is not that a judgment which is void will be enforced as if it were valid, but that it cannot be shown to be void except in certain ways. *864 And if the parties admit or stipulate, or fail to object to the evidence of, the facts showing a lack of jurisdiction, it is then established that the judgment is void as effectively as shown by the record; and whenever such fad is brought to the attention of the court, it is the duty of the court to so declare as a matter of law.’ (Italics supplied.) “In Thompson v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569 [ 127 P.2d 909 ], the Supreme Court states the rule a 1960The rule is not that a judgment which is void will be enforced as if it were valid, but that it cannot be shown to be void except in certain ways. *864 And if the parties admit or stipulate, or fail to object to the evidence of, the facts showing a lack of jurisdiction, it is then established that the judgment is void as effectively as shown by the record; and whenever such fad is brought to the attention of the court, it is the duty of the court to so declare as a matter of law.’ (Italics supplied.) “In Thompson v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569 [ 127 P.2d 909 ], the Supreme Court states the rule a | 1 | 1 |
Brockway Land & Water Co. v. County of Placergreen2 sentences1960In the present ease, the findings establish the fact that there was no service of summons upon or authorized appearance by the defendant.” Brockway etc. Co. v. County of Placer, 124 Cal.App.2d 371, 376 [ 268 P.2d 524 ] : “In 15 California Jurisprudence, pages 61, 62, it is said: ‘The public policy underlying the doctrine of collateral attack is not such as to prevent the interested parties from waiving the protection of the rule limiting collateral inquiries to the face of the record. 1960In the present ease, the findings establish the fact that there was no service of summons upon or authorized appearance by the defendant.” Brockway etc. Co. v. County of Placer, 124 Cal.App.2d 371, 376 [ 268 P.2d 524 ] : “In 15 California Jurisprudence, pages 61, 62, it is said: ‘The public policy underlying the doctrine of collateral attack is not such as to prevent the interested parties from waiving the protection of the rule limiting collateral inquiries to the face of the record. | 1 | 1 |
Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1958This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case.’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 235 [ 293 P.2d 778 ].) To the same effect, see Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 235 [ 44 P.2d 562 , 99 A.L.R. 990 ]; Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 240 P.2d 993 ]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal.App.2d 364, 369-370 [ 255 P.2d 843 ]. *770 An examination of later rulings of the Supreme Court ind 1958This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case.’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 235 [ 293 P.2d 778 ].) To the same effect, see Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 235 [ 44 P.2d 562 , 99 A.L.R. 990 ]; Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 240 P.2d 993 ]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal.App.2d 364, 369-370 [ 255 P.2d 843 ]. *770 An examination of later rulings of the Supreme Court ind | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Spinosagreen2 sentences1958This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case.’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 235 [ 293 P.2d 778 ].) To the same effect, see Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 235 [ 44 P.2d 562 , 99 A.L.R. 990 ]; Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 240 P.2d 993 ]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal.App.2d 364, 369-370 [ 255 P.2d 843 ]. *770 An examination of later rulings of the Supreme Court ind 1958This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case.’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 235 [ 293 P.2d 778 ].) To the same effect, see Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 235 [ 44 P.2d 562 , 99 A.L.R. 990 ]; Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 240 P.2d 993 ]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal.App.2d 364, 369-370 [ 255 P.2d 843 ]. *770 An examination of later rulings of the Supreme Court ind | 1 | 1 |
Guardianship of Di Carlogreen2 sentences1958This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case.’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 235 [ 293 P.2d 778 ].) To the same effect, see Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 235 [ 44 P.2d 562 , 99 A.L.R. 990 ]; Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 240 P.2d 993 ]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal.App.2d 364, 369-370 [ 255 P.2d 843 ]. *770 An examination of later rulings of the Supreme Court ind 1958This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case.’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 235 [ 293 P.2d 778 ].) To the same effect, see Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 235 [ 44 P.2d 562 , 99 A.L.R. 990 ]; Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 240 P.2d 993 ]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal.App.2d 364, 369-370 [ 255 P.2d 843 ]. *770 An examination of later rulings of the Supreme Court ind | 1 | 1 |
Greenfield v. Mathergreen2 sentences1958In such cases it will not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or important considerations of policy.” (Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal.2d 23, 35 [ 194 P.2d 1 ].) “ ‘The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment. . . . 1958In such cases it will not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or important considerations of policy.” (Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal.2d 23, 35 [ 194 P.2d 1 ].) “ ‘The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a case be set at rest by a final judgment. . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Charters
green
2 sentences1966This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case. ’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, supra, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 234-235.) The enedavor of the attorneys to defend their actions throughout this litigation is no doubt due to the insistence of their client, Moran. 1958This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case.’ (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].)” (Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 , 235 [ 293 P.2d 778 ].) To the same effect, see Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 235 [ 44 P.2d 562 , 99 A.L.R. 990 ]; Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 240 P.2d 993 ]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal.App.2d 364, 369-370 [ 255 P.2d 843 ]. *770 An examination of later rulings of the Supreme Court ind | 2 | 1958–1966 |
In Re Marriage of Rothrock
green
1 sentence2016(In re Marriage of Rothrock (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 223, 230 .) Here, the trial court clearly did not exceed the bounds of reason by finding Virginia’s circumstances insufficient to outweigh the public policy underlying the presumption.3 3 In her reply brief, Virginia argues that the court failed to give her the opportunity to rebut the presumption by presenting evidence of Cesar’s domestic violence against her. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Chiu
red
2 sentences2015A primary rationale for punishing such aiders and abettors – to deter them from aiding or encouraging the commission of offenses – is served by holding them culpable for the perpetrator’s commission of the nontarget offense of second degree murder. [Citation.]” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 165 .) The Court further concluded, however, that “this same public policy concern loses its force in the context of a defendant’s liability as an aider and abettor of a first degree premeditated murder. 2015It imposes vicarious liability for any offense committed by the direct perpetrator that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. [Citation.] Because the nontarget offense is unintended, the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to that offense is irrelevant and culpability is imposed simply because a reasonable person could have foreseen the commission of the nontarget crime.’ [Citation.]” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 164 .) The Court also described the public policy underlying the doctrine: “In the context of murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrin | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Albertson v. Raboff
red
1 sentence1988(Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375, 380 ; Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 576 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 592 ].) The complaint alleged that defendants had made no appearance at the court hearing they had requested. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder
red
1 sentence1988(Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d 893, 897 .) Nor can it be said that, in holding the absolute privilege inapplicable to the statements here, we are depriving defendants of freedom of access to the courts to secure and defend their rights, which is the public policy underlying the privilege. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1977The reason therefor is to avoid unseemly dispute between counsel over purported waiver of the statutory requirements. ( Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 333, 340 [ 219 P. 1006 ].) Plaintiff argues the Supreme Court's decision in Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 [ 96 Cal. Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 ] dictates the application of an estoppel doctrine to the conduct between plaintiff and defense counsel. 1977The reason therefor is to avoid unseemly dispute between counsel over purported waiver of the statutory requirements. ( Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 333, 340 [ 219 P. 1006 ].) Plaintiff argues the Supreme Court's decision in Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 [ 96 Cal. Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 ] dictates the application of an estoppel doctrine to the conduct between plaintiff and defense counsel. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Roos v. Harris
green
1 sentence1971Thus, as observed in Babb : “Furthermore, the rule tends to eliminate unnecessary litigation, for a defendant who loses in the principle action will not institute a malicious prosecution suit, since the adverse judgment operates to establish conclusively that the plaintiff had probable cause.” ( 3 Cal.3d at p. 847 ; also Roos v. Harris, supra, 203 Cal. at p. 202 .) *640 Moreover, we have examined the foreign cases cited by plaintiffs and find that they do not support the rule contended for. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Jaffe v. Stone
green
1 sentence1971(Babb v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 846-848.) In this connection, we note that while the theory most often cited as underlying the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the absence of probable cause (see Babb v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 846 , Jaffe v. Stone, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 150 ), the requirement is, in a case such as this, founded upon another, and perhaps more significant, basis, to wit, the doctrine of finality of judgments and the public policy underlying that doctrine. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Babb v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1971(Babb v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 846-848.) In this connection, we note that while the theory most often cited as underlying the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the absence of probable cause (see Babb v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 846 , Jaffe v. Stone, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 150 ), the requirement is, in a case such as this, founded upon another, and perhaps more significant, basis, to wit, the doctrine of finality of judgments and the public policy underlying that doctrine. 1971(Babb v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 846-848.) In this connection, we note that while the theory most often cited as underlying the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the absence of probable cause (see Babb v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 846 , Jaffe v. Stone, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 150 ), the requirement is, in a case such as this, founded upon another, and perhaps more significant, basis, to wit, the doctrine of finality of judgments and the public policy underlying that doctrine. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.